A single term or phrase containing one or two words has carried multiple interpretations, some controversial, others outright rejected. The discussion here revolves around what has been called “radical Islam” and “moderate Islam.” These expressions emerged alongside the role religion played over past decades in shaping the ideologies of individuals and groups that became active globally. At the same time, voices have risen calling to replace the phrase “radical Islam” with “radicalism in Islam,” emphasizing that for some, religion has been used as a means to achieve private interests.
In an interview with +963, writer and political analyst Firas Alawi answered many questions, including how to end extremist discourse in a future Syria, whether reconciliation between Islamists and secularists in governance is possible, and how appropriate or necessary the move toward “social secularization” might be.
Below is the full interview:
What are the forms of “radical Islam,” and how have they evolved from past to present?
Personally, I prefer the term “radicalism in Islam,” which means moving in ideological and political directions that range from nonviolence to violence, with the most extreme point being the use of violence to bring about change. I believe we are facing a broad spectrum that extends from attempts at peaceful change to the utmost level of violence represented by jihadist radicalism.
The most notable changes occurred when leaders of jihadist movements, such as in Egypt, initiated revisions or shifted toward militant formations that carried out operations in different parts of the world, such as Al-Qaeda, which later evolved into ISIS. These transformations went in various directions, some toward intellectual revisions and less violent solutions, others toward maximum violence.
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Is “moderate Islam” capable of reducing social tension and polarization in the region?
I believe that the talk about moderate Islam is an inverted discourse. It is not accurate to say there is a “moderate” or “radical” Islam, nor a “simple” or “complex” Islam. There are theories within Islam and multiple interpretations among Muslims. Each adherent draws from them differently, some toward moderation, which is predominant, others toward extremes of radicalism or toward diluting the Islamic identity.
In my view, centrist Islam has the potential to resolve many issues in the Arab world, but this requires new awareness and educational processes, alongside a reexplanation of many concepts and the reinforcement of Islamic culture in its true, uncorrupted form.
How can extremist discourse be ended in a future Syria?
Generally speaking, Syria has witnessed the least spread of extremist discourse. It emerged after the Syrian revolution in waves and forms that began with Islamic factions fighting the regime, later evolving into organized structures. Yet, these organizations soon declined. Even Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which originated as a jihadist group, pragmatically declared its separation from Al-Qaeda and shifted toward domestic Syrian politics. We now observe intellectual transformations within that former organization, which once held power in Syria.
I believe that radical violence in Syria is far less widespread than in many other countries. The main source of violence has been the regime itself. Therefore, labeling Syria as a center of radicalism is an exaggeration. I rely on the Syrian society’s ability to dismantle this culture, ending the jihadist phase and beginning reconstruction as a pluralistic society capable of overcoming the traumas of past years. I also believe that both President Al-Sharaa’s discourse and the new government have surpassed much of the radical phase.
How do you view the Islamic governance models in Saudi Arabia and Turkey?
In truth, both the Saudi and Turkish models are advanced in their understanding of Islam’s relationship with life and society. Opinions may differ on governance styles: Saudi Arabia appears closer to conservative Islam than Turkey. I believe the nature of each system plays a role. In Saudi Arabia, there is no radical line within or outside authority, which has preserved Islam in its current form, distanced from radicalism, while keeping religious figures out of political power, thus maintaining their social position alongside state officials.
In Turkey, laws and the constitution have a secular character, which obliges successive governments, whether Islamic or secular, to adhere to constitutional principles.
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Is it possible for Islamists and secularists to reach a consensus in governing Syria?
I do not think there is a deep division between Islamists and secularists in Syria. The matter depends on who holds power. If secularists rise to power, the Islamic trend will naturally recede, and vice versa. Currently, the situation is different, with individuals and groups of Islamic backgrounds in power. However, it is likely that a civil trend will emerge in the coming period, one that is less secular and closer to moderation, which the current government seems to be pursuing. Islam in Syria is a centrist Islam, far removed from violence and radicalism.
What model does Syria need to rebuild the state after the fall of the former regime?
Syria primarily needs a participatory model that includes all national and civil forces from various currents. It must avoid confrontation and exclusion among different parties, while prioritizing the country’s economic reconstruction. At this stage, we need constructive economic ideas more than political ones, leaving the debate over governance methods to the constitution. Syrians are capable of building a civil conservative state, a model that could bring about relative stability.
Is there a need for Syria to follow the path of “social secularization”?
I do not believe Syria will pursue social secularization in the Western sense. Rather, it might move toward civil secularization, in other words, seeking civil currents within Syrian society and creating a balance between the conservative nature of both the authority and the people, and a centrist civility. Syria does not need extreme radicalism or excessive secularism. What we need now is a centrist approach, along with a consensual constitution and fair elections that reflect the true will of the Syrian people, whatever their orientation. The ballot box remains the best solution for shaping the state’s identity and direction.
