The fourteenth anniversary of the Syrian revolution coincided with the issuance of a constitutional declaration aimed at structuring the new administration. This declaration, drafted by a committee appointed by interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, granted him the authority to appoint the three branches of government—legislative, executive, and judicial—throughout the transitional period, which was set to last five years.
Instead of laying the groundwork for an inclusive political future, as Al-Sharaa often promised in his speeches, the constitutional declaration concentrated power in his hands without any mechanisms for oversight or accountability. The past three months had already fueled concerns over unilateral decision-making and exclusionary practices—evident in the appointment of officials exclusively from one faction, the hasty organization of a so-called “National Dialogue Conference,” and the formation of a new military and security apparatus largely composed of former members of the “Military Operations Administration,” dominated by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allied factions.
From a pragmatic perspective, expecting a democratic governance structure from an armed religious faction like HTS is unrealistic. The group’s fundamentalist ideology, past affiliation with extremist movements, and authoritarian rule in Idlib demonstrate a clear resistance to political pluralism or opposition. Over the years, the influence of pro-democracy currents within the Syrian opposition has waned as political Islamists took control of key institutions representing the revolution. While some Islamist factions have superficially embraced democratic principles, such as electoral processes and party pluralism, Salafi factions reject democracy outright, viewing it as incompatible with their interpretation of Islamic governance.
Despite these challenges, there was cautious optimism that Syria’s geopolitical complexities and its dire economic situation might necessitate a more inclusive governing model to attract international support for reconstruction. Al-Sharaa’s early public statements projected an image of openness and pragmatism, likely aimed at reassuring the global community.
However, recent security developments in Syria’s coastal regions have exposed the persistent influence of armed groups, including factions with foreign fighters, that were supposedly integrated into the Ministry of Defense. The government’s inability—or unwillingness—to curb sectarian violence perpetrated by these “unruly factions” has raised doubts about Al-Sharaa’s control, intentions, and his administration’s capacity to establish a stable state.
Read also: Syrian Transitional Government Set for Announcement on Saturday Amid Political Reshuffle
These security threats, in turn, undermine the possibility of a genuine political movement emerging to challenge the new regime. Opposition groups, whether political or civil, struggle to organize and assert their presence in the public sphere. Without political space to operate, efforts to shape a more participatory transitional period remain stifled.
The promise of democratic transformation that once fueled the Syrian revolution now seems more distant than ever. The nature of those in power, the role of armed factions in their ascent, and the regional and international arrangements that ended the Assad era all prioritize stability over freedom and democracy for the Syrian people.
The obstacles to a healthy political environment in Syria remain formidable. A truly competitive political landscape, reminiscent of Syria’s brief democratic experience in the 1950s, remains a distant memory. While that period was flawed and short-lived, it serves as a reminder that democracy is not foreign to Syrian society. The revolution itself gave rise to early signs of a burgeoning civil society and significant efforts to organize political and civic movements. Some of these initiatives persist, and in the immediate aftermath of Assad’s fall, they sparked dynamic political and cultural activity in Damascus and beyond.
As long as the balance of power on the ground remains tilted against political plurality and inclusion, Syrians will not have the chance to experience democracy. However, meaningful political reforms—driven by international and regional pressure—could offer renewed hope for a more open and participatory system. While democracy in Syria remains deferred, it is not an impossibility.
