While the Syrian government seeks to polish its image abroad, by restoring diplomatic ties and rejoining international forums, signs of confusion and disarray are surfacing at home in managing sensitive internal files. In the south, Suwayda witnessed violent clashes between Druze factions and Bedouin tribes, leaving hundreds dead and injured. In the northeast, the stalemate with the Kurdish-led SDF continues, with no clear vision or practical initiative for resolution.
Does this reflect institutional weakness? Or is the regime prioritizing foreign relations while neglecting domestic crises? Could it signal a deeper structural crisis in decision-making, or is it merely a temporary stumble in the face of Syria’s complex realities?
No Fundamental Solutions
Journalist and political analyst Abdel Halim Suleiman, based in Qamishli, argues that the government is caught in a continuous state of disarray when handling national issues. He notes that while Damascus announces steps that appear transitional and raise hopes among Syrians, such as calls for “revolutionary legitimacy” or a National Dialogue Conference, these moves are executed unilaterally, excluding key political, civil, and military actors.
“The government does not truly consider Syria’s diverse communities, Kurds, the Autonomous Administration, or religious groups,” Suleiman tells +963. “This creates a de facto one-sided authority imposed on people, sowing suspicion and mistrust from the very beginning.” He adds that Damascus’ reliance on force to reassert control only fuels more crises, as seen in Suwayda, where the state confronted a native community with violence rather than dialogue.
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Suleiman believes the government is more concerned with its external image, seeking international deals to present itself as a viable post-Assad authority, while neglecting comprehensive domestic solutions. “The steps taken are about consolidating power inside Syria, not genuinely solving problems,” he says, pointing to the widening trust gap between citizens and the state. Promises of improved living conditions, for example, remain unfulfilled.
He identifies the core issue not just in implementation but in planning itself: initiatives branded as “national reconciliation” are exclusionary from the start, undermining their credibility. As for the crisis within the structure of the state, Suleiman divides it into several levels, the most prominent being the unilateral and exclusionary approach, where the authorities seek to form a small, homogenous team that controls the levers of power, something previously emphasized by the Syrian president.
He also points to a lack of cohesion among the forces controlling the ground, in addition to ideological divisions within the ruling authority itself; ranging from hardline factions to pragmatic ones, to others dissatisfied with the government’s performance and accusing it of abandoning religious “constants.”
Suleiman concludes that the challenges within the new governing framework are deepening, particularly as the state continues to ignore issues related to its social fabric, ethnicities, religions, and sects. This neglect, he argues, produces a structural crisis stemming from the exclusion of these communities from the political process, ultimately obstructing the building of an inclusive state founded on pluralism and genuine participation.
Complex Internal Challenges
London-based political analyst Samer Khlewi presents a different view. He argues that the Syrian government is not avoiding domestic issues but grappling with highly complex challenges that require time. These, he says, unfold in parallel with Damascus’ foreign diplomacy, and foreign meddling only deepens internal difficulties.
Khlewi insists the government has made progress in stabilizing the economy and maintaining security, despite not having full territorial control. Yet “remnants of the old regime” still pose obstacles to rebuilding Syria.
Regarding state rhetoric versus practice, Khlewi points to the ongoing stalemate with the SDF, accusing the group of repeatedly breaching agreements with the Syrian president. He also claims that Druze leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri undermines state agreements, complicating Suwayda’s unrest, and alleges coordination between Hijri and the SDF, with ties extending to Druze leadership in Israel.
“The government has every right to reassert authority over all Syrian territory,” Khlewi tells +963. “It is not responsible for instability in Suwayda or SDF areas; rather, Damascus is pursuing diplomatic solutions but faces actors who refuse to engage in good faith.”
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Between Rhetoric and Reality
Observers see a widening gap between official rhetoric, focused on diplomatic breakthroughs and easing Syria’s isolation, and the unresolved or worsening crises inside the country. Some argue this reflects a hierarchy of priorities: Damascus is betting that foreign progress will eventually ease sanctions and isolation, paving the way for internal recovery.
