Turkey has long been a central player in Syria’s political and security developments since the modern Syrian state emerged after the Sykes–Picot Agreement and the end of the French Mandate. While the two countries share more than 900 km of border, their relationship has fluctuated over decades, shaped by tension, cautious rapprochement, and mutual strategic calculations. However, the current phase, following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime late last year, has been described as the most aligned, with Turkish-aligned actors now in power in Damascus.
Tensions and Cautious Engagement
Since Hafez al-Assad came to power in the mid-1960s and declared Syria’s alignment with the Soviet Union, relations with Turkey, then a NATO member aligned with the West, grew increasingly strained. The tension culminated in 1998 when Turkish President Suleyman Demirel deployed troops to the Syrian border, demanding Damascus expel PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who was residing in Syria. Syria complied, expelling Öcalan to Kenya, and subsequently signed the Adana Agreement, allowing Turkish forces to pursue national security threats up to five kilometres inside Syrian territory. The agreement was widely seen in Syria as Turkish coercion.
Bashar al-Assad Era and Arab Spring
When Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in 2000, relations began to thaw. By 2007, ties had warmed significantly, with the signing of joint economic and investment agreements and the easing of border restrictions. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Damascus and Aleppo, and the countries appeared to be building a strategic partnership, even as Syria maintained close ties with Iran and Russia.
This trajectory shifted dramatically with the outbreak of mass protests in Syria in 2011. Turkey immediately backed the uprising, urging Assad to reform and avoid violence. As the regime’s crackdown intensified, Ankara cut diplomatic ties and openly called for Assad’s departure. Whether this move was a genuine stance in support of the Syrian people or an opportunistic bid to expand Turkish influence remains a subject of debate.
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A Complex Role
Political analyst Majed Alloush, based in Gaziantep, Turkey, argues that “Turkey’s role in Syria has never been entirely constructive.” He notes that Ankara historically encouraged anti-Arab sentiment in some circles, pushing early Syrian leaders toward an alliance with Egypt to counter Turkish pressure. Relations hit their lowest point in the late 1990s but improved with Assad’s early outreach and Turkey’s eastward policy shift.
Alloush describes the early Assad-Erdoğan era as a political honeymoon, though it had negative economic implications for Syria and sparked friction with domestic economic elites. With the start of the Syrian revolution, Turkey’s policy pivoted once again. It can be said that the Turkish leadership secretly harbors an inclination to restore former imperial influence. However, with the faltering of the Syrian revolution and the declining fortunes of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region, the Turkish government sought to penetrate the Syrian impasse. It joined efforts with Russia and Iran to find a way out of the stalemate and courted Bashar al-Assad in hopes of securing a foothold and preserving some degree of influence.
Direct Military Interventions
Turkey’s role moved from political support and refugee hosting to direct military intervention. Turkish-backed Syrian opposition factions received arms and coordination, while Turkish forces launched operations inside Syria, claiming national security threats Kurdish forces. Since 2015, Turkey has participated alongside Russia and Iran in the Astana process, a platform for de-escalation and negotiation.
Turkey has led three major military campaigns: Operation Euphrates Shield (2016) against ISIS in al-Bab and Jarablus; Operation Olive Branch (2018) in Afrin; and Operation Peace Spring (2019) in northeast Syria targeting the SDF. Following these interventions, Turkey established de facto governance zones using Turkish currency, local councils, and administrative appointments.
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December, just as Ankara was moving toward a diplomatic rapprochement, marked a turning point. Turkey promptly dispatched Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin to meet newly installed Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa. This signalled a move from indirect opposition support to direct engagement at the highest levels.
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Strategic Calculations Going Forward
Alloush notes that while the new Syrian leadership includes factions ideologically close to Ankara, they do not necessarily view Turkey as the legitimate guardian of regional Islam or leadership. With limited resources and growing Arab and European support for Syria’s reconstruction, Turkey faces strategic constraints.
He argues that Turkey is likely to offer limited military support, facing Israeli objections and Arab scepticism, especially regarding Turkish base-building plans. Ankara may also avoid repeating its costly Libya model and instead seeks more sustainable leverage through loyal local actors, particularly the Syrian Turkmen Council.
Despite these limitations, security and military coordination between Ankara and Damascus is expected to increase, even as the new Syrian government leans toward the Arab Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, under U.S. supervision. Last week, Turkey’s Defense Ministry reported that the Syrian government formally requested Turkish assistance in counterterrorism, including against ISIS. Turkey pledged to train, advise, and support Syrian forces, potentially anchoring a deeper role that reaches into central Syria.
