Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 and the start of a transitional period under Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), the role of moderate Islam has become central to political and social debate in Syria. While al-Sharaa presents himself as a moderate leader seeking to ease conflicts, his Salafi-jihadist past and Syria’s history of sectarian tensions continue to cast doubt on whether a model of Islam can truly anchor stability.
For decades, moderate Islam in Syria was more a political construct than a free intellectual movement. Under Assad, it was portrayed as an instrument of regime preservation and rejection of secularism, promoted through a loyal clerical elite. In that era, “moderation” was defined by security standards: those who accepted state authority were considered moderate, while Islamic opposition was labelled extremist.
This political use of religion turned Islam into a tool of psychological and social control. Friday sermons were standardised and monitored by intelligence services, leaving little room for free theological debate. The image of the “believing president” served to legitimise authoritarianism and suppress dissent.
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After 2024: Ambiguous Moderation
With al-Sharaa and his coalition in power, a new discourse emerged, attempting to combine Islamic law with civil administration. Al-Sharaa portrayed himself as a moderate statesman guiding a transitional phase, stressing peace and moderation in international speeches. Yet his jihadist background, the adoption of Islamic law as the main source of legislation, sectarian massacres in coastal areas and Suwayda, and the suppression of opposition all undermined the credibility of this narrative.
According to Dr. Sharif al-Dawakhli, a researcher in international relations and terrorism, the interim constitutional declaration of 44 articles, set to last five years, preserved Islamic jurisprudence as the primary source of legislation. He argued that this contradicted Syria’s sectarian diversity and echoed elements of Assad’s rule. The declaration followed a bloody clash in the coastal region that left nearly 1,500 civilians, mostly Alawites, dead.
Al-Dawakhli stressed that relying on a jurisprudence developed over 1,400 years, containing thousands of interpretations and schools, poses major challenges. In classical Islamic law, the ruler enjoys absolute authority and cannot be deposed; opposition is treated as rebellion against religion. This stands in tension with modern principles of civil liberties and the right to opposition.
Egyptian scholar Ahmed Ban agreed, arguing that traditional jurisprudence cannot resolve Syria’s sectarian and political complexities. Instead, he called for a pragmatic secular political system based on citizenship and equal rights. He noted that the success of moderate Islam in easing tensions depends less on religious frameworks than on the structure, values, and orientation of the political system.
Ban added that the challenges to implementing moderate Islam extend beyond extremist groups or shifting regional dynamics. They also include the absence of guidance that resonates with minorities and diverse communities. Imposing a single religious vision, he said, is insufficient; the political system itself is decisive, especially under continuing regional and international intervention.
The transitional authority has officially adopted a technocratic model, with constitutional reforms such as separation of powers and recognition of certain rights. Yet in practice, sectarian tensions persist, and hard-line Salafi groups within the coalition continue to exert pressure.
Moderate Islam as a Path to De-escalation
Despite these contradictions, moderate Islam remains a potential tool for easing tensions; provided it moves from political rhetoric to practice. Scholars suggest this requires balancing religious traditions with civil rights, rejecting religion as a tool of authoritarian control, reforming religious and educational institutions to promote openness, and empowering independent scholars and reformers to develop a renewed vision of Islam compatible with stability and coexistence.
Al-Dawakhli argued, however, that “moderate Islam” often functions as an image-management slogan rather than a solution to deeper structural issues. Reconciling Islamic principles with modern civil values remains a profound challenge. For many, Islam remains a spiritual and ascetic experience rather than a framework for political pluralism.
He insisted that addressing human needs is the starting point for peaceful coexistence. Religious institutions should foster a sense of shared national identity instead of sectarian or tribal loyalties. Countering hate speech and cycles of revenge must also become a top priority alongside reconstruction and reconciliation.
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A Regional Opportunity
Redefining moderate Islam in Syria could have implications beyond national borders. If successful, it could reduce polarisation between Islamic movements regionally, foster inter-sectarian dialogue, and restore religion as a unifying rather than divisive force.
Yet, as al-Dawakhli noted, Syria’s deep identity-based divisions; religious, ethnic, and communal remain entrenched. Collective grievances fuel a mentality of “us versus them.” This has only intensified under al-Sharaa’s presidency, amid economic decline that demands trust-building between state and citizens, and a roadmap linking political reconciliation with economic recovery.
Today, moderate Islam in Syria stands between a legacy of authoritarian co-option and a hesitant transitional experiment. But if it can overcome both security restrictions and jihadist rigidity, it could serve as a bridge toward easing tensions and building coexistence; offering a model for broader regional stability.
As al-Dawakhli concluded, Islam recognises human rights as divine obligations, and the state is bound to protect them. The challenge lies not in principle, but in practice. The way forward, he argued, is to renew religious discourse, reinterpret texts for the modern age, and adopt dialogue instead of exclusion. Only then can a balance be struck between religious tradition, human rights, and civil freedoms, while aligning Islamic values with international norms.
