The experience of political parties in Syria, spanning more than a century, extends beyond simply contributing to the trajectory of the state or defining society’s relationship with the political system. It is deeper than attempts at revival and strengthening social diversity. This experience, particularly under the rule of Hafez al-Assad and his son over the past decades, was marked by a systematic mobilization of ideology and regional loyalties at the expense of a unifying national identity.
Today, after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and as the contours of the “new Syria” emerge with great ambition and profound anxiety, revisiting this legacy has become imperative. A critical review of what these parties achieved and where they failed can help avoid the policies that entrenched authoritarianism and undermined the prospects of building a state of institutions. This is an essential step toward establishing a more just and democratic political system, rooted in citizenship, respectful of diversity, and inclusive of all components of society.
The Role of Parties
Researcher Mazid al-Kreidi told 963+ that despite the criticisms leveled at nationalist and religious parties in Syria, they played historical roles that cannot be dismissed. They revived national and pan-national identity, mobilized popular resistance against colonialism, and supported liberation movements. They also created spaces for political participation in the absence of democratic institutions and sought to represent Syrians beyond sectarian or regional divisions through advanced intellectual, organizational, and political programs dealing with state-building, social justice, land reform, education, and development.
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Nevertheless, al-Kreidi noted that these parties made serious mistakes that must be avoided in any future political experience. Chief among them was politicizing identity by tying political allegiance to religious or ethnic belonging, which led to internal divisions. Some parties treated Syria as a temporary entity, awaiting the rise of the Arab or Islamic nation or Greater Syria according to their ideological outlook.
He further explained that the use of violence by some political actors as a tool to eliminate rivals militarized public life and entrenched a culture of violence, laying the foundations of a repressive security state. Internally, the parties lacked genuine democratic structures, producing authoritarian leadership unaccountable to their members and fostering a culture of dominance and absence of rotation within party institutions.
The Syrian researcher pointed out that the experience of the Ba’ath Party exemplified this trajectory starkly. It entrenched a totalitarian regime based on one-party rule, with full dominance over the economy, education, development, and politics. This led to the desertification of civil and political life, the erosion of the public sphere, and the rise of sectarian and regional loyalties. Ultimately, the Ba’ath Party became an instrument of personal authoritarian control, aggravating internal divisions under the guise of formal unity.
Al-Kreidi concluded that one of the most significant lessons from the failure of post-independence political pluralism was the absence of a culture of negotiation and compromise and the inability to forge national consensus. Parties competed for power rather than working toward a unifying national contract, making military coups a more attractive option than democratic elections.
In light of these experiences, he argued that building a democratic political system in the new Syria requires first laying the foundations for a new social contract based on citizenship as the basis of belonging, not sect or ideology. This entails reviving politics and constructing a political community that represents Syrians’ economic, social, and cultural interests through national programs. It also requires involving intellectuals, elites, and civil society forces, while encouraging the formation of democratic national parties, rather than ideological or military extensions. The state, for its part, must remain neutral toward affiliations, guaranteeing individual rights for all citizens and collective rights for communities without imposing any form of loyalty.
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The Continuity of Authoritarianism
For his part, Syrian academic Abdullah Turkmani told 963+ that drawing lessons from the experience of political parties in contemporary Syria requires insight into the devastating effects of six decades of authoritarian persistence (1963–2025). These manifested in populist rhetoric, arbitrary arrests of political activists, and the limited awareness of parties across their nationalist, Islamist, and leftist variations.
He emphasized that these parties remained captive to totalitarian ideologies in nature, structure, and orientation, even if their social bases and slogans differed. They stood in opposition to democratic thought, modern state standards, and human rights. He explained that after the change on December 8, it became essential for these parties to build broad alliances and formulate programs with democratic orientations, contributing to the establishment of a modern Syrian national state.
Turkmani also cautioned that prevailing traditional religious culture still obstructs communication between Syria’s social components, as it remains focused on transmission and bound by centuries-old entrenched interpretations.
He concluded that a successful transition toward a state of law and justice requires a break with the culture of slogans that has exhausted Syrians for six decades. Instead, it calls for meaningful engagement with present challenges and forward-looking planning based on freedom, justice, and equal citizenship. These principles can only be achieved through consensus among diverse intellectual and political currents operating within the framework of inclusive Syrian nationalism.
He stressed that the priority of the “new Syria” must be to return politics to society, enabling its vital forces to engage in patient and deliberate dialogue on public issues. This should be pursued away from hollow slogans, focusing instead on the essence of politics as interaction, exchange, and compromise.
Meanwhile, Syrian writer Mohammad Hallak al-Jarf told 963+ that political life in Syria did not cease after independence in 1946. Despite prolonged periods of authoritarianism, parties managed to adapt to reality with varying degrees of success. He explained that these parties revolved around three main currents: religious, nationalist, and leftist.
He clarified that these currents did not originate organically from within Syria but were extensions of external projects.
Al-Jarf concluded that this structure caused most parties to view Syria as part of a larger project, not as a final homeland in itself. This prevented the emergence of a “nation-state” model, which is a fundamental condition for building citizenship and democracy.
