The issue of sectarian and ethnic identity in Syria continues to strongly assert itself amid persistent political, economic, and security crises. Although Syrians lived for decades within a wide spectrum of religious and ethnic diversity, the consequences of war and foreign interventions deepened the turn toward narrow affiliations, viewed as a refuge for social, economic, and political safety. Legal experts and academics agree that such affiliations have emerged as an involuntary option for many Syrians, especially given the prevailing sense of insecurity and the state’s retreat from its role as guarantor of citizenship.
Sectarianism and ethnic affiliations have thus come to express the need for protection in moments of collapse. However, addressing this phenomenon, according to experts, requires a restructuring of Syrian national identity. They emphasize that any future framework must be built on legal and constitutional guarantees that strengthen equality among all components, paving the way for national bonds capable of overcoming narrow divisions and restoring the value of a unifying identity.
Most opinions converge on the notion that building a civil state in Syria cannot succeed if sectarian and ethnic specificities are ignored or denied. Rather, establishing a genuine state of citizenship requires crafting a clear system of rights for minorities, integrating guarantees of political and social participation with legal mechanisms to criminalize sectarian rhetoric that incites violence and hatred. Without such steps, collective fears will remain an obstacle to any inclusive national project.
Despite political constraints and the security reality, civil society remains one of the actors capable of rebuilding the national bond. Initiatives promoting dialogue and a discourse of coexistence are important initial steps. Yet, their success depends on the availability of a more open political and media environment, alongside serious legislative and oversight efforts to reduce sectarian division and strengthen a unifying national identity.
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Safety and the Restructuring of National Identity
Jalal Al-Hamad, a legal expert at Justice for Life, told +963: “Sectarian and ethnic identity is one of the sub-identities of Syrians. The need for it increases or decreases depending on the political, economic, and security situation in the country. We notice that whenever the political crisis deepens and people feel a stronger need for safety, they resort to these sub-identities and narrow affiliations, including sectarian ties.”
He added: “Whether under Ba’ath Party policies over the past 50 years or under current policies across different areas of control, Syrians have been driven toward narrow affiliations in search of safety. Within these affiliations, they find a form of solidarity and support that is difficult to find outside them during such severe crises.”
Al-Hamad further explained: “The war in Syria has heightened the Syrians’ need for safety, whether personal, familial, or economic. As a result, they turned toward narrow affiliations.”
He believes that “there are indications suggesting Syrians can gradually move beyond sectarian affiliations, not in the sense of eliminating them, but by creating bonds that transcend them. This depends on whether each sectarian group feels secure, meaning it is treated equally with other groups, whether sects or ethnicities. If the right conditions are created to make these groups feel they are equal with all Syrians regardless of affiliation, then coexistence through broader bonds becomes possible. This requires instilling a sense of security among these groups.”
He clarified: “This should not be portrayed as a gateway to dividing the country. Rather, it is an essential step toward restructuring Syrian national identity, by combining individual citizenship rights with group rights through a new vision for minority rights. This would significantly pave the way for reintegrating fearful sectarian groups that do not feel safe into the Syrian society as a whole.”
Al-Hamad continued: “Naturally, when people increasingly turn to sectarian and narrow bonds, they become available partners for external interventions pursuing their own interests, whether Iranian, Turkish, Israeli, or others. Such interventions find ready partners precisely because people have drifted away from national bonds toward narrower affiliations, which is the result of complex economic, security, and social factors.”
The Civil State and Sectarian Rights
He further argued: “Building a civil state in Syria is possible, but such a state must not ignore sectarian and ethnic particularities, concerns, and rights. Merely speaking of a civil state and citizenship is not enough for sectarian groups to feel safe. A fundamental pillar of building such a state must be a high sensitivity to sectarian components, beginning with enshrining minority rights in law to enable integration into Syrian society, rather than allowing the law to reinforce division.”
Al-Hamad noted that “civil society is the only actor working to transcend these narrow affiliations, as past and current authorities have pursued the same policy of sowing division among Syrian communities. Civil society alone attempts to restore the national bond, but for it to succeed, other factors must converge, such as media and political management of conflicting parties. These conditions remain absent, limiting civil society’s role thus far.”
For his part, Ahmad Al-Kanani, journalist and lecturer at the Faculty of Media, Damascus University, told +963: “Syrian society is not inherently sectarian despite differences across the geography. On the contrary, it has been a society of coexistence for many years. Even before Ba’ath Party rule, Syria was a multi-sect and multi-ethnic society, governed by diverse political figures. The most prominent historical example is Fares Al-Khoury, a Christian, who delivered sermons at the Umayyad Mosque.”
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Loyalties, Quotas, and the Civil State
Al-Kanani dismissed the notion that the Ba’ath regime relied on sectarianism to reinforce its identity through distributing resources and positions. Rather, he argued that the Ba’ath system depended on loyalties regardless of sect. In practice, those who pledged allegiance to the ruling Alawite leadership obtained privileges, thus strengthening allegiance rather than sectarian belonging.
He added: “The Syrian revolution did not divide the Syrian people along sectarian lines, especially since protesters came from all sects against Assad’s regime, which relied on personal loyalty rather than sectarian belonging. The deposed regime used sectarianism to delegate authoritarian and security powers to specific individuals it trusted personally, rather than on sectarian grounds.”
Al-Kanani noted: “Some people viewed the revolution as sectarian and aimed at one sect, which made certain sects reject it as an existential threat. This perception was fueled by the Ba’ath regime under Bashar Al-Assad, who eventually fled to Moscow.”
He continued: “Foreign interventions played a major role in strengthening sectarian tendencies, particularly Iran and Hezbollah, who armed and funded militias with sectarian affiliations to suppress and kill those demanding freedom. After the militarization of the revolution in 2013, the regime’s introduction of weapons, and the spread of factions, these groups were deployed on sectarian grounds into battles against the defunct regime’s army. Thus, Iran’s intervention deliberately strengthened sectarianism, while Turkey pursued primarily political and strategic aims rather than sectarian ones.”
He concluded: “Building a civil state has become increasingly difficult after recent events in March and July in the coastal and Suwayda regions. Sect has turned into identity, and given international interventions and external support, a civil state will not emerge without at least a quota system, whether through distributing positions on sectarian grounds or managing the state according to components.”
Al-Kanani clarified: “There is a difference between quota systems that grant sects their rightful share in political and administrative participation, which is a legitimate right, and sectarian discourse that must be criminalized by law. Unfortunately, the Ministries of Information and Justice have failed to enact laws that criminalize sectarianism, which allowed such rhetoric to spread among the Syrian public. It has become increasingly sectarian in populist discourse, reaching intellectual elites, where it has taken on separatist, sectarian, and violence-inciting tones.”
He noted: “Several civil society organizations have begun facilitating dialogue sessions to establish foundations for regulating media discourse in Syrian public and private institutions. They are also supporting legislative efforts to criminalize sectarian and hate-inciting rhetoric. There are successful experiences in neighboring countries and Europe, but they require stronger regulatory measures to prevent the use of incitement language.”
