The concept of the “deep state” has long been present in political debates about Syria and the wider Arab region. It usually refers to an invisible network of security, military and political power that controls the course of the state beyond its official institutions. This network combines hard power, represented by security and military agencies, with soft power provided by alliances with influential businessmen, as well as religious and media institutions that offer it a veneer of legitimacy and morality. In this sense, talk of a deep state in Syria is directly linked to the mechanisms of producing and maintaining authority, both in its early phases and over the past decades, leading up to today’s transitional stage.
However, Tarek Ziad Wahbi, a researcher in international relations in France, argues that this concept does not apply to Syria in the same way it does in other countries. He explains that the deep state, in its classical sense, is usually tied to a strong administrative and bureaucratic apparatus that interacts with political forces and influences decisions beyond the immediate interests of parties or factions, as seen in the United States, France or Germany. The Syrian system, according to Wahbi, was never based on such elites but was instead a thoroughly security- and intelligence-driven system.
He adds that what is happening in Syria today is little more than the influence of foreign advisers from Western or regional states who already possess networks of interests and who seek both to contribute to running state affairs and to secure future privileges in the reconstruction phase. In his view, this represents a distorted version, a “caricature”, of the deep state.
Historical Roots
The historical roots of the deep state in Syria go back to the colonial era. During the French Mandate, real power did not lie with the newly created official institutions but with French officers and local elites linked to them in informal ways. This arrangement planted the seeds of a parallel structure that influenced political and administrative decisions from behind the scenes.
After independence, the essence did not change much, even if the form did. Military figures and security agencies emerged as the real decision-makers, echoing a wider regional pattern in the Arab world where security–military networks replaced civilian elites in leading the state.
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The Assad Era and Institutionalisation of the Deep State
With Hafez al-Assad’s rise to power, Syria entered a clearer phase in the consolidation of a deep state. He restructured the security agencies and the army, binding them into a closed network of economic and political interests. Power became divided among intelligence branches, while official institutions remained a façade. The system entrenched its dominance through continuous emergency rule since 1963, alliances with influential businessmen, and the use of religious institutions to legitimise authority.
This model deepened further under Bashar al-Assad. Security agencies became the central player in running politics, society and the economy. Syrian society came under the grip of a complex security network that monitored daily life and controlled the public sphere, while civilian institutions remained hollow shells without independent capacity.
Brigadier-General Dr Hassan Jouni, a political science professor, notes that Syria was globally exceptional in this respect: there was no gap between the deep state and the visible state. According to him, the security apparatus became synonymous with the state itself, with security leaders representing both the visible face of power and the core of the deep state.
The 2011 Syrian uprising, he adds, marked the beginning of the weakening of this structure, though not its immediate collapse. The security system endured through the years of war but gradually lost control to foreign powers supporting the regime, until the system finally fell in 2023–2024. With it, the security and non-security structures that underpinned governance also collapsed.
Revolution and the Disruption of the Deep State
The 2011 Syrian uprising was a turning point that exposed the fragility of the deep state’s internal structure. Military defections and mass protests shook its foundations. Yet rather than collapsing outright, it was reconstituted in new forms.
The long civil war brought new players into the scene: local armed factions, jihadist groups, regional powers such as Iran and Turkey, and major states like Russia. The deep state was no longer a single entity but became layered with competing interests, making the Syrian landscape even more complex.
The Transitional Phase and the “New Deep State”
With the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, after nearly a quarter-century in power, a new phase began with Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) taking the helm of the transitional authority.
But this shift did not end the idea of a deep state; it reshaped it into what some call a “new deep state” or a “mujahideen state”.
This rests on a network of jihadist factions, foremost among them Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, along with other groups operating under the direct supervision of Turkish intelligence officers. This network influences crucial decisions on government appointments, military moves and social policies, while al-Sharaa’s government provides the formal executive cover.
This model reflects an internal struggle between different Islamist currents: the jihadist Salafi current, which seeks to penetrate state institutions and impose direct control, and the Muslim Brotherhood current, backed by Turkey and Qatar, which pushes for a more pragmatic model of Islamic governance that takes regional and international balances into account. In both cases, ultimate power rests with informal networks operating from the shadows, undermining the transitional authority’s ability to achieve genuine democratic change.
Yet Jouni argues that calling this a deep state is inaccurate, since building such a structure requires time and entrenched institutions. The current transition emerged over the rubble of a collapsed regime, with no continuity or institutional backbone to build on. He believes the new system is being created from scratch across different sectors, and that the real focus should be on the role of foreign states in shaping Syria’s future, either through direct support or through struggles for influence.
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Limits of Internal and External Responsibility
Although al-Sharaa has tried to present himself as a civilian leader, by dissolving the People’s Assembly, repealing the 2012 constitution, integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces, and launching a national dialogue process, real power remains in the hands of armed and security networks outside official frameworks, directly influenced by regional actors.
Here Wahbi insists that the situation cannot truly be described as a deep state in the classical sense. At best, there are partial similarities produced by external involvement. He stresses that the current political authorities bear direct responsibility for the future of Syrians and Syria’s place within the Arab and regional order, as well as in its dealings with “enemies of the Arab world” such as Israel.
He concludes that resolving the crisis is not achieved by blaming foreign advisers alone but by recognising the ruling authorities’ responsibility for setting the country’s course and future.
It can be said that Syria’s experience has gone through two distinct phases: first, under the Assads, when the security apparatus embodied a traditional deep state indistinguishable from the state itself; and second, after 2011, when war and transition produced a more fragmented and fragile picture.
But as both Wahbi and Jouni conclude, the classic notion of a deep state does not apply to Syria today. The current landscape is closer to an overlapping web of interests among local factions, regional powers and international actors. This leaves Syria’s future dependent on whether civilian and political forces can overcome this structure, or else coexist with it within a long-term regional balance of power.
