Negotiations between Syria and Israel have reached a clear standstill, according to both Syrian and Israeli media reports, largely due to Damascus’ insistence on a full Israeli withdrawal from the south and the Golan Heights. Israel, for its part, continues to tie any withdrawal to a comprehensive peace treaty that appears nowhere on the horizon. While the United States has encouraged limited security contacts aimed at reviving elements of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, Israel maintains that the status of the Golan is non-negotiable, and Damascus argues that any discussion of full peace is premature without a complete pullback and adherence to previous agreements.
Meanwhile, the Syrian interim government has pursued indirect, mediator-led talks aimed at lowering tensions in the south, yet little progress has been made on the withdrawal issue. Analysts note that the core dispute stems from fundamentally divergent goals: Syria seeks the restoration of territory and sovereignty, while Israel aims for security arrangements or limited normalization without offering strategic concessions. These conflicting aims have deepened the stalemate, making any future step contingent on political and security conditions that far exceed simple field arrangements.
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Key Structural Obstacles in the Negotiation Track
Dr. Muhammad Abbas, a Damascus-based military analyst, tells +963 that although several fundamental disagreements have been partially addressed, one underlying question persists: “Can Syria ever be a source of reassurance for Israel?” According to Abbas, Syrian leadership insists it will not serve as a security guarantor for neighbouring states. If that question was once central, he argues, it has largely been overtaken by more immediate concerns.
Yet the deeper issues remain unresolved. Abbas raises a series of difficult questions: Could Syria ever openly concede the Golan? Could it recognize Israeli control over Mount Hermon? What would such concessions entail – and what price could Syria reasonably demand in return? He stresses that the Syrian public would not easily accept relinquishing land or historical rights, and any negotiator in Damascus would rely heavily on domestic support. Whether Syrian leaders could risk signing away territory, he says, is an extraordinarily complex matter.
On security arrangements, Abbas notes growing clarity. Both sides are working – cautiously – toward frameworks that could eventually underpin a broader relationship and bring an end to decades of confrontation. But he cautions that sovereignty itself is never absolute: states routinely enter asymmetrical exchanges and make mutual concessions shaped by their relative power. The real question, he says, is how far each side is willing to go.
Abbas explains that Damascus has consistently articulated its objectives: securing stability, rebuilding after years of war, and emerging as a constructive player in regional security. Significant concessions on sovereignty, he says, might be acceptable if they resulted in durable security and opened the door to long-term gains through negotiated – rather than adversarial – relations.
He argues that a “win–win” outcome is essential and insists that Syrian leadership has repeatedly signalled readiness for meaningful peace measures, even expressing willingness to move “as far as possible” along a peace track – provided it restores land and sovereignty. Under such conditions, Abbas believes, the Syrian public would support an agreement.
Still, Israel holds far stronger leverage and seeks to use its military dominance to impose conditions on buffer zones, demilitarization, and airspace restrictions – positions that circulate widely in Israeli media before appearing in any official channel. Abbas notes that only international guarantees, UN oversight, and joint U.S.–Russian monitoring could provide meaningful assurance of Israeli compliance. He adds that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states could emerge as key guarantors should any deal materialize.
Abbas reflects on the nature of “opportunities” in the region. In 1947, the Palestinian partition plan was rejected despite offering 35–40% of the land; today discussions concern a two-state solution on less than a quarter. What was once a dispute over a narrow strip of land around Lake Tiberias has grown into the loss of Tiberias, Mount Hermon, the Golan and vast portions of Syrian territory. “Are we speaking of missed opportunities,” he asks, “or possible openings still available to Syrian or Arab negotiators?”
He argues that Syria currently lacks the strength to impose its preferred terms after years of war. Still, if an opportunity arises that returns occupied land, it could serve as a constructive basis for peace. A long-term truce or phased security arrangements may pave the way for political negotiations, he suggests, especially as the U.S. seeks regional stability – a success that Washington may wish to claim.
He concludes that guarantor states will play a decisive role in transforming security understandings into lasting peace – grounded in recognition of rights and sovereignty, non-interference, withdrawal from occupied territory and cooperation on regional security. Sustainable security, he stresses, is essential for the region to move beyond cycles of conflict and towards long-term development, including resolving the Palestinian and refugee issues that have shaped the region for over seventy years.
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The Israeli Position and Prospects for Peace
Ismat Mansour, a Jerusalem-based journalist specialising in Israeli affairs, tells +963 that although no official announcement has been made on freezing talks, credible Israeli media leaks indicate that the dispute centres on withdrawal from areas seized near the summit of Mount Hermon. Israel insists it will not withdraw except as part of comprehensive peace and normalisation – not merely a security arrangement. “This is the stated reason,” he says, “but the deeper reason is that after 7 October, Israel does not want to maintain forward defensive positions inside neighbouring countries.”
Mansour adds that the structure of the Israeli government – and much of Israeli society – continues to doubt Syria’s ability to maintain stability and territorial control. As a result, peace is not an immediate priority, and even a security agreement would be shaped to maximise Israeli advantage, driven by post-7 October security doctrine and the worldview of Israel’s defence establishment.
He notes that as Syria’s transitional government consolidates authority, resolves internal issues and gains international legitimacy, its negotiating capacity could grow – potentially shifting Israeli calculations, particularly if Israel heads to elections in the coming year.
Mansour explains that Israel is seeking an agreement that includes far-reaching concessions, extending beyond sovereignty or military presence to include involvement in Syrian domestic matters, particularly regarding the Druze community and proposed forms of ‘protection’ or guardianship. This, he says, makes any agreement substantially more complex.
Under the current balance of power and political conditions, Mansour believes there is no realistic prospect of a peace treaty. A shift might occur only if the Israeli government changes and if parallel progress occurs on the Saudi–Palestinian or broader Arab tracks. Such developments could create space for discussions on withdrawals or arrangements concerning the Golan Heights. However, he stresses that “current conditions do not allow for a peace agreement – and even a security agreement has not met the necessary conditions despite U.S. pressure.”
