Ahmad Al-Sharaa’s visit to Washington in November 2025 marked a notable moment in the gradual rebuilding of Syrian–American relations. After years of diplomatic rupture, wide-ranging sanctions, and a profound shift in Syria’s political landscape, the trip was widely viewed as a test of whether both governments could redefine their engagement – particularly in southern Syria, where American, Syrian and Israeli security interests converge.
Discussions in Washington focused on potential sanctions relief and the possible repeal of the Caesar Act, alongside Syrian commitments to counter-terrorism cooperation and to a more formal role within the international coalition against ISIS. Although reserved in his public statements, Al-Sharaa appeared intent on a cautious political opening – one designed to stabilise his interim government while protecting Syrian sovereignty along the southern frontier.
In interviews with US media, Al-Sharaa declined to comment directly on the question of potential talks with Israel. He stated that Syria was not ready for direct negotiations, yet he left scope for indirect, US-led channels on specific security matters. Analysts argue that this dual posture – rejecting outright normalisation while permitting limited mediation – suggests that Damascus may be willing to entertain narrow security understandings that do not address core national issues such as the Golan Heights.
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Shifting geopolitical calculations
Firas Mokheimer Yaghi, a Jerusalem-based analyst of Israeli and Palestinian affairs, tells +963 that Al-Sharaa’s “warm and symbolic White House visit – with highly visible gestures – reflects a major geopolitical shift following the fall of the previous regime.”
He argues that Syrian–American relations are increasingly tied to shared interests: Washington’s regional security priorities and Israel’s strategic concerns on one side, and Syria’s pressing need for economic space on the other. According to Yaghi, the United States has agreed to gradual sanctions easing “within a monitored and largely humanitarian financial framework,” supported by regional actors including Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Yet, he notes, Israel’s wider security doctrine regarding Syria, Lebanon and Gaza continues to limit what Washington can pursue with Damascus. The United States, he says, cannot demand concessions from Israel that challenge its core threat assessments – especially in relation to Syria’s Druze and Kurdish regions.
Yaghi identifies three elements that he believes will frame any future US–Israeli approach to Damascus:
– Security: widening the disengagement zone into a broader, heavy-weapons-free buffer in the south, restricting Syrian army deployments, and reinforcing US positions in al-Tanf and bases near Damascus – preparing the conditions for any future Israeli drawdown.
– International and regional: integrating Syria into the coalition against ISIS and coordinating with Israel and Arab states to contain Iran’s IRGC, Hezbollah and Palestinian armed groups – effectively placing Damascus under probation.
– Political: encouraging decentralisation or strengthened local governance to accommodate the demands of Druze and Kurdish communities without breaking Syria’s territorial integrity.
Emerging security coordination
Political analyst Talaat Taha tells +963 that developments over recent months indicate “a clear intention to create structured security coordination between Syria and Israel,” adding that Al-Sharaa’s visit was principally intended “to align security channels with Israel,” opening the way for broader cooperation in the future.
He claims that the emerging US–Israeli–Syrian framework grants Al-Sharaa the authority he needs to secure a renewed presidential term, provided he fulfils joint American and Israeli requirements.
For Israel, Taha says, the aims are relatively direct: to contain Hezbollah, secure the northern border, expand logistical networks in the region, and exert indirect pressure on Lebanon through Syria. He points to recent joint operations against ISIS cells in southern Syria – which he regards as preliminary evidence of coordinated counter-terrorism activity.
Taha adds that some proposals address particularly sensitive issues, including the Golan Heights. He argues that the territory is unlikely to return to Syria under any foreseeable arrangement, though it might eventually become a “neutral open zone” under a future agreement.
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A policy of restraint
From Damascus, political analyst Bassam Suleiman tells +963 that despite increasing speculation, southern Syria “will remain Syrian,” arguing that Israel may apply pressure but cannot alter the region’s identity.
He says that the Syrian government is prioritising diplomatic outreach and avoiding escalation, while resisting any comprehensive political settlement under externally imposed terms. According to Suleiman, Israel is attempting to shape an agreement at what it perceives as a moment of Syrian weakness – a scenario Damascus rejects as dangerous for national sovereignty.
Suleiman contends that gradual re-engagement with the international system, accompanied by phased sanctions relief, will strengthen Syria’s legitimacy and restrict Israel’s freedom of unilateral military action. As he puts it, “as Syria reconnects with the international system, targeting it becomes costlier.”
On the ground, southern Syria appears to be undergoing a slow transformation in security arrangements. The United States is reportedly working on layered security zones involving heavy-weapons-free areas under Syrian police supervision. Israel has expressed concern over this process, even as it faces American pressure to review its operational approach.
Full political normalisation remains a distant prospect. Nonetheless, evolving security understandings in the south are gradually shaping a pragmatic equilibrium – one balancing Syrian sovereignty, American strategic objectives, and Israeli security priorities, while Damascus seeks to stabilise the country and avoid further confrontation.
