As regional and international interactions accelerate around the Iranian nuclear file, political circles in Tehran describe the European move, Britain, France, and Germany, towards activating a thirty-day timeline for the “trigger mechanism,” which could result in the reimposition of international sanctions on Tehran, as an “illegal step.”
Iran now faces the dynamics of this critical moment, which place it in a complex test. Between European and American pressure and continued Israeli threats, the likelihood of escalation on the ground and the outbreak of a war scenario is rising once again.
The determinants of European and American pressure on Iran’s nuclear program are embodied in attempts to undermine its functional arms, particularly the Houthis in Yemen, and to pressure Hezbollah into handing over its weapons in accordance with the Lebanese Army’s plan and Lebanese government decisions.
These developments are viewed within a broader framework that includes equations of influence and power in the Middle East, as well as paths of international conflict and competition. Current indicators point to a political, economic, and military confrontation led by the United States with European support through the activation of the “trigger mechanism.” On the other side, Tehran seeks to invest time and maneuver along the edges of negotiations, with the possibility that such moves could lead to greater escalation if not managed with balance.
No real capacity
In this context, Iranian affairs researcher Mona Silavi notes that the facts on the ground clearly indicate Iran does not have genuine capabilities for military escalation, as its airspace is exposed to external military strikes, particularly after losing a significant portion of its air defense capacity.
Silavi also told +963 that Tehran tested, in the last round of conflict, the extent of its allies’ readiness to provide support, only to find clear weakness in the level of military and political backing.
Accordingly, she concludes that “Iran is aware of all these realities, which is why it is working to buy time, invest it, and move in the field without incurring real losses.”
In a notable development, Europe is paying significant attention to the Iranian file against the backdrop of opposing Tehran’s ability to develop a fully integrated nuclear program.
This European direction falls within the framework of American policies opposing Iran’s nuclear program, which has been evident in recent weeks through official statements stressing that “Iran must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon, as this is a non-negotiable priority for European and global security.”
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European caution
According to Iranian affairs researcher Ammar Tasai, speaking to +963, Europeans have begun to realize that Iran “will not stop at any limit in its nuclear ambitions.” He explained that this realization has come alongside growing despair in the diplomatic track with Tehran.
He added that the war in Ukraine, and Iran’s role in it by supplying Russia with drones since the start of the conflict, provided additional motivation for Europeans to adopt a firmer stance toward Tehran.
Tasai pointed out that Iran’s lack of flexibility and insufficient cooperation with inspection and monitoring teams at its nuclear facilities pushed Europeans to a clear conviction that “the time has come to activate the trigger mechanism,” especially as they fear losing the opportunity provided by the 2015 nuclear deal.
He continued: “For this reason, Europeans are seeking to exploit the remaining period before it is too late.”
On the other hand, the researcher noted that Tehran has consistently used its nuclear file as a pressure card to extract the greatest possible concessions from Europe and the international community.
He elaborated: “Iran has repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, yet it is unlikely to take this step, as it realizes the catastrophic consequences that would follow, from a potential military strike by the United States and Israel, to Europe joining them politically and possibly militarily.”
Tasai added that such a withdrawal would practically mean expelling inspection teams and ending international monitoring, giving the world the impression that Iran is determined to acquire nuclear weapons. “And this in itself,” he said, “is a grave danger whose consequences Tehran cannot afford to ignore.”
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“Washington has decided”
Regarding the American position, Tasai stated that Washington has made its decision: it wants a purely peaceful Iranian nuclear program with very low enrichment levels, coupled with oversight of Iran’s missile program.
He pointed out that “the United States’ disregard of several Iranian requests to resume negotiations confirms it understands the sensitivity of Iran’s current predicament and is seeking to increase pressure until Tehran is forced to negotiate from a position of weakness.”
As for Israel, Tasai concluded that the likelihood of Israeli military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities remains on the table, but it depends on intelligence assessments in both Tel Aviv and Washington, particularly concerning the enrichment levels Iran has reached.
He added: “If it is confirmed that Tehran has reached high enrichment levels, this will be considered an existential threat to Israel and may drive it to launch preemptive strikes.”
The researcher concluded that “the activation of the trigger mechanism by Europeans will further weaken Iran’s position and may encourage Israel to exploit the situation to carry out harsher and more destructive strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. In the end, Tehran today finds itself at a decisive crossroads: either enter a serious negotiation track that secures some gains, or continue with an escalation policy that could open the door to an open confrontation with dire consequences.”
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had previously said: “Some think the trigger mechanism is like a gun trigger, which if pulled will ignite war, but this is not the case at all.”
Araghchi stressed that his country is “ready to negotiate with Europeans and the United States on the basis of mutual respect and common interests.”
For his part, Egyptian Major General Yasser Hashem told +963 that military escalation is not a distant option, yet the core of the situation will remain centered on continued pressure on Iran and the tightening of sanctions imposed on it. The American withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during President Trump’s first term clearly showed that Washington will not return to the agreement under its old terms, which it had previously rejected and denounced.
On the European front, the initial stance was one of opposition to the American withdrawal, but new realities reversed the equation. Iran’s continued enrichment without restrictions, its reduced cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, its evasiveness in negotiations, along with Europe’s desire to align with Washington, all pushed Europe toward a tougher position. This eventually led to the activation of the trigger mechanism, which requires about a month of review before being referred to the Security Council for approval to reimpose previous international sanctions.
Another point, according to the Egyptian military expert, is that “Russia appears outwardly satisfied with Western pressure so long as it serves its strategic interests, yet its proposals to resolve the crisis have not been welcomed by Tehran, leaving Moscow in the position of a beneficiary observer rather than an influential actor.”
Meanwhile, the Israeli-American stance aims to neutralize all forms of Iranian threats, whether nuclear, missile, or through Tehran’s regional proxies. This approach goes far beyond the scope of the previous agreement, making the chances of reaching a new deal almost non-existent.
Based on the above, Hashem indicated that “Iran today is more vulnerable than ever to international pressure through the weapon of sanctions, which leaves it with only two options. The first is to revert to its previous policies, as it did since 2006, by attempting to circumvent sanctions and focusing on strengthening its domestic front under the banner of ‘resisting global oppression.’
The second is field or undeclared escalation, whether through its regional proxies or operations aimed at destabilizing the regional landscape and disrupting international calculations.”
In conclusion, Hashem argued, if Tehran chooses escalation, this may lead to a new wave of direct confrontations involving more parties and fields, signaling greater tension and instability on both the regional and international levels.
