Relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv have entered a critical phase after an Israeli air strike on senior Hamas figures in Doha. The strike was followed by threats from Israeli officials to pursue Hamas leaders “anywhere in the world”, including Turkey, comments that prompted Ankara to denounce Israel’s actions as “state terrorism”.
The sharp escalation in rhetoric suggests a possible shift from diplomatic friction to something more dangerous. But is this brinkmanship simply a deterrence tactic, or does it risk snowballing into a direct confrontation that could reshape Middle Eastern alliances?
Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant raised the stakes in an interview with the Saudi outlet Elaph, insisting that “anyone linked to Hamas cannot sleep safely anywhere in the world”, a pointed reference to Istanbul, home to senior Hamas members.
Meanwhile, Turkey’s National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) announced it had dismantled a wide-ranging espionage network linked to Mossad. Dozens of suspects were arrested across multiple provinces on charges of tracking political and military activities of foreign nationals,many of them Arab, using encrypted communications, fake websites, and advanced surveillance methods.
In parallel, Ankara unveiled a nationwide civil-defence strategy, including the construction of shelters across all 81 provinces. The plan, shaped by lessons from Japan and Switzerland, was accelerated in the aftermath of the 12-day Israel–Iran conflict earlier this year, reflecting Turkish concerns about potential escalation.
Turkey’s Security Redefined
Turkish political analyst İslam Özkan told +963 that Mossad-linked networks remain a “serious and continuing” threat, illustrating how bilateral tensions have sharpened since October 2023. MIT has already disrupted several Israeli operations, most notably Operation Mole in January 2024, which led to 34 arrests across eight provinces.
In March 2025, MIT exposed another network allegedly led by Istanbul businessman Ahmet Ersin Tömlütçalı, accused of collecting personal data on behalf of Mossad handlers abroad. These networks, Özkan explained, often involve Syrians, Lebanese and Afghans using burner phones, cryptocurrencies and multilingual fake websites to evade counter-intelligence.
The key targets remain Palestinian political figures and students based in Turkey, particularly Hamas leaders. Beyond intelligence-gathering, Özkan argued, Mossad’s strategy includes intimidation campaigns and disinformation operations designed to weaken Hamas’s presence.
He warned that such activities undermine Turkey’s credibility as a safe haven for Palestinians, restrict the mobility of Hamas leaders, and heighten Ankara’s diplomatic friction with Israel. Turkey has hosted around forty Hamas leaders since 2011 and frames its support as solidarity with a “resistance movement”. Yet Israel’s threats of pursuit abroad, coupled with the strike in Doha, have put Ankara in a difficult position.
Turkey’s response has been two-pronged: tightening security in Istanbul and rolling out a new civil-defence programme, including turning metro stations into temporary shelters and strengthening early-warning systems. Still, Özkan rated the ongoing threat as “medium to high”, noting that it drains Turkish security resources even if MIT’s counter-intelligence record remains strong.
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Turkey and Israel: Rivalry or Collision?
For Abdulbaset Sieda, a Syrian academic and politician now based in Sweden, the tensions are less about an imminent clash and more about competing spheres of influence in Syria.
“Turkey shares nearly 900 kilometres of border with Syria, alongside deep demographic ties, security anxieties and the Kurdish question,” he told +963. “It also enjoys broad sympathy among Syrians for opening its borders to refugees. Israel, meanwhile, occupies Syrian territory and openly declares that it will not allow Turkey to replace Iran as the dominant external actor in Syria.”
On Hamas, Sieda argued that the movement has become “a bargaining chip” in wider regional diplomacy rather than merely a bilateral issue between Ankara and Tel Aviv. He suggested that Arab states must reckon with their previous abdication of leadership on the Palestinian issue, as well as with Iran’s expanded role.
He also noted that European engagement with the two-state solution, combined with Washington’s new initiative led by former UK prime minister Tony Blair, could reset regional priorities.
Sieda does not expect a direct war between Turkey and Israel. Instead, he foresees continued rhetorical skirmishes, limited field provocations and media campaigns aimed at consolidating influence. With Turkey entrenched in northern Syria and Israel in the south, both appear focused on legitimising their roles in a fractured Syrian landscape.
