Since the birth of the Syrian state in the 1940s, political life was tied to a short yet turbulent experiment with parties. In that period, national parties such as the National Bloc and the People’s Party emerged, alongside Baathist currents, religious movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, and leftist parties. Yet, these parties failed to solidify as cohesive political institutions. Their presence depended more on individuals and charismatic leaders than on strong organizational structures.
At the time, the Syrian parliament was a platform for the rise of national social figures, while the influence of parties remained limited, except for some pressure regarding issues tied to religion or Palestine. The Palestinian question stood as a unifying cause across the discourse of all currents, though in practice their role was mostly limited to demonstrations and statements rather than effective political action.
With the successive waves of military coups between 1949 and 1970, party life gradually shrank before being completely frozen under the Assad regime. Parties were either banned or domesticated within the “Progressive National Front” led by the Baath. With the Muslim Brotherhood outlawed in the 1980s and the rest reduced to mere façades, Syrian politics became a closed field, monopolized by the security and military apparatus.
This historical legacy turned Syrian parties into more of a political memory than actual vehicles for change. Today, after the Syrian revolution and the collapse of traditional structures, the question resurfaces: can parties regain their role? Will it be through recycling old nationalist and religious experiments, or through the emergence of new civic parties that reflect Syrian society’s needs and rebuild trust in politics as a tool for change?
Since 2011, Syria has witnessed a political vacuum. The old parties lost their presence, while new ones failed to establish themselves. The political scene remains divided between a security-driven authority, a fragmented opposition, and local entities like the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces and other armed factions. Thus, any upcoming elections, if they occur, will likely lack genuine competition.
Amid this, calls have emerged for national civic parties that transcend ideology and sectarianism. Yet this depends on a new constitution guaranteeing freedoms, a fair electoral law, and a genuine political transition. It also requires moving beyond reliance on individual leaders, which never builds durable institutions. Past parties that thrived on slogans, whether “Palestine,” “Arab unity,” or “Islam is the solution”, failed when tested by governance or repression.
Also read: Nationalist and Religious Parties in Syria: From Independence to the Post-Mandate Era
The Palestinian Cause and the Role of the Military
Political writer and analyst Firas Allawi told +963 that nationalist and religious parties in Syria emerged almost simultaneously with the state itself. Among them, the Muslim Brotherhood, Arab nationalist currents, and cross-border leftist groups stood out.
He explained that participation occurred during Syria’s brief democratic phase, when parties joined political life largely on an individual basis rather than through organized blocs. Their presence in parliament was more personal than collective.
“There were also local parties, such as the People’s Party and the National Bloc,” Allawi noted. “They had the strongest presence in parliament, stronger than the nationalist and religious parties at the time. Later, the Baath and the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as dominant forces.”
Parliament relied more on national social figures than on party blocs. Still, some individuals affiliated with parties contributed to legislation and political life, often in their personal capacity. Popular pressure from party bases sometimes led to amending sensitive articles related to religion. Similarly, nationalist parties sought specific political gains through such pressure.
Allawi stressed that in the rhetoric of all these parties, Palestine was the “central cause.” Each incorporated it into their political agenda and aligned with successive Syrian governments on the issue. Yet their practical impact was limited.
Contributions to the Palestinian cause were more individual than collective. During the 1948 war, both Islamic and nationalist parties played a modest role—mostly by mobilizing the street through protests and political statements rather than effective political action.
“The parties’ role was minor,” Allawi said, “because Syria’s democratic period lasted only a few years.” After the military seized power, parties were stripped of function. Once Assad rose to power, parties were shut down, frozen, or reduced to non-productive shells. Political life became subject to authoritarian control.
Nevertheless, Allawi argues that parties left behind a political legacy more than a living awareness. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Baath Party succeeded in crossing borders, building regional branches and networks. Even after being banned inside Syria, the Brotherhood maintained regional presence and influence.
“All military coups,” Allawi concluded, “had a devastating impact on party activity. They either froze or dismantled them entirely. There is no political life under the military.”
Also read: Transitional Justice: Gateway to National Reconciliation in Syria’s New Era
Legislation and Popular Representation
Dr. Zaher Badrani, head of the Syrian Future Movement, told +963 that the role of nationalist and religious parties in Syrian political life can be seen from several angles. First, their participation in parliamentary elections and popular representation. “Today, we cannot speak of genuine participation by nationalist or religious parties in any upcoming parliament,” he said. “Organized political life is still suspended. Elections in their normal form are not possible in Syria right now.”
This absence, he stresses, reflects a political vacuum accumulated over decades of suppressing party activity. As a result, no force has been able to fully embody or represent its popular base.
He noted that while these parties once rallied around grand slogans like Palestine and Arab unity, the Syrian revolution and the collapse of traditional frameworks forced them inward. Their regional agendas gave way to survival struggles, leaving Syria without functioning political parties.
Badrani stressed that reviving party life now requires two essential conditions: a constitution that safeguards freedoms and a fair electoral law that allows genuine competition. Beyond that, parties must move away from rigid ideological frameworks and instead build inclusive, service-oriented organizations capable of addressing Syrians’ daily needs.
He concluded: “The future of Syria’s political parties will not lie in reproducing the old nationalist or religious models. It depends on their ability to rebuild on civic foundations, restore trust in politics, and reestablish the citizen as an active participant in public life.”
