Since 2011, real estate ownership has turned into a highly sensitive issue due to the displacement of millions and the enactment of Decree 66 and Law 10, both of which impose short deadlines and almost impossible evidentiary requirements for those who are absent. This threatens the loss of property rights and their conversion into low value shares through valuation committees with expansive authority. International organizations view these laws as tools effectively used to exclude owners and reshape the demographic map in destroyed or opposition leaning areas, while compensation remains unjust and does not guarantee return. Experts affirm that the continuation of these laws entrenches the effects of exclusionary policies and calls for a comprehensive review to safeguard the rights of Syrians inside and outside the country.
Exclusion of Owners
Nabil Shofan, a journalist based in France, tells +963 that Law No. 10 of 2018 and Decree 66 open the door wide to excluding displaced and uprooted persons by imposing short deadlines for proving ownership and procedures that are nearly impossible for absent owners to meet, which leads to the automatic loss of property rights. He notes that many have lost their documents and that announcements regarding zoning areas are made through limited official channels that fail to reach most affected individuals, rendering exclusion a practical reality rather than an unintended shortcoming, and functioning instead as a mechanism for redistributing property in the context of reconstruction.
Shofan explains that the implementation of both laws incorporates large areas into new master plans such as Marota City and Basilia City, with redesigned streets and infrastructure that alter the original urban fabric and open the way for land acquisition through legal instruments, depriving owners, particularly women, orphans and the displaced, of their rights without their knowledge. He views these policies as reshaping the population map and laying the foundations for demographic engineering tied to reconstruction mechanisms.
Shofan warns that compensation and housing alternatives are insufficient and do not remedy the loss of property. The law grants rent allowances only to tenants and does not clarify the fate of owners, rendering the legislation ambiguous according to Human Rights Watch. He believes that focusing reconstruction in loyalist areas or for influential investors deepens concerns over demographic change and redistributes property in favor of specific groups at the expense of residents who have lost their homes and neighborhoods entirely.
Read also: Demographic Engineering in Syria: Old Patterns, New Realities
Technical Committees and Redistribution of Ownership
Mustafa Hani Idris, a member of the Ru’a Center for Political Studies and based in Latakia, tells +963, in response to the question: “To what extent do ownership proof requirements and registration procedures in Laws 10 and 66 open the door to excluding a wide segment of owners and displaced persons, and what is the impact on the demographic structure of reconstruction zones?”
Idris believes that the requirements for proving ownership and registration under Law No. 10 of 2018 and Law No. 66 of 2012 are in practice effective tools of exclusion rather than merely administrative measures. He explains that these laws impose on owners, especially the displaced and refugees, an almost impossible burden to prove their ownership within a short timeframe.
He notes that these laws often require personal presence or an officially notarized power of attorney from regime embassies, which is extremely difficult for millions who have left the country. He adds that this requirement opens the door wide to the effective confiscation of property. When an absent owner fails to prove their rights, ownership is converted into low value compensatory shares, effectively forcing them to sell or relinquish their rights.
Idris analyzes the demographic impact by stating: the impact on the demographic structure is deliberate and systematic. These mechanisms ensure that original owners who opposed the regime or fled the conflict will not be able to return and regain their properties. Consequently, this paves the way for altering the population composition of strategic and destroyed areas and facilitates the transfer of ownership to investors close to the regime or loyalist groups, thereby reshaping demographic maps and political loyalties in those areas.
Idris explains that technical committees established under these laws are granted broad and nearly absolute discretionary powers, particularly in assessing the value of properties within zoning areas. These valuations serve two core purposes that ultimately reshape ownership distribution.
He explains that first, properties are often valued at prices far below actual market value and insufficient for owners to buy alternative housing. This low valuation constitutes an initial step in the economic displacement of original owners. Second, property rights are converted into shares in the zoned area.
He notes that owners then find themselves holding shares instead of tangible property, undermining their bargaining power. These shares, especially for small properties, do not necessarily entitle owners to a unit of equivalent size or location, often forcing them to sell.
Idris continues that this process opens the door for major investors, often linked to authorities, to purchase and accumulate remaining shares, enabling them to control reconstruction and property redistribution in ways that allow them to own vast tracts of land.
He concludes that this reshapes the population map by dissolving individual ownership in favor of corporate ownership, changing the region’s social and economic makeup and introducing new populations.
Risks for Absent Owners and the Role of Authorities
Idris stresses that absent or displaced owners face the very real risk of losing their property entirely. Procedural requirements such as notarized powers of attorney and original ownership documents, many of which were lost or destroyed during the war, constitute administrative barriers that most refugees and displaced persons cannot overcome.
He notes that these requirements are not simply bureaucratic measures but mechanisms created to manage the conflict and enable property seizure. Failure to meet these requirements places property at risk of being transferred to public ownership or the zoning authority.
Idris analyzes the demographic implications, stating that this situation directly affects the demographic balance of the area. If millions of absent owners cannot reclaim their property, the option of return is effectively removed.
This cements the demographic changes that occurred during the uprising and transforms destroyed areas into zones that can gradually be repopulated by groups aligned with political or security agendas.
He concludes that this freezes the current demographic reality. He adds that these are laws enacted under the fallen regime, and revisiting them is necessary to change their intended outcomes. Without such review, nothing will change.
He continues that authorities and investors play interlinked and central roles in directing reconstruction projects, roles closely tied to political and security considerations. Authorities use their powers to designate areas where these zoning laws will apply.
These are often areas that suffered extensive destruction or hold strategic importance near major urban centers. This selection is based on security and political priorities aimed at permanently securing these zones.
Investors, often front companies linked to the authorities or well connected businessmen, acquire development rights and purchase property shares from absent or coerced owners. This ensures that reconstruction remains in the hands of those who serve political agendas.
He notes again that these laws originated under the ousted regime and must be reassessed to nullify their malign objectives. Since these laws were designed to achieve such objectives, this joint direction aims to reshape the population identity of affected areas.
By preventing the return of original residents and facilitating the settlement of new, loyalist or security affiliated groups, reconstruction becomes a tool for altering demographic allegiance, consolidating control over territory and transforming formerly hostile areas into supportive ones.
Read also: Internal Displacement in Syria: A Crisis Reshaping Society and the Economy
The Value and Fairness of Compensation
Idris explains that according to observers and human rights organizations, financial compensation and housing alternatives provided by these laws are neither adequate nor fair in most cases. The core problem lies in the undervaluation of properties, which does not reflect actual market prices or living costs.
Compensation rarely enables original owners to purchase an equivalent home in an urban area. This leaves them with a difficult choice: accept meager cash compensation that forces them to seek shelter in rural or remote areas, or wait for a small residential allocation in the new project, a process that may take years.
He analyzes the consequences, stating that this is not merely economic injustice but a mechanism of indirect forced displacement. By offering ineffective compensation, original residents are effectively pushed out of their historical and social environments.
This serves a broader objective by creating space for deliberate population changes previously intended and possibly still ongoing. Investment companies and regime associates then develop and build for new or loyalist populations, furthering demographic reengineering.
Idris concludes by stressing the need to place these laws, especially Laws 10 and 66, within their historical and political context. These laws were issued under the fallen regime, and current authorities continue to apply them in practice. This continuity means ongoing implementation of the former regime’s projects and goals, including demographic restructuring of urban areas.
He calls for the current authorities, amid unprecedented humanitarian challenges and the presence of millions of displaced persons and refugees, to fundamentally reassess these laws.
He warns that Syria cannot be rebuilt on the basis of laws that entrench exclusion and legitimize indirect confiscation. The solution lies in suspending these laws entirely and issuing new transparent legislation, or making substantive amendments that guarantee property rights for absent owners and provide fair and accessible mechanisms to prove ownership remotely. He stresses that this is essential to halting demographic projects based on displacement.
