As Syria undergoes profound transformations following the collapse of the Baathist regime, the issue of relations with Israel has resurfaced as one of the most complex and sensitive files on the table. From secret negotiations in the past to a new approach of conditional normalization, the “Israeli factor” appears more influential than ever. With a pragmatic policy now focusing on conditional engagement and greater independence from Iranian influence, speculations are mounting over the future of the Golan Heights and how a potential thaw with Israel might reshape regional stability.
Political activist Sadr al-Din Al-Yafi believes that Syria was once at the forefront of Arab rejection of the Israeli state. However, he identifies a turning point in 1967, when Hafez al-Assad, then Minister of Defense, ordered what he called a “tactical withdrawal” from the Golan Heights, an act Yafi sees as the most disastrous military and political setback for the Arab world, with consequences that persist to this day.
According to Al-Yafi, that period laid the groundwork for a new phase of covert engagement between Syria and Israel, rooted in dependency and backchannel communications. He points to the 1974 Disengagement Agreement following the October War, what he calls a “war of manoeuvring”, as the gateway that allowed Assad to occupy Lebanon politically and militarily.
Israel Investing in Post-Baath Syria
Speaking to +963, Al-Yafi asserts that Israel has capitalized on the fall of the Syrian regime by launching airstrikes that have disabled up to 90% of Syria’s military hardware, establishing a de facto buffer zone, and extending its operational presence within Syrian territory. He also accuses Israel of supporting separatism efforts by aligning with local actors in Suwayda, aiming to redraw Syria’s geography and establish new understandings as detrimental as those under the previous regime.
Al-Yafi further argues that Israel’s evolving policy reflects regional shifts and international pressures. While past coordination focused on Baathist rulers, Tel Aviv is now reportedly reaching out to emerging Islamist forces, concerned that a broad-based, nationally legitimate Syrian leadership could endanger its strategic interests.
He warns that Israel is actively exploiting the regime’s collapse to enforce new dynamics through military pressure and regional bargaining. Unless such actions are checked by the U.S. and key global actors, he cautions, Israel’s manoeuvres could destabilize both Syria and the wider region.
Regarding the Abraham Accords, Al-Yafi notes that Syria is currently uninterested in joining, due both to popular opposition and the political risks of such a move without careful, long-term planning.
Read also: Turkey’s Role in Syria: From Hafez al-Assad to Ahmad al-Sharaa
Between Conflict Legacies and Risky Rapprochements
In contrast to Al-Yafi’s perspective, political researcher Ali Thabet offers a broader historical reading. He sees Israeli Syrian relations as structurally embedded in Syria’s state formation since the early 20th century, intertwined with colonial projects like Sykes–Picot and the Balfour Declaration. He argues that the 1949 coup led by Husni al-Za’im, shortly after the armistice with Israel, was backed externally and formed the early blueprint for regional power alignments.
Thabet tells +963 that the 1974 disengagement agreement has served as a cornerstone in Syrian Israeli relations, keeping the Golan front largely quiet despite regional upheavals. He describes a long-running “peace track” that began with the U.S. invasion of Iraq and sought to bring Syria into the fold of treaties like Camp David and Wadi Araba, yet the unresolved Golan issue remains the central obstacle to any breakthrough.
Thabet warns that today’s political climate is dangerously unstable, especially with the backers of Syria’s transitional government proving too weak to withstand Israeli pressure. He says Israel sees this moment as an opportunity to neutralize Syria as a regional force, aiming to replicate the Lebanese or Palestinian models: militarily defanged, politically penetrable, and strategically passive.
He also criticizes the American approach, calling Trump’s policy transactional, leveraging Gulf wealth while using Turkey to maintain influence. The U.S., he argues, views the region solely through an Israeli lens.
Recently, Israeli media outlets reported a meeting between Syria’s transitional president Ahmad al-Sharaa and Israeli officials in Baku, Azerbaijan. Syrian newspaper Al-Watan quickly dismissed the claims, asserting that Al-Sharaa had not participated in any such talks. According to the report, Damascus is currently focused on ensuring Israeli compliance with the 1974 disengagement agreement, and normalization is not on the official agenda.
Secret Ties, Unspoken Agreements
Human rights activist Sulayman al-Kafiri highlights what he sees as a stark contrast between public Arab hostility toward Israel and the quiet normalization efforts of their governments. He believes that much of what has unfolded over the past five decades results from international agendas and undisclosed agreements between Israel and Arab capitals.
According to Al-Kafiri, while the fall of the Baathist regime should have reset relations, the current Syrian authority, installed with international approval, appears to be operating under the same paradigm. He suggests that public statements often mask private coordination.
Speaking to +963, Al-Kafiri claims Israel had a hand in the Baathist regime’s downfall and that a new roadmap for Syria was drafted in advance, including provisions for future ties with Tel Aviv. He alleges that Israel maintains informal communication channels with the transitional government, confirming that Syria’s current rulers do not operate independently of Israeli influence.
He further argues that President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s key role is to represent the Sunni religious majority, which comprises roughly 80% of Syria’s population. For Israel, he says, signing agreements with such a figure may be more reassuring than with representatives of minority factions.
Al-Kafiri concludes by stating that the roadmap followed by Al-Sharaa and his government is not merely reactive, but the result of prior agreements. These include Syria joining the Abraham Accords in exchange for sanctions relief and transforming the country’s south into a demilitarized zone. He points to the so-called “Abraham Route”, from Quneitra through Suwayda to al-Tanf, as a key component of this strategy, one that ultimately paved the way for Al-Sharaa’s rise to power.
