The political landscape in the region is filled with striking paradoxes. Sunni Hamas relies on Shiite Iranian support, while Shiite Hezbollah long depended on Sunni backing from Lebanese Hamas sympathizers. These alliances were ambiguous, with the constant imagined justification: Palestine. Despite Hamas being a Sunni movement rooted in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, its relationship with Shiite Iran has evolved over the decades into one of the strongest forms of strategic support in the region. This relationship began in the early 1990s, when Tehran saw in its support for Hamas an opportunity to expand regional influence and present itself as a comprehensive Islamic power. Above all, Hamas places Tehran at the gates of Tel Aviv.
According to American sources, Iran sent Hamas and Islamic Jihad 100 million dollars annually, a figure that rose to 350 million dollars in 2023 on the eve of the October 7 incursion. Support was not limited to finances but extended to training, weaponry, and military technology. It was even said that Hamas fighters trained in live drills on glider landings in Iran, preparing for the infamous assault over the separation wall.
The relationship suffered a sharp rupture during the Syrian conflict, when Hamas sided with its Muslim Brotherhood brethren against Bashar al-Assad, while Iran and Hezbollah stood firmly by the Ba’ath regime. In 2012 Hamas moved its leadership from Damascus to Doha, prompting Iran to suspend its monthly funding. Yet geopolitical pressures following Sisi’s ouster of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt in 2013, combined with the mediation of the late Hassan Nasrallah, gradually restored Hamas to Iran’s embrace by 2017.
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In Lebanon, Hezbollah succeeded in forging what it considered “strategic” alliances with Sunni armed groups, most notably the al-Fajr Forces of the Islamic Group, the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. This alliance was temporary, surfacing during what Hezbollah termed its “supportive” war against Israel, yet it served both sides: it provided Hezbollah with a Sunni cover for operations in Sunni border villages like Shebaa, and it gave the Islamic Group a chance to strengthen its political and popular standing. Again, the justification was always Palestine.
The latest war on Lebanon marked a decisive turning point in Hezbollah’s political and military trajectory. The party lost two secretary generals and 5,000 fighters, with more than 1,000 left permanently disabled. It was forced into a ceasefire in November 2024 that was far from favorable, compelled to withdraw north of the Litani River, hand over hundreds of weapons depots south of the Litani to the Lebanese army, and it lost much of its popular support beyond its immediate environment. The Arab Barometer 2024 survey showed a decline in Shiite confidence in Hezbollah, as the war exposed the heavy price of the party’s policies. Those who once tied their livelihoods to Hezbollah salaries began detaching their ideological loyalty. Iran, under economic strain, will not be able to sustain its indulgences nor those of its Lebanese proxy. This means Hezbollah cannot recover its full popular base without comprehensive reconstruction, one Iran may not be able to fund.
These shifts indicate that geopolitical interests and practical performance have become more important than sectarian identities in shaping the fate of political movements in the region, at least tactically. While Hamas continues to benefit from Iranian support despite sectarian divides, Hezbollah is paying the price of strategic choices that elevated Iranian interests over Lebanese ones, costing it local legitimacy and a support base that once, in a fleeting moment of war, transcended sects.
*The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent those of +963 Media Association .
