Since the outbreak of the Syrian uprising in 2011, the country has become an open arena for overlapping regional and international interests. Military fronts quickly intertwined with political and economic agendas, while maps of control were drawn by forces backed by outside powers. For over a decade, Iran and Russia played a central role in supporting the former regime, while Turkey consolidated its influence in the north. The picture was defined by fragile balances between allies and adversaries alike.
But everything shifted after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the formation of a new Syrian government. Iran’s presence disappeared entirely, Russia’s role shrank to the margins, and new players stepped in to fill the vacuum; most notably Israel, whose interventions became more overt in pursuit of security and strategic gains, and Turkey, which positioned itself as a supporter of the new government and Syria’s territorial unity, while many still viewed its moves as an attempt to advance its own regional ambitions.
This redistribution of power has opened the door to a new type of conflict; one less about open battles and more about political, security, and economic manoeuvring to shape the transition period. Official statements and public cooperations often mask shifting understandings and uneasy alliances. Behind the scenes, the balance of power game continues, too often at the expense of Syria’s national priorities.
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The Real Challenge
Dr. Shaher Shaher, professor of international relations in Damascus, told +963:
“The real fear today is that Turkish influence may simply replace the Iranian role that ended with the fall of the old regime. It all depends on whether the Syrian government can strike a balance in managing foreign presences inside the country, and turn regional and international contradictions into leverage, rather than allowing one actor to dominate at the expense of Syrian sovereignty.”
Shahir notes that Israel’s opposition to Turkey’s deeper involvement, alongside the American presence in northeast Syria, limits Ankara’s ambitions. For Washington, curbing Turkish expansion is a priority; U.S. officials see Turkey as a state with “excess power” in a region surrounded by fragile neighbours, something they are determined to restrain.
He also argues that Russia’s role is fundamentally different from that of Iran or Turkey:
“Moscow doesn’t meddle in Syria’s social or religious affairs. Instead, it pursues its interests through engagement with the ruling authority. That makes its presence more tolerated and accepted by the U.S., tolerated by Turkey, met with Israeli silence, and broadly acceptable inside Syria.”
According to Shaher, today’s Syrian reality reflects a “dualism of inside and outside.” Every domestic event is tied to external extensions. When the internal front is fragile, external interference inevitably grows. Syria currently lacks both geographic and demographic unity, while some actors have crossed traditional “red lines” by cooperating even with historical adversaries. This has made the Syrian crisis as much a regional and international issue as it is a national one.
He adds that Syria’s geostrategic position, lying across key oil and gas routes and major economic corridors like China’s Belt and Road, the Indian corridor, and the Arab Development Road, leaves it exposed to endless external competition. Although Syrians remain one people in identity, political divisions have fractured them. Some politicians, he warns, are chasing personal gains at the expense of national interests.
Shaher stresses the need to abandon the “us vs. them” mindset and avoid framing Syria’s challenges solely in terms of minorities and majorities. Historically, minorities often played leading roles, while majorities suffered from political stagnation. He also cautions that contact with foreign powers should not be treated as a right for all parties.
“This right must remain with the legitimate authority. Only the state can negotiate with the outside world. The dispute with the government must never turn into an attack on the state itself. Division among Syrians has left everyone weaker, while outside players, whoever they are, seek only their own interests and use pressure to extract concessions.”
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Foreign Entanglements
Major General Mohammed Abdel Wahed, an expert in national security and international relations based in Cairo, sees the crisis differently but with the same underlying concern.
“The Syrian conflict, which erupted in 2011, is still deepening because of an unresolved internal imbalance. This structural weakness, decades in the making, has left Syria wide open to mounting external interference.”
Speaking to +963, Abdel Wahid explains that the struggle is no longer confined to military terms but now extends into politics and economics. The result is a race among foreign powers to impose their agendas, at the expense of stability and genuine national consensus.
“Today, Syria is the stage for a hidden struggle among many outside players,” he says. “From regional actors like Turkey, Iran, and Israel, to global powers such as Russia and the United States, even Gulf states with clear stakes in Syria’s future are part of this game.”
He points to examples: Ankara supports the new government of Ahmad Al-Sharaa to entrench its northern foothold; Tehran is trying to reinsert itself via militias in central and coastal regions; Moscow, despite being tied up in Ukraine, clings to its bases and historic ties to prevent leaving the field to Washington. Israel, meanwhile, bombs Iranian sites and backs Druze groups in the south under the pretext of “minority protection”; a rationale Abdel Wahid dismisses as a colonial hangover. The U.S. continues supporting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), not only to keep ISIS at bay but also to block Iran’s return.
These entanglements, Abdel Wahed warns, perpetuate instability, widen sectarian and ethnic divisions, and prolong the conflict. Israeli strikes in Suwayda and support for Druze groups, for instance, stoke fears of partition. Meanwhile, the Turkish Iranian rivalry adds new flashpoints in both the north and the coast.
He acknowledges that President Ahmad Al-Sharaa has been working hard to launch a national dialogue and assert sovereignty. But these efforts are up against enormous challenges, especially external pressure to weaken the government. Israel, in particular, has escalated its strikes, even targeting areas near the presidential palace, in what Abdel Wahed sees as a bid to undermine legitimacy.
Compounding these pressures are Syria’s dire economic burdens and the complexity of the geopolitical landscape. Abdel Wahid notes that Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE support transitional arrangements, but only on condition of political and security reforms, further squeezing the government’s room to manoeuvre.
