By Noha Sweid
Amid Syria’s political transformations following the fall of the Assad regime, women’s representation in the new authority has become a critical indicator of whether the ruling body Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is genuinely committed to inclusive governance. From the outset, however, the headline was clear: limited female presence and rhetoric steeped in ideological discourse. The new authority quickly revealed its vision for women’s place and rights.
On December 22, 2024, Ms. Aisha al-Dibs was appointed head of the Women’s Affairs Office within the Political Affairs Administration of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government. In her first statement, al-Dibs declared: “We will work to build a model suited to the situation and conditions of Syrian women,” stressing that “Islamic Sharia will be the foundation of any model.” She further asserted: “I will not open the space to those who differ with me ideologically,” clarifying that organizations not aligned with this “model” would not be permitted to operate.
In this same vein, remarks by Ubaida Arnaout, spokesperson for the Political Affairs Administration, sparked heated debate. In December 2024, he stated that “a woman’s essence, her biological and psychological nature, does not suit all positions.” These words raised serious concerns about sidelining women from sovereign and ministerial posts.
From the very beginning, the dominance of ideological thinking over the transitional government’s policies was evident: only one woman was appointed to a ministerial post out of 23.
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These developments show that women’s representation in the new authority remains restricted to administrative or marginal roles, without any real impact on political decision-making. This trajectory contradicts societal and human rights demands for effective female participation in all state institutions, raising pressing questions about the transitional government’s commitment to inclusivity and equality in governance.
How, then, will women’s position and rights be reshaped under political Islam?
Under Assad, policies were marked by duality: official rhetoric promised “modernization” and “equality,” while legal and social structures entrenched discrimination. The new phase under political Islam, however, places women in an even more complex equation. The debate is no longer about weak implementation or selective enforcement, but about redefining rights themselves according to religious-legal standards. This risks institutionalizing gender hierarchy in law and policy, with far-reaching consequences for civic and political life.
At the same time, international legal frameworks continue to define obligations. Syria, as a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), is formally required to align any new legal framework with international standards prohibiting gender-based violence and discrimination. Yet in practice, previous reservations on CEDAW, combined with the conservative rhetoric of political Islam, render such alignment more of a fraught test than a guaranteed policy. Women already burdened by gendered legal restrictions under Assad and the devastating consequences of armed conflict (sexual violence, displacement, loss of livelihoods), now face a new phase in which traditional “customs” risk being codified into binding law.
Thus, the central issue goes beyond a political transition from authoritarianism to religious governance. It reopens the fundamental question of rights and freedoms: Will the new Syria break with women’s marginalization, or extend and entrench the structures of exclusion? Can Syrian political Islam reconcile itself with gender equality, or will its duality,outward political pragmatism paired with internal social conservatism produce an even narrower reality than before?
HTS’s experiment in Idlib, which it seeks to impose nationwide, highlights three interconnected dimensions of political Islam’s policies:
Religious-Legal: HTS practices a form of “institutionalized religiosity” that maintains a flexible outward discourse but imposes strict internal controls, limiting women’s education, work, and mobility, while enforcing rigid dress codes and segregation.
Political-Authoritarian: These restrictions become instruments of domination, with women’s activism placed under heavy surveillance, weakening its impact.
Rights-Based-International: Practices clash with CEDAW and Syria’s international commitments under the new constitutional declaration regarding women’s right to work, education, and political participation, placing any new legal framework under pressure to reconcile Islamic references with international standards on gender equality.
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Meanwhile, Syrian women continue to face grave violations that amount to war crimes, including sexual violence, kidnapping, arbitrary detention, and forced displacement, worsened by HTS offensives in coastal areas and Sweida. Activists and feminists have been subjected to harassment, threats, smear campaigns, and restrictions aimed at silencing them, in clear violation of the Geneva Conventions and CEDAW.
This conflict has deepened women’s economic and social fragility, exposed them to gender-based violence, and threatened to shrink civic space further, multiplying violations while undermining state and de facto authorities’ obligations to ensure protection and accountability.
The reality today reveals an increasing codification of “public morality,” with social customs on dress, gender mixing, and public life transformed into binding national regulations. This imposes further restrictions on women’s mobility, education, and work, narrowing the space for feminist activism and widening the gap between international commitments and local policies.
At times, authorities may resort to selective moratoria under popular or international pressure, only to reinstate strict controls later. Such an approach fosters chronic legal and social uncertainty, leaving women’s gains fragile and temporary, undermining long-term planning and rendering women’s civic participation hostage to political whims.
The relationship between political Islam and women’s rights in Syria remains deeply complex, serving as a litmus test for the credibility of any political project on the ground.
Traditional political Islam, for all its controversies, offers a clear ideological and political project implemented through state institutions, education, and social regulation, including a systematic vision of women’s roles.
HTS, by contrast, lacks such a coherent political identity. Its approach to women is not grounded in a consistent ideological vision but shifts with power dynamics and immediate political and security calculations. Religion is used instrumentally to justify authority and secure temporary gains rather than to build stable institutions or a cohesive social project. This ideological fragility is reflected in the stark duality between its outward commitments and restrictive internal practices.
Thus, the essential question arises: Does HTS truly belong to political Islam, or is it merely an armed faction that exploits religion to achieve temporary objectives?
The current moment represents a defining test for the nature of Islamic governance in Syria. It reveals whether any political project can reconcile international obligations, societal pressures, and religious references, while creating at least minimal space for women’s equality and participation.
With the political and social horizon still fragile, the question remains open: Can Syria move beyond the instrumentalization of religion as a tool of control, toward a project that respects rights and secures genuine institutional stability?
