The interim Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow comes at a critical moment in the history of the Middle East, where regional transformations coincide with the redrawing of power balances following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, which for decades was one of Russia’s most prominent allies in the region. This visit, Al-Sharaa’s first since assuming power last December, goes beyond protocol. It represents a strategic turning point reflecting the re-positioning of both Moscow and Damascus within a new equation that merges political, economic, and military interests.
On one hand, Syria seeks to regain internal stability and rebuild its international relations after years of war and division. On the other, Russia aims to reaffirm itself as a key player in the Middle East, this time not as protector, but as partner. Between these two objectives arise essential questions about Russia’s true role in the downfall of the previous regime, and whether Moscow has transitioned from the “savior” to the “architect” of post-Assad Syria.
The visit carries multiple political implications. It tests Moscow’s intentions to rebuild its relationship with Damascus on new foundations and expresses Syria’s desire to turn the page of the past without compromising national sovereignty, at a time when Syrian memory remains scarred by war and foreign intervention. Thus, the visit becomes an indicator of a new political phase in Syrian-Russian relations, one where pragmatic interests intertwine with historical calculations, reflecting the shifting balance of power in the region after a decade of conflict.
Al-Sharaa conducted an official visit to the Russian capital Moscow, where he met President Vladimir Putin in what was described as a “strategically new” encounter.
This visit, al-Shar’a’s first since taking office after the ousting of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December of last year, represents a pivotal moment in bilateral relations after years of political divergence and stagnation.
Both presidents emphasized their commitment to rebuilding ties in line with the new realities of Syria and the region. After two decades of close alliance under Assad, Moscow and Damascus now appear ready to open a new page of cooperation aimed at building a “post-Assad” Syria as part of a broader Russian strategy for the Middle East.
Despite divisions among Syrians regarding the visit, public sentiment oscillates between caution and hope, amid expectations that it may lead to improved economic and political conditions. Yet questions persist about Russia’s real role in the fall of the Assad regime.
Read also: Ahmad al-Sharaa in Moscow: New Phase in Syrian–Russian Relations
The Game of Interests
Political analyst Hisham Khalifa told +963 that Al-Sharaa’s visit reignited debate about Russia’s possible role in toppling Bashar al-Assad’s regime as part of an undeclared deal mediated through Turkish channels. For years, Moscow was the regime’s foremost military and political supporter, and its 2015 air intervention prolonged Assad’s rule during the civil war. However, Russia’s shift in stance in late 2024, as opposition attacks intensified and regime defenses collapsed, signaled a fundamental change in Russian policy.
Political expert Abdullah al-Abdullah told +963 that Moscow had long accepted the necessity of political change and may have quietly facilitated a transfer of power to avoid further bloodshed, especially after scaling back its direct military support in the regime’s final battles.
Field reports indicate that Russian air operations in December 2024 were limited and largely non-decisive, targeting mostly empty areas, a sign of a deliberate retreat at the critical moment.
Al-Abdullah added that “Moscow acted with strategic rationality, choosing to safeguard its military and economic interests, including its bases in Tartus and Hmeimim, rather than engage in a futile battle to rescue the regime.”
Leaks suggest prior coordination between Moscow and the opposition to facilitate a smooth power transition in Damascus.
According to al-Abdullah, Russia was not merely a supporter of the former regime but played a central role in managing its fall in a way that preserved its interests and ensured the continuity of its regional influence with minimal losses. Today, Moscow appears to be reaping the benefits of that cautious strategy.
Between Syrian Memory and International Interests
Syrian views on al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow range from resentment to pragmatic acceptance.
Ahmad al-Tayyib, a government employee, told +963 that Russia continues to shelter figures from the former regime and shield them from accountability, a source of anger among many Syrians who lost trust in Moscow since its military intervention.
Conversely, writer Mahmoud Jarrad told +963 that politics is driven by interests, not emotions, stressing that Syria’s current priority lies in balanced relations built on equality and mutual respect, away from dependency on any external power.
Read also: Damascus Ankara Talks: Who Holds the Final Word in Syria?
Strengthening Military and Economic Cooperation
According to political analyst Hisham Khalifa, the main outcomes of al-Sharaa’s October 2025 visit to Moscow included: the renewal of agreements on continued Russian presence at the Hmeimim and Tartus bases; renewed Russian military support for the Syrian army, particularly in air defense; the signing of reconstruction contracts for infrastructure in transport and energy sectors; and President al-Sharaa’s affirmation of respect for all previous agreements with Moscow while seeking to enhance political and economic partnership on the basis of sovereignty and shared interests.
Political analyst Ismail al-Shahir told +963 that Russia has shifted from being a direct military ally of the former regime to a strategic partner of the new government in Damascus, acting with flexibility and realism.
According to all-Shahir, Moscow no longer pursues a policy of “unconditional support.” Instead, it aims to preserve its military foothold in Tartus and Hmeimim while reducing its direct military footprint elsewhere, in exchange for greater economic and political cooperation.
Al-Shahir concludes that Russia’s new strategy in Syria is built on pragmatic cooperation and the preservation of influence at minimal cost, adapting to new political realities to ensure its continued regional role.
Analysts agree that al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow marked a turning point in Syrian-Russian relations, opening the door to a new phase of balanced interests and orientations. While public skepticism remains regarding Russia’s role in Assad’s downfall, both Damascus and Moscow appear intent on shaping a new relationship, one that moves beyond the legacy of war and division toward a partnership grounded in pragmatism and national sovereignty.
