Security challenges continue as ISIS maintains its presence in the Syrian Badia to this day, despite its military defeat and the loss of territorial control across large parts of Syria and Iraq in 2019. The Badia’s vast geography and complex desert terrain continue to provide a suitable environment for ISIS cells to operate using guerrilla-style tactics, exploiting security gaps and fragmented military efforts.
Field data indicates that ISIS activity in the Syrian desert persists at an intermittent yet impactful pace. According to multiple security assessments and reports published by local and international media in recent years, dozens of attacks have been recorded across the Badia stretching between Homs, Deir ez-Zor, and Raqqa in central and eastern Syria. These attacks have largely targeted military positions, supply convoys, energy fields, and fuel tankers. Most operations have taken the form of ambushes and hit-and-run attacks, reflecting the group’s shift from territorial control to a strategy of security attrition.
Estimates suggest that ISIS still has around 2,000 active fighters in Syria, particularly in the Badia areas of Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and Hasakah, according to reports issued by the media centre of the Syrian Democratic Forces. Local security sources and field assessments, however, indicate that the number may be higher – ranging between 2,500 and 3,000 fighters operating in the Syrian desert.
In this context, Dr Marwan Shahadeh, a researcher specialising in Islamic movements, explains that the vast expanse of the Badia – stretching into Iraq’s Anbar desert, reaching Al-Bukamal and the Deir ez-Zor countryside, as well as extending towards Palmyra – makes it extremely difficult to control ISIS cells. He notes that such terrain requires large troop numbers, advanced equipment, and high-level coordination.
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Speaking to +963, Shahadeh says: “The Syrian army, in its current form, does not exceed 40,000 personnel. This number is insufficient to secure the areas under government control. The Syrian government would need around 200,000 troops to fully impose control over its territories. As for the desert, it remains particularly difficult to control at present, as it is security- and militarily porous. This allows ISIS cells to move freely. The area also contains weapons caches, hideouts, and tunnels belonging to the group. In this sense, the Badia has been the safest refuge for ISIS over the past years, and I expect it to remain so in the near future.”
For his part, journalist Suleiman Al-Mohammad confirms in comments to +963 that ISIS activity in the Syrian Badia has not declined significantly in recent years. Instead, the group has relied on ambushes and small units, deliberately avoiding direct confrontation – a pattern shaped by a combination of field and organisational factors.
Al-Mohammad points out that several reasons explain ISIS’s continued activity in the desert. Chief among them is the multiplicity of controlling forces across Syria. Military presence in the Badia is divided among several actors with differing priorities and limited coordination, creating opportunities for rapid, organised attacks. He adds that military focus often centres on populated urban areas, while the desert receives far less security and military coverage – a reality that ISIS continues to exploit.
He further explains that ISIS relies in the Badia on a strategy of attrition warfare, operating through small, fully independent cells – including their supply routes and checkpoints – without the need to monitor territory or administer large population centres.
The Syrian journalist stresses that Syria’s ongoing economic and social conditions continue to facilitate the group’s ability to recruit collaborators or secure logistical support. This is compounded by ISIS’s capacity to gather detailed intelligence in the desert, where the open terrain enables ease of targeting and manoeuvre. He notes that the group has long been familiar with the area’s geography, relying on old smuggling networks and informal routes to ensure movement and supply, a tactic it has refined over years of operating in the Badia.
