By Hevi Salim
Eight months have passed since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and Syria is still struggling to find its footing amid the rubble of decades of authoritarianism and unresolved internal explosions. The transitional phase is facing immense challenges, burdened by the legacy of the former regime and deeply entangled regional and international dynamics.
Today, Syria stands at a historic crossroads: Are we witnessing the birth of a Third Republic that might correct the structural failures of the previous ones? How can a comprehensive national consensus be built? What role will regional powers like Turkey and Israel play? And is there a real possibility of building a state based on equal citizenship?
In this in-depth interview, Syrian writer and researcher Mohammad Said Rasas offers a sharp analysis of the post-December 8, 2024 period, and outlines a vision for an inclusive national salvation project.
Q: After eight months under the transitional authority, how do you evaluate this period?
This is not merely a political transition; it is a historical test for the entire Syrian state. When Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiri fell in 1985, General Abdel Rahman Swar al-Dahab famously said: “Unlucky is the one who rules after Nimeiri.” I believe this applies even more strongly to whoever rules Syria after Assad. The devastation left behind, from Hafez to Bashar al-Assad, dwarfs what Sudan endured under Nimeiri.
This isn’t just “post-dictatorship.” It’s an explosion of long-suppressed, multi-layered crises, internal and external. We need to examine these past eight months closely: What latent crises have erupted? Which new problems were generated by the transitional phase itself? And what remains buried, waiting to surface?
Syria has been a battlefield of intersecting international, regional, and local conflicts since 2011. We’re not in the recovery phase yet. That’s why no single faction or political party, or even a lone governing body, can navigate a ship of this magnitude through such stormy waters. We need a genuine national consensus, backed by clear regional and international will.
Read also: Turkey’s Role in Syria: From Hafez al-Assad to Ahmad al-Sharaa
Q: Given your assessment, what mechanisms can produce this national consensus?
We must recognize that we are building a “Third Syria.” The First Syria was born on March 8, 1920, after the end of Ottoman rule, and was short-lived, defeated at Maysalun by the French. The Second Syria was born on April 17, 1946, with the departure of French forces, but it collapsed on December 8, 2024.
The key difference between those births was the presence, or absence, of a foundational awareness.
The 1920 experience was based on a general national congress, whose members were popularly elected. They chose Prince Faisal as monarch, transformed the assembly into a constitutional body, and formed an executive government. It was a mature, though brief, experiment.
By contrast, the 1946 version lacked that founding awareness. It led to military rule, then full-fledged authoritarianism.
Today, talk of “dialogue” or “partial initiatives” is not enough. What’s needed is a general national founding conference, with elected representatives from political, economic, social, and military sectors, to draft a new national project from scratch.
Q: Decentralization is a key topic but fraught with fear. How do you approach it?
The future structure of the Syrian state shouldn’t be imposed from above or dictated by foreign powers, or even by elite circles. It must be discussed and agreed upon within a constitutional committee that emerges from the national founding conference.
No one holds the authority to decide this matter before Syrians themselves come to a consensus.
Decentralization should be primarily administrative and economic, organizing the relationship between the centre and provinces. Administrative boundaries should be based on economic logic, not sectarian or ethnic lines.
Q: What is your assessment of the roles played by Turkey and Israel in Syria’s crisis and future?
If you study Syrian history since 1920, you’ll see that problems with Kemalist Turkey are not new. They go back to the 1921 Ankara–Paris Agreement that carved away 18,000 square kilometres of Syrian land, and to the 1939 annexation of the Sanjak of Alexandretta (Iskenderun). These issues arose with the Turkey of Atatürk.
During the 2011–2024 crisis, Turkey played a pivotal role, steering parts of the Syrian opposition, both politically and militarily, in line with its national interests. Today, Ankara holds significant leverage within Syria.
Israel, on the other hand, never had internal instruments. It relied solely on its military power. Since the regime’s fall, it has sought to enforce normalization by force, but has so far failed, as seen in the recent escalation in southern Syria. The U.S. and some Western actors believe normalization is premature. Instead, they support a revised version of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement as a middle ground.
Read also: Syria: Between Neo-Ottoman Ambitions and Israel’s Expanding Vision
Q: What would a balanced and natural relationship with Turkey look like?
I believe Kemalist Turkey is gone. Our problem was always with that version of Turkey. Today, there’s an attempt to build a new Turkey, based on understandings between Erdoğan, Devlet Bahçeli (leader of the Nationalist Movement Party), and Abdullah Öcalan (the imprisoned PKK leader).
If this post-Lausanne Turkey is successfully born, it could open a new chapter in relations with both Arabs and Kurds. With Greece and Armenians, that reconciliation will take longer. But for Syria, the moment is ripe to build a balanced relationship based on mutual respect and shared interests.
Q: How can Syria protect itself from future foreign interference?
The answer is both simple and difficult: Build a true state of citizenship.
When citizens enjoy equality, freedom, and dignity, they no longer need to invite foreign intervention to achieve their rights. Every external intervention in Syria stemmed from internal dysfunction. Therefore, the remedy begins within.
Q: How do you assess the role of Arab states in Syria’s post-Assad phase?
The Arab world has suffered from a power vacuum since the 1967 defeat. That vacuum allowed non-Arab powers, like Iran, Turkey, and Israel to fill the space. Now, with Iran’s influence waning, there are signs of a new Arab-international project, led by Washington and Riyadh, to reshape the region.
Saudi Arabia, in particular, views Syria as part of its national security sphere. Indicators of this include a deeper U.S.–Saudi alignment than we saw under Trump or Netanyahu. There’s a revival of the old Gulf economic vision: the Syrian coast as the Gulf’s gateway to the Mediterranean. That idea fuelled major oil pipeline projects in the 1940s and 50s (derailed by coups like those of al-Za’im and Shishakli).
Now, this vision seems to be returning, propelled by strategic economic and security factors.
Today, Syria stands on the edge of a founding moment, but the real question is: Can Syrians avoid falling into the trap of repetition? The choices are clear: No individual salvation, no replacement of one tyranny with another, and no foreign guardianship What’s needed is a national founding conference; one that builds a new social contract based on mutual recognition and national interest, not domination.
