Political participation in the governance of post-conflict Syria has become one of the core requirements of the transitional phase. After the fall of the former regime, the need has grown for a genuine partnership between the country’s political forces and social components, with the aim of overcoming the legacy of unilateral state rule.
Amid mounting political and social pressures – particularly in Suwayda and the Syrian coast – the importance of a participatory approach has come increasingly to the fore. Such a model is seen as essential to creating a stable state, rebuilding trust between society and the authorities, and allowing citizens to influence decision-making, away from monopolisation of power or domination by any single group.
Although a technocratic interim government has been formed, criticism has focused on the appointment process and the absence of a balanced distribution of authority, especially while some sovereign files remain under the control of non-state actors.
Syria must now shift, as interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa has repeatedly argued, from the logic of “revolution” to the logic of “state”. This requires unifying military and security institutions under legitimate national authority and launching comprehensive constitutional and legislative reform to rebalance relations between the centre and the periphery.
Syrian writer and political analyst Darwish Khalifa tells +963 that the current phase has emerged amid regional and international efforts to manage crises that have once again shaken the foundations of Syrian society and the Syrian state. He adds that the security disturbances seen in the coast, Jaramana and Sahnaya, and ultimately in Suwayda, created deep fractures between certain communities and the Syrian government, bringing matters close to a standstill as a result of Israeli intervention and the regionalisation of the Suwayda file in favour of external agendas.
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Managed tension under March agreement
Khalifa notes that the north-east is also experiencing tension, albeit of a contained nature following the 10 March agreement signed between President Al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, under US sponsorship and French follow-up. While the deal helps to curb certain flashpoints in the short term, he stresses that it does not remove the need for a comprehensive solution.
He argues that the stability of any republican system requires both political and popular legitimacy – something that can only be obtained through national consensus or genuine elections that deliver an elected president or a parliament capable of responding to citizens’ demands for improved living conditions. The current authorities may not yet possess a complete vision, he says, yet they are working to define the parameters of a national compact that could rebuild trust between state and society.
Following the Suwayda events, which he interprets as a clear rejection of marginalisation and political monopolisation, Khalifa believes the need for genuine partnership is more urgent than ever. These developments revealed the depth of the rift between society and the governing apparatus, and the refusal of Syrian communities to continue as bystanders or victims.
Khalifa underscores the need to acknowledge significant domestic and external challenges. Internally, radical voices continue to oppose engagement in any inclusive national project. Externally, regional powers pursue their own interests at the expense of Syrian national priorities, while some Israeli officials now behave as though they are custodians of Suwayda’s Druze community – something he sees as an infringement of national sovereignty.
Khalifa argues that the presence of US envoy Thomas Brack carries particular importance in relaying Washington’s position to Damascus and in supporting efforts to resolve internal disputes ahead of a new stage. This stage, he says, encompasses counterterrorism, agreement on the issue of foreign fighters, and the development of a roadmap for shared political participation and decision-making built on voluntary coexistence rather than coercion or emergency measures.
On 13 November, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that Syrians want a national government representing all components of society and providing a sense of safety, adding that “every element of Syrian society will be represented in the Syrian government” and that the United States wishes to give the transitional administration a real opportunity to succeed, so as to avoid civil war. He warned that failure – whether intentional or not – could push Syria into widespread internal conflict, turning the country into an ungovernable space and a platform for extremist organisations and other dangerous actors.
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Partnership as a governmental responsibility
Dr Khaled al-Azzi, professor of international relations and foreign policy, tells +963 that the Syrian government bears responsibility for widening political participation by integrating national elites from all communities, although demographic realities make it impossible for some groups to obtain half of all government positions.
He argues that any future government must include the broadest possible Sunni representation, and that once the constitutional process is initiated, participation will become necessary for all communities – particularly the Sunni majority. Representation today, he insists, must be based on citizenship rather than sectarian affiliation, as sectarian notions of majority and minority have now been overtaken by events.
Al-Azzi maintains that symbolic partnership will not resolve Syria’s political crisis. What is needed is a fundamental solution, beginning with the removal of the “minority” concept that the former regime used as a tool to secure control over the majority. True partnership, he says, lies in future-oriented vision and national production, just as occurred in the early stages of the Syrian revolution when broad social cooperation emerged against the Assad regime – cooperation that should now serve to build a new Syria.
He identifies numerous obstacles, including ethnic and nationalist fragmentation, Iran’s influence and interventions, Israeli attempts to manipulate stability, and Sunni extremism rooted in decades of repression. He argues that Syria’s reintegration into its regional environment, reconstruction, and the return of capital and skilled labour are all necessary steps to achieve comprehensive economic and social development.
According to al-Azzi, Western support is important in shielding Syria from Russian, Iranian and Israeli ambitions, but it will not suffice unless Syria itself builds a strong and stable state capable of protecting its citizens. The return of refugees – particularly those with expertise and investment capacity – is essential to rebuilding industry, tourism and local development.
Al-Azzi concludes that genuine participation is not defined by the distribution of ministerial positions, but by the distribution of development and wealth. Each region – the coast, the Jazira, Hauran, Aleppo – has its own potential contribution to a wider national economy, from tourism and natural resources to agricultural production and foreign trade. The transitional government, he says, is the first step towards a state built on strong political parties and development-focused programmes rather than sectarian loyalties. Governments may change – but the citizen and the state remain – and rights must be guaranteed to individuals rather than sects, as is the case in democratic states such as France and Germany.
