Sarkis Kassarjian
Turkey has long sought to realize its vision of a “Turkey free of terrorism,” but this ambition collides with the complex realities along its southern border. Despite years of military operations in northern Syria, Ankara has failed to eliminate the presence of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a force many Syrian Kurds, and other opponents of Islamist centralism, view as existential to their survival.
The challenge extends beyond Syria’s geography into Turkey’s domestic arena. Peace efforts face serious internal obstacles. Opposition parties such as the Good Party, Homeland Party, and Victory Party exploit anti-Kurdish sentiment, warning against any “concessions” on Syria.
Military campaigns cost Turkey an estimated $15.6 billion annually, draining its already fragile economy. Critics argue this money could instead support development in Turkey’s southeast, where unemployment reaches 28%, fuelling resentment among Kurdish youth.
Iraq’s Model as Inspiration
Ankara once viewed Iraq’s Kurdistan Region as an enemy. Today, it is a partner, bound by mutual oil trade, political cooperation, and security ties. Many Turkish voices now suggest a similar formula may be possible with the SDF in Syria.
Proposals include creating joint economic zones along the border to generate jobs and reduce the appeal of armed groups. Others envision extending Ankara’s pipeline projects to link Kurdish energy interests with Turkey’s regional energy strategy.
Also read: Kurdish-led SDF and Turkey: Between Political Maturity and Fragile Implementation
The Nationalist Opening
A surprising development has been calls for Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation from the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), one of Turkey’s most hardline parties. Its leader, Devlet Bahçeli, warned that unresolved Kurdish issues, inside Turkey and across the border, would only deepen Ankara’s vulnerabilities.
Bahçeli pointed to the March 10, 2025 Agreement between the Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa and SDF leader Mazloum Abdi, a framework seeking to integrate SDF fighters into the Syrian army and return their territories to Damascus, as a potential key to defusing the crisis.
For Bahçeli, the Kurdish question is not simply a local dispute but a three-dimensional challenge:
- Ideological ties between the PKK in Turkey and the SDF’s backbone, the People’s Protection Units (YPG). Many in Turkey’s DEM Party still treat imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan as a red line, complicating peace.
- Israeli influence, underscored by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s open support for Kurdish self-rule.
- Firm U.S. backing of the SDF as a frontline ally in the war against ISIS.
Regional Tensions
Meanwhile, Israel has escalated its military operations in Syria, moving deeper into its territory and threatening to weaken Turkey’s leverage in the south. Ankara, in turn, has stepped up support for Syria’s transitional government, on condition it pledges to fight “separatist groups.”
Turkey’s hostility toward the SDF is driven by three overlapping concerns:
- SDF control in northern Syria is viewed as a direct security threat due to its alleged PKK ties.
- Ankara claims the SDF acts as a proxy for Israel, adding a geopolitical layer to the conflict.
- Recent unrest in places like Suwayda and Manbij raises fears of Syria’s fragmentation, which Turkey insists it must prevent.
To strength its position, Turkey signed a historic defence pact with Damascus on August 13, 2025, promising joint training, intelligence sharing, and a new operations centre in Gaziantep.
Also read: Syrian Gov and Kurdish SDF: Experts Warn March 10 Agreement Faces Major Challenges
Washington’s Shift
But Ankara may have to recalculate. A new U.S. diplomatic tone has emerged. Thomas Barrack, the U.S. Special Envoy for Syria, stated that the SDF is now “structurally independent” from the PKK, remarks widely seen as an attempt to ease Turkish fears while keeping the SDF as Washington’s key partner against ISIS.
This dual strategy reflects Washington’s balancing act: reassuring Turkey while maintaining a reliable ground force against ISIS. CENTCOM continues its military coordination with the SDF, while the U.S. State Department leans toward cautious engagement with Damascus.
SDF’s Position
For its part, the SDF insists it poses no threat to Turkey. Its leader, Mazloum Abdi, has repeatedly emphasized that the group’s priority is defence, not aggression. The SDF continues to press for decentralized governance and rejects full integration into the Syrian army without guarantees of local autonomy.
Despite Turkish threats of new military operations, practical constraints remain. A direct assault risks U.S. backlash, potential sanctions, and disruption of Turkey’s own outreach to Damascus.
A Pragmatic Opening
Domestic politics also play a role. Ahead of municipal elections, President Erdoğan must balance nationalist rhetoric with the need for regional stability. A long-term strategy of containment, alliances, and limited political engagement now seems more viable than costly wars of attrition.
Reports last month suggested the SDF was exploring fallback options, including alignment with Turkey’s concept of the “Misak-ı Milli” (National Pact), should talks with Damascus fail. While denied by SDF officials, the idea resonates with segments of Turkish society where nationalism and Islamism intersect.
Syria’s fast-moving dynamics show that Turkey and the SDF are no longer locked into permanent confrontation. History of enmity aside, shifting economics, U.S. diplomacy, and regional pragmatism may push both toward a reluctant accommodation.
For Turkey, such an arrangement would secure its borders and ease military strain. For the SDF, it could mean international legitimacy and a pathway to protected autonomy. Unlikely as it once seemed, an Ankara–SDF understanding may turn out to be the least bad option available.
