The constitutional declaration adopted in Syria a few months ago was not a mere formality or an administrative measure. From its very first moment, it appeared as an attempt to craft a charter that ties a fragmented present to a burdensome past. When Islamic jurisprudence was invoked as one of the primary sources of legislation, it seemed as though the authorities were seeking roots deeper than any political agreement, roots that draw their legitimacy from a collective memory that still regards religion as an indispensable reference. Yet this choice, which Damascus intended as a bridge toward stability, quickly turned into a gateway to a wider conflict: a conflict over who holds the right to interpret Sharia, and who monopolizes its representation in the political sphere.
As for Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which announced its dissolution at the end of last January, it never truly left the stage. The uniforms changed, but the faces remained the same, with most of its key figures moving into the very heart of power under official titles, from the president to ministers and officials now shaping the features of a state that claims to be opening a new chapter. The regime thus seems to shed its skin without ridding itself of the lingering scent of yesterday embedded in its pores. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood raises the banner of protest, not merely because it lost political ground, but because it views the entire scene as a falsification of a legitimacy it once considered itself the guardian of. How, they ask, can Islamic jurisprudence be summoned to lend constitutional authority, while they are shut out of power? In this way, the constitution becomes a fractured mirror: each current glimpses its own reflection within it and refuses to let its image blend with another’s.
Parallel to this contested political scene, the military establishment is moving with deliberate calm but considerable weight. The Ministry of Defense is not only reorganizing its combat ranks but is also venturing into the realms of thought and religion, as if intent on instilling in the soldier, alongside obedience and discipline, a carefully crafted creed that guarantees loyalty to the ruling order. The curricula recently reported on by al-Modon newspaper are not conventional educational materials; they range from Qur’an, biography, and jurisprudence to modern Syrian history, including a crucial chapter on “intellectual currents” that labels extremism as “Kharijite,” thereby invoking an ancient jurisprudential legacy to legitimize today’s fight against radicalism. Yet the most telling marker in these curricula is the adoption of Shafi‘i jurisprudence as the official reference, a clear rupture with Salafism that for years nourished jihadist discourse and provided it with its legal cover.
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What makes the picture even more complex is that those leading this process are not traditional jurists or figures emerging from outside the conflict. Instead, they are prominent names from HTS itself: Mazhar al-Wais, now Minister of Justice; Abdul Rahim Atoun, presidential adviser on religious affairs; and others. These men, once pillars of jihadist theorizing, have now recast themselves as architects of moderation, drafting new curricula that attempt to fuse all currents into one crucible, rehabilitating the Ash‘aris, Maturidis, and Sufis, once cast as internal enemies in jihadist literature. It is a paradox that encapsulates the trajectory of the new authority: recycling the jihadist elite itself, but under a different ceiling, transforming them from bearers of the banner of arms into guardians of the official gate of legitimacy.
Still, the regime is not alone in attempting to redefine the religious frame of reference. The Muslim Brotherhood continues its oppositional rhetoric, seeing in this “official Shafi‘ism” a deliberate attempt to diminish their role and exclude their project. For them, the issue is not with adopting Sharia as a source of legislation per se, but with the way its interpretation has been monopolized and their participation barred. Here lies the essence of the struggle: not over religion itself, but over the right to monopolize its interpretation and instrumentalize it in the making of power.
Alongside this, the Ministry of Defense is enforcing a strict internal system for managing moral guidance. Every soldier undergoes training courses, defected officers are sidelined, and delegations are dispatched to Saudi Arabia for training, according to specialized online outlets. In this dimension, it becomes clear that the new reference is not being forged in Damascus alone but also rests on a regional umbrella that reconnects the regime with major religious centers. Saudi Arabia, once the spiritual reference for Salafi and jihadist currents in past decades, is now being summoned to grant Syrian “military moderation” official blessing, a turn that is as political as it is jurisprudential.
In this sense, what is unfolding in Syria today is more than a reordering of curricula or institutional structures. It is a struggle over the very essence of the state. Will the coming legitimacy be an extension of the jihadist jurisprudence broken on the battlefield? Or of the Muslim Brotherhood’s interpretations excluded from the political arena? Or of Shafi‘i jurisprudence, drawn from the vaults of the past to clothe the present in a more moderate garb? In the background of this struggle, the army looms as the ultimate laboratory, where references are distilled and refashioned into a single military creed.
Perhaps the most vivid image of this scene is that Syria today resembles a fractured mirror. Each crack reflects a different face of legitimacy. Every current reaches out to seize a shard it deems its own, yet none has the ability to assemble the pieces into a coherent whole. The constitutional declaration provided the regime with a cover, but it did not extinguish the questions. The integration of Islamists into state institutions reproduced them with new faces, but did not erase their old memories. Sending delegations to Saudi Arabia opened a regional door, but at the same time tethered Syrian legitimacy to external factors.
Thus, the crisis of identity and legitimacy in Syria remains unresolved. It is not merely a dispute between the state and Islamists, but a struggle over the very reference that grants governance its meaning. Without settling this question, legitimacy will remain suspended in the air, oscillating between constitutional texts, jurists’ fatwas, and regional allegiances, while Syria continues to search for an identity capable of uniting its fragments into a single, unbroken mirror.
