Hussein Omar
I am not easily surprised when the media machine aligned with Damascus – along with some of its regional affiliates in the Gulf and Turkey – rallies around a particular narrative. These outlets are not neutral observers. They function as political instruments, actively shaping public opinion with pre-packaged storylines tailored for both domestic and external consumption.
In recent months, the most aggressively promoted narrative has been the so-called “integration” of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the state’s institutions – presented as a prerequisite for national unity, but without any meaningful reform of the entrenched political and security structures that caused the crisis in the first place.
On the surface, the idea may appear reasonable. It is framed as a pragmatic step toward reconciliation. Yet, it reproduces the very logic that brought Syria to prolonged conflict, risking a new cycle of instability rather than ending the current one.
Negotiations in recent months – direct or mediated – between the Islamic de-facto authority and SDF have never moved beyond vague generalities. They were heralded as breakthroughs, but in truth yielded no strategic progress, only polite statements engineered to satisfy their international sponsors.
The core failure is not accidental – it stems from a deeper conceptual flaw: prioritizing military integration and security arrangements before rebuilding the state itself.
Military integration is not a technical administrative patch. In any functioning state, it is the outcome of a legitimate political framework, a civilian authority, and – crucially – a constitutional foundation that defines the military’s mandate and civilian oversight. Without that framework, integration becomes a coerced absorption into a hollow and unreformed institution, incapable of providing legitimacy or cohesion.
It is astonishing that some actors speak of integrating SDF as if Syria today possesses a constitutional, representative, and legitimate state apparatus into which any force could safely merge. The blunt reality is that Syria, at present, lacks the basic components of a functioning state:
No government that derives legitimacy from the ballot box.
No elected legislature exercising oversight.
No consensual constitution for a pluralistic nation.
No unified, national army under civilian control.
What exists instead is a complicated landscape of armed actors – some nominally affiliated with Damascus, others reliant on foreign patrons.
Under such conditions, “integration” serves as a political tactic rather than a state-building project. It positions Damascus as the conciliatory actor and shifts pressure onto SDF, while sidestepping the fundamental question: institutional reform.
A new, consensual constitution must precede any military integration. Not by choice, but by necessity. A constitution is not merely a legal text – it is the social contract that defines the nature of the state, the distribution of power, and the relationship between authority and citizens.
Without that contract, the army becomes a political instrument rather than a national institution.
A modern constitution would require:
– separation of religion and state, to ensure neutrality
– political and administrative decentralisation, to reduce tensions
– formal recognition of cultural and ethnic diversity
– strict civilian control and oversight of the military
Without such foundations, any attempt to integrate SDF – or any faction – will collapse under the weight of structural contradictions.
SDF is not the root of the problem. The absence of a national, constitutional framework is:
Expecting any force – whether SDF or Turkish-backed armed factions –. to dissolve into institutions that lack legitimacy, representativeness, or accountability is illogical. The problem is not the identity of armed groups, but the void where a state should be.
The realistic path begins where most actors refuse to start: drafting a new, inclusive constitution that defines the state, its governance model, the rule of law, and the military’s role within it. Only after that comes integration, as a natural and technical process – not as political coercion.
Attempting to resolve Syria’s crisis through premature security integration is like trying to build a roof before the walls exist. It ensures collapse.
The way forward is constitutional consensus first — not forced military absorption.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of +963.
