After the fall of ISIS’s so-called caliphate in 2019, the organisation continued to exist through small, decentralised cells that move from one place to another – sometimes openly, sometimes in secret. Following the collapse of the Assad regime, ISIS activity intensified and its mobility increased, even as its most well-known base remained the Syrian desert, particularly around Palmyra. There, the group benefits from the vast desert terrain, which enables concealment, movement, and the execution of killings or bombings that have not ceased since the regime’s fall. This escalation came amid the announcement by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham that it had dissolved itself after assuming government authority, alongside its declaration of cooperation with the United States in combating terrorism represented by ISIS.
However, the group is not confined to the desert. Its operations extend from Deir ez-Zor to Aleppo and its countryside, Idlib, Raqqa, and even Homs, Daraa, and the Damascus countryside. In all these areas, ISIS maintains sleeper cells that move covertly and carry out sudden attacks targeting members of the new Syrian security forces as well as civilians. Despite repeated attempts to eradicate the organisation entirely, these efforts appear unsuccessful. Neither the Syrian Democratic Forces – which have long led the fight against ISIS – nor the United States and coalition forces, nor the new authorities have managed to significantly curb its operations. News emerges of arrests here and there, or of US raids targeting or detaining individuals said to belong to the group, yet without clarity regarding who these figures are, or the identities of those detained or killed in what are described as ongoing counter-terrorism operations.
Several weeks ago, during security and military meetings in Palmyra involving US officers, one of the security personnel assigned to protection duties carried out an attack that killed two American officers and the interpreter accompanying the delegation – with no mention made of Syrian casualties. The United States responded with military operations that, according to an official American source, could last for more than a month. Does this incident indicate infiltration by ISIS within the ranks of the new authorities? In reality, the group’s ideology differs only in minor details from that of many jihadist factions that have recently been integrated into the Ministry of Defence. Syria’s prolonged war has produced deep fractures in concepts such as citizenship, justice, and faith. Years of war, displacement, life in camps, and isolation from diversity have shaped generations that were never given the chance to experience alternative realities. Accumulated grievances among Syrians have fuelled enduring resentment, often nourished along sectarian lines throughout the conflict – whether by the former regime or by armed factions – even though those responsible for killings and abuses came from all Syrian communities without exception.
Even if the international community were to refrain from imposing conditions on genuine power-sharing within the state – including the construction of a military and security apparatus representing all Syrians – this would still require a transformation of the army’s doctrine from a religious framework to a national one. Such a shift demands a new and different official and media discourse, accompanied by the criminalisation of sectarian rhetoric, an end to incitement, and the development of new educational plans that treat Syrian history as a shared narrative shaped by all components of society. It also requires redefining culture and activating its role in society and state-building, as culture constitutes a cornerstone of reconstruction. This includes independent and official cultural production at all levels. These are, in any case, long-term steps necessary to rescue future Syrian generations from extremism and the ideology of excommunicating the ‘other’.
Yet Syria today is also in need of urgent measures to prevent the spread of ISIS and its ideology within society and state institutions, and to halt indiscriminate killings. This requires international and regional coordination to compel the new authorities to withdraw weapons from civilians and to unify their discourse towards all Syrians. It also necessitates strengthening intelligence and information security capable of monitoring and tracking cells, uncovering their locations, and identifying their networks within society. Such measures may prove more effective than poorly planned military operations. This effort further requires activating channels of dialogue between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the interim government for the exchange of information on ISIS and similar groups, given that the SDF has long been directly engaged in this issue. Cooperation must also include the SDF, the Syrian authorities, coalition forces, and neighbouring countries – including Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon – not only to strike ISIS, but also to prevent the flow of fighters and jihadists across borders. In addition, a sustainable solution is needed for the families of ISIS detainees held in SDF prisons, alongside the establishment of an effective and fair judicial system that ensures legal oversight for all.
Read also: The Syrian Badia: ISIS’s last refuge
Ultimately, the most important step in confronting ISIS lies in entrenching political, economic, and social stability. ISIS thrives on chaos, political and security vacuums, and economic collapse – conditions that deepen poverty and provide ideal breeding grounds for extremist ideologies in all their forms.
In short, defeating ISIS cannot be achieved solely through military operations that exacerbate grievances the organisation knows how to exploit. What matters more is the genuine will of the interim authorities to pursue real change and a peaceful democratic transition towards a state of citizenship – through genuine dialogue with all segments of society, the rejection of sectarian fanaticism, and the abandonment of religious dominance that undermines national identity and belonging. ISIS is not the monster it is often portrayed to be. It is, ultimately, an organisation manufactured in some hidden basement – and one that can be dismantled when genuine international will exists.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of +963.
