After more than a decade of conflict, shifting dynamics, and regional divisions, Syria is once again at the centre of a complex geopolitical landscape, one marked by uncertainty and open to multiple outcomes. The possibilities for Syria’s reintegration come amid profound global transformations and intersecting international agendas. Against this backdrop, Arab states are making cautious moves to reintegrate a “new Syria” into its traditional Arab fold, distancing it from broader regional and global spheres of influence.
In this context, Abdel Rahman Salah, former Egyptian ambassador to Türkiye, offers a seasoned diplomatic perspective in an interview with +963. He explains that the political scene remains deeply entangled, particularly when considering the various scenarios for Syria’s reintegration into the Arab world. These scenarios intersect with shifting power balances in Damascus, major challenges related to reconstruction, refugee return, and the evolving nature of Syria’s ties with both the Gulf states and Egypt. All of this unfolds as the new Syrian regime grapples with a long legacy of division and ever-changing international alignments.
In this conversation, Salah goes beyond merely analysing current realities, he outlines what the Arab world’s approach to a “New Syria” should be. His vision is marked by clarity and grounded in a deep understanding of history, geography, and politics. At the same time, he identifies the responsibilities that the new administration in Damascus must embrace if Syria is to fully return to its Arab context.
In your estimation, has Syria returned to the Arab embrace, or has the path not yet begun in the opinion of some Arab powers? Do you think there is a unified Arab understanding regarding the position on “New Syria,” or are the approaches still different?
In my view, Syria never truly left the Arab embrace. What changed over the past fifteen years was the differing visions among Arab countries regarding the conflict that unfolded within Syria.
Some Gulf states, along with Türkiye and Western powers, chose to intervene in support of the armed opposition against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Their goal was to overthrow him by force after he refused to pursue a political settlement and instead sought military assistance from Russia and Iran to stabilise and preserve his rule. In contrast, Egypt and the majority of Arab nations opted not to intervene in the internal Syrian conflict.
Cairo hosted the peaceful Syrian opposition coalition, a group that neither took up arms nor contributed to the shedding of Syrian blood. Egypt consistently sought a political resolution to the war and took part in all relevant international efforts. Unfortunately, these efforts failed, largely due to the Assad regime’s lack of cooperation, a regime that has recently weakened as a result of the collapse of its key allies: Iran, due to its confrontation with Israel, and Russia, because of its involvement in the war in Ukraine.
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So what has changed today?
The differences in Arab positions persist, largely because of the orientation of the new authority in Damascus. Many of its leaders have known affiliations with the political Islam movement and a history of fighting within organisations such as al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the al-Nusra Front.
While all Arab countries now formally recognize the new Syrian authority and accept it as the legitimate representative of Syria in the Arab League, their degree of acceptance and support varies. These differences stem from each country’s past stance toward the new Syrian leadership during the war and before the fall of the regime.
Those who once provided the opposition with funding and weapons have been quick to embrace figures like Farouq al-Sharaa and his allies. Alongside Türkiye, they are now helping cover the costs of governance and state services, advocating for the lifting of international sanctions on Syria, and promoting the new leadership as having transitioned from revolutionary extremism to a more rational, moderate governance style, one that accepts responsibilities and imposes limits.
Are there conditions or requests that must be met for Syria’s full and effective return to the Arab scene? How do we accurately interpret Cairo’s vision of developments in Damascus?
There has undoubtedly been considerable Arab sympathy toward Syria in recent times. News bulletins are now often led by images of Israeli military strikes on Syrian sites, the expansion of Israeli forces in western and southern Syria under the pretext of protecting Syrian minorities, and Türkiye’s occupation of northern Syria under the claim of preventing Kurdish secession, Kurds who are themselves under the protection of American forces in eastern Syria. Egyptians, in particular, empathise with the hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees living in Egypt, as well as the millions who were displaced from their homes during the war.
On the other hand, the Syrian leadership’s welcoming of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood members, individuals wanted in criminal cases in Egypt, and appointing some of them to leadership roles within the Syrian army has provoked strong resentment in Egypt, both among the government and the public. Allowing supporters of the political Islam movement to use Damascus as a platform to attack Arab governments opposed to that movement will inevitably alienate those governments and strain their relations with the new Syrian regime.
Is it possible to separate Syria’s political return from issues like reconstruction and refugee repatriation?
Egypt invited the new Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, to attend the extraordinary Arab summit held in Cairo two months ago, which focused on the Palestinian issue. Al-Sharaa met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and several other Arab leaders. The upcoming Arab summit in Baghdad will mark the first participation of the new Syrian leadership in a regular summit with a full agenda, including discussions on reconstruction and the return of refugees.
The willingness of Arab and foreign countries to contribute to Syria’s reconstruction will depend on how the new regime treats Syria’s diverse sects, as well as how it handles relationships with key players on the ground, namely, Türkiye, Israel, the United States, and Russia. Balancing these factors is undoubtedly a major challenge, complicated by conflicting interests. The priorities of these countries, which may diverge from what most Syrians consider their national interest, are also factors that the new Syrian leadership may weigh in its decisions.
For example, while Türkiye opposes the formation of a Kurdish state in northeastern Syria, it began establishing a “buffer zone” in the north a decade ago. It has resettled Sunni Syrian opposition supporters in that area, aiming to create a Sunni Syrian region aligned with Turkish interests, extending toward the İskenderun (Hatay) region, with Aleppo as its centre. Turkish companies, using European funding, are already leading reconstruction efforts there in exchange for Türkiye controlling the flow of Syrian refugees toward Europe by land and sea.
Israel, meanwhile, justifies its military operations and expanded presence inside Syria as necessary for protecting its national security and that of some minorities, such as the Syrian Druze. But it is no secret that Israel’s core objectives are twofold: first, to expand its territorial control over strategic highlands and water sources in Syria, eventually annexing them as it did with the Golan Heights; and second, to encourage minority groups across Arab states to seek autonomy from their national governments, fragmenting the Arab world into mini-states: Sunni, Shiite, Maronite, Druze, Kurdish, and Berber. This would leave Israel as the dominant regional power in a divided region.
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How should we assess the Gulf’s position, particularly that of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, toward Damascus, following recent steps toward reconciliation and mutual visits? Do you believe Syrian-Arab reconciliation must coincide with a political settlement inside Syria, or can it come beforehand?
I believe that the fall of the Assad regime and the entry of al-Sharaa and his factions into Damascus were outcomes of recent regional developments and the result of a Turkish-Russian understanding that was welcomed by the United States and quietly supported by the Gulf states.
The new regime in Syria now has a promising opportunity to preserve this regional and international backing, but to do so, it must gain the support of all sects and minorities within Syria and distance itself from the jihadist factions that helped bring it to power. Achieving internal political settlements that uphold state unity will increase confidence among both regional and international stakeholders in the new leadership. This trust is vital to ensuring Syria’s cooperation with Arab and foreign nations in the fight against terrorism and in preventing Syrian territory from becoming a base for groups conspiring against other Arab governments or planning terrorist attacks abroad.
What are the chances of success for Arab initiatives aimed at advancing a real political solution in Syria?
Before the fall of Assad, political solution efforts were largely driven by non-Arab international powers. I expect that countries with significant influence on the ground, especially Türkiye, will continue to play a leading role in shaping and encouraging any political settlement.
Given the current global economic and geopolitical shifts, I anticipate that the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, will bear the financial burden of reconstructing both Syria and Gaza. This responsibility will naturally grant them greater influence over how political settlements in Syria are designed, implemented, and monitored. At the same time, “New Syria” will require Arab political backing to lift the Western and international sanctions imposed on it.
If the new Syrian leadership can demonstrate competence and seriousness in tackling these multifaceted challenges, Arab investors and contractors, especially Egyptians, will have a strong opportunity to return to the Syrian market after a fifteen-year absence. It’s worth noting that the Arab Gas Pipeline, which originates in Egypt and passes through Jordan and Syria, was only about 100 kilometres short of reaching the Turkish border. This same pipeline was intended to deliver gas, Egyptian or Israeli, to Lebanon via Egypt and Jordan. Therefore, Syria’s stability could mark the beginning of a new era of regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean.
