Since the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, Syria under Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa has been taking steps to reorganize its foreign relations, particularly with key former allies such as Russia. In recent months, the scope of these diplomatic efforts has widened as Damascus began reassessing previous agreements and subjecting them to review with regard to the balance between sovereignty and mutual interests.
Syrian–Russian relations have witnessed intensive diplomatic activity since early autumn 2025, exchanging high-level visits covering energy, economy, security, and defense. Damascus received Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, while Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani visited Moscow in his first official trip after the political transition. Both sides agreed to reassess prior agreements and form joint committees to strengthen cooperation on the basis of mutual interests and respect for sovereignty.
In the same context, a Syrian military delegation led by General Ali al-Nassan met with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov to discuss ways to enhance defense coordination between the two countries. This process culminated in the visit of Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa to Moscow to discuss the future of Russian military bases, the handover of Bashar al-Assad for accountability, and key economic files. These moves are seen as an attempt to redefine the relationship with Russia between the paths of transitional justice and sovereignty on one hand, and influence and strategic partnership on the other.
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Transitional Justice and Interests
Analysts believe that the Interim President’s visit to Moscow carries a multifaceted character encompassing political, military, and economic issues, in an attempt to reframe the relationship with Russia after the Assad era.
Mustafa Qalaaji, Secretary-General of the Syrian Party for Change and Renaissance and a member of the Geneva delegation, told +963 that “al-Sharaa aims to achieve several key objectives through his anticipated visit to Moscow,” noting that “Russia has a clear presence and vested interests in Syria, while Syria also has deeply rooted interests with Russia dating back decades, the latest being the 2017 agreement.”
Qalaaji emphasized that “the Syrian presidency will seek to advance multiple interests during this visit, including the Port of Tartus, the Hmeimim base, and the situation in northeastern Syria, as well as relations with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Most importantly, according to him, is the continuation of de-escalation agreements through maintaining the Astana process in Syria.”
He believes that the relationship between the two sides is heading toward “a shift from the traditional format” that was based on political and military dependency under the former regime, to one “based on mutual interests.” He added, “Russia will try to capitalize on its relationship with Syria, which represents its last strategic foothold on the Mediterranean.”
However, Mahmoud al-Afandi, an academic and political analyst based in Moscow, offered a more optimistic reading to +963, stating that the visit represents the culmination of “a series of intensive diplomatic moves” that preceded it.
He said, “This visit was preceded by several important trips, including those of al-Shaibani, the head of general intelligence, and the minister of defense to Moscow,” adding that “President Putin’s reception of al-Shaibani indicated that the outcomes of those meetings were very positive.”
He noted that the subsequent reciprocal visits “confirm that there has been active preparation for a high-level meeting,” adding that the upcoming summit “will lay the foundation for future relations between Russia and Syria based on mutual respect.”
While Qalaaji stressed that transitional justice and accountability, particularly concerning Bashar al-Assad, would be among the visit’s central topics, saying that “the ousted Assad remains a key part of this file,” al-Afandi considered this argument “media speculation,” asserting that “there has been no official statement from the Syrian interim government requesting Russia to hand over Bashar Al-Assad,” and that the issue is “merely an attempt by some media outlets and Western governments to fish in troubled waters.”
Here, the difference between the two views becomes evident: while Qalaaji sees transitional justice as part of the new equation in relations, al-Afandi believes that this issue is not a focus of current understandings between Moscow and Damascus.
Building Trust
Both analysts agree that Syrian–Russian relations are in a phase of “rebuilding trust,” though they differ in their assessment of the depth and level of understanding achieved.
Qalaaji argues that “Russia was a key partner with the former regime in committing many war crimes,” stressing that “the new Syrian presidency will not overlook these facts,” indicating that the renewed relationship should be built on mutual interests rather than “forgiving the past.”
Al-Afandi, on the other hand, contends that “Russia and Syria are no strangers to complex relationships,” citing Moscow’s past experiences with “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)” and “the Taliban.” He added that “what Moscow is doing today reflects its political flexibility and its ability to handle difficult files.”
He said that the upcoming meeting “will lay the groundwork for strategic partnerships in multiple sectors,” pointing out that “Syria’s priority now is to build a strong army,” a goal that “can only be achieved through cooperation with Russia,” which “is not subject to external dictates and does not have partners like Israel, unlike the United States.”
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A New Phase: Strategic Partnership
Both sides agree that the relationship between Damascus and Moscow will not return to its former pattern of dependency, although they differ on the extent of change.
While Qalaaji believes that Russia “seeks to maintain its strategic influence in Syria, particularly regarding military bases and the Port of Tartus,” al-Afandi points out that “the issue of military bases was settled during al-Shaibani’s visit to Moscow,” adding that “the previous military agreement remains in effect, though not publicly announced.”
On the economic front, Qalaaji notes that “Russia lacks the capacity to play an active role in reconstruction due to the pressures from its war in Ukraine,” while al-Afandi asserts that “Russia is capable of contributing to energy and wheat projects,” revealing that “Qatar has joined the effort through an agreement with Russia to finance energy-sector reconstruction projects in Syria.”
They also differ in evaluating Russia’s role in transitional justice. Qalaaji believes that Moscow “must bear part of its responsibility for war crimes,” while al-Afandi insists that “issues of justice and sovereignty are purely internal Syrian matters, in which Russia neither intervenes nor can legally do so.”
Despite these differing perspectives, both analysts agree that Al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow opens a new chapter in Syrian–Russian relations, whose main theme is “the balance between interests and sovereignty.” The path toward building mutual trust remains long, but this time it is moving in a different direction from the past.
