Syria has received the second and final shipment of the Saudi fuel grant – a total of 1.65 million barrels of crude oil – offering temporary relief to an economy struggling under a severe and prolonged energy shortage. Although the grant provides short-term breathing space, it raises bigger questions about the future of Syria’s energy sector: whether this assistance marks a strategic shift or whether it remains only a brief interruption in the ongoing crisis.
The two shipments arrived at the Baniyas refinery on 17 and 23 November 2025, following a memorandum signed between the Saudi Fund for Development and the Syrian Ministry of Energy. The move carries both economic and political significance, as it supports the electricity and fuel sectors while also reflecting a warming in relations between Damascus and Riyadh after years of tension and the earlier halt of Iranian fuel supplies.
Engineer Mohammed al-Khalil, a former official at the Ministry of Oil, explains to +963 that Syria’s refineries – Baniyas with a design capacity of 120,000 barrels per day and Homs with 100,000 barrels per day – have suffered considerable damage due to the lack of crude and the deterioration of infrastructure. He notes that operating the refineries effectively depends on “a stable and predictable flow of crude”, adding that “any renewed interruption in supplies will take the crisis back to its starting point”.
Al-Khalil adds that Saudi Arabia has not indicated whether it plans to extend or repeat the grant. However, the resumption of crude transportation from areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces towards Damascus provides what he describes as “an internal lifeline” that may reduce short-term dependence on external sources.
Read also: The Syrian Scene Poses a Question: Tourism Before Reconstruction?
Al-Khalil outlines the scale of the gap facing the country. Domestic production stands at only 20,000 to 25,000 barrels per day, while the minimum economic need is between 100,000 and 125,000 barrels per day. This leaves a daily deficit ranging from 80,000 to 100,000 barrels. On this basis, he stresses:
“The Saudi grant, despite its importance, covers only 30 to 45 days of actual consumption by the essential sectors.”
He suggests that Syria faces several potential paths: continued grants – which cannot be guaranteed – an increase in domestic production that would require major investment and regained access to eastern fields, or reliance on commercial imports under difficult financial conditions now that the Iranian credit line has stopped. To navigate the crisis, he recommends encouraging exploration investment, protecting strategic reserves, combating smuggling, expanding renewable energy, and treating energy as a priority within reconstruction plans.
Economist Ali Fallouh tells +963 that the grant immediately eased market pressure, lowering prices in both official and informal markets because of increased supply. Yet, he warns, the effect will be temporary. “We are looking at a short-lived bubble,” he says. “As soon as the stock begins to run low, prices will rise again because there is no permanent source of crude.”
Fallouh adds that part of the grant may be allocated to state electricity and industrial needs, limiting its impact on retail fuel distribution. In his view, the future of prices will depend on the availability of supply, the functioning of the refineries, and broader regional and global market conditions. He concludes:
“Once the shipments run out, Syria enters a new test in the fuel file. What the country needs now are strategic options – not emergency patches.”
