The file of ISIS detainees and the camps housing the families of its members in northeastern Syria represents one of the most complex and dangerous issues in the current Syrian landscape, not only because of its security nature, but due to its deep entanglement with international and regional political calculations and its direct connection to the future of stability in Syria and the region. These prisons and camps, which hold thousands of fighters and tens of thousands of ideologically influenced women and children, are no longer merely a temporary humanitarian or security concern. They have become a deferred strategic dilemma, managed through a logic of containment rather than resolution, amid a clear absence of any serious international horizon to bring it to an end.
This reality unfolds amid a state of international stagnation and political confusion that has surrounded the file since the fall of the organization’s last territorial enclave in Baghouz in 2019. Despite the passage of more than five years since the military defeat of ISIS, these prisons and camps continue to represent one of the most dangerous hotspots of tension and sources of ongoing security threat locally, regionally, and internationally, in light of declining international attention and the preference of many states to keep the problem beyond their borders rather than confront it directly.
A Security File or a Political Card?
In this context, Nasreddin Ibrahim, Secretary of the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria, argues in statements to +963 that the core of the problem does not lie solely in the security nature of the file, but in the way it is handled politically. According to Ibrahim, the issue of ISIS detainees and the camps of their families is not managed merely as a security or humanitarian matter, but is used as a highly sensitive political card, in the absence of international recognition of the Autonomous Administration and amid the intertwining of this file with the broader complexities of the Syrian conflict. This reality, Ibrahim says, has contributed to entrenching partial and fragile solutions that have been adopted as a substitute for a comprehensive and sustainable resolution.
This view aligns with the assessment of researcher on jihadist movements Hasan Abu Hanya, who tells +963 that this file has been known and complex since ISIS lost its last geographic stronghold. Today, the prisons and camps hold around 8,500 foreign and Arab fighters, in addition to approximately 40,000 of their family members, most of whom are women and children. Abu Hanieh believes that this massive number of detainees makes the file one of the most complex security challenges in the region, in the absence of any genuine international desire to close it.
International Abdication and Domestic Calculations
Speakers agree that international abdication is the most influential factor in the continuation of the crisis. According to Abu Hanya, preparations by some countries, whether in the European Union or the Arab world, to repatriate their nationals have been extremely slow and limited. Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of those held in the prisons and camps are Syrians and Iraqis, without trials or reintegration or rehabilitation programs.
Abu Hanya explains that the primary motive behind this hesitation is political above all else, as many European states believe that repatriating these individuals could entail internal security risks, making it difficult to find a political official willing to bear that cost.
He adds that the US administration, particularly during the previous term of President Donald Trump, repeatedly called on countries to take back their nationals, given the small number of American fighters, but these calls met with little meaningful response.
For his part, Ibrahim believes that this international abdication has imposed a heavy security and political burden on northeastern Syria, pushing the relevant actors to adopt a policy of crisis management rather than working to end it effectively, whether through clear legal pathways or comprehensive political solutions.
The Legal and Trial Impasse
Legally, the crisis appears as an almost intractable dilemma. Syrian writer Firas Allawi notes in statements to +963 that this file is governed by complex political and security considerations, amid the absence of clear laws in countries of origin, particularly European ones, that could be relied upon to repatriate fighters and put them on trial. He stresses that this issue constitutes the primary obstacle to any serious legal or political track to address the file.
Allawi adds that a large portion of fighters’ families suffer from additional legal problems related to the absence of nationality or incomplete personal data, whether due to the use of aliases during their involvement with the organization or the absence of fathers’ names, creating logistical, security, and political difficulties simultaneously.
He also points out that the lack of agreements between countries of origin and the Syrian government, which does not itself control these prisons and camps, further complicates the picture and renders any potential solution postponed.
Abu Hanya reinforces this argument by pointing to the failure of proposals put forward over recent years, whether to establish international or special courts or to have regional states such as Iraq try these individuals, due to the absence of guarantees related to fair trials and political disagreements among the concerned parties.
A Renewed Security Threat and a Breeding Ground for Extremism
From a security perspective, speakers warn that the continuation of the current situation turns the prisons and camps into an ideal environment for reproducing extremism. According to Ibrahim, leaving these sites without radical solutions means providing fertile ground for the regeneration of extremist ideology, particularly among children who have grown up inside these camps in the absence of education and rehabilitation programs.
Abu Hanya goes further, describing the detainees today as forming something akin to a reserve army for ISIS, noting that they have become more rigid and extreme amid the chaos and imbalances prevailing in Syria.
In this context, he recalls the organization’s attack on al Sina’a prison in January 2022, during which fighting continued for weeks, as a living example of the group’s ability to exploit any security vacuum.
Firas Allawi believes that the danger is not limited to the reproduction of extremist ideology within the prisons and camps, but extends to the possibility of escapes, whether by individual elements or groups, in the event of changes in the geopolitical or security situation. He warns that these individuals constitute ticking time bombs if they are not addressed in a radical manner.
Deferred International Courts and an Open Political Struggle
Politically, Syrian politician Mohammad Arslan notes in statements to +963 that the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces have repeatedly proposed the establishment of an international court to try detained ISIS members, particularly leaders and emirs, but that most states have clearly ignored these calls, in what he described as a blatant abdication of legal and moral responsibilities.
Arslan adds that only a few states have repatriated their nationals and tried them, while the majority continue to deal with the file through a policy of turning a blind eye, preferring to leave detainees to face an unknown fate.
He also points out that the dispute over the fate of these individuals is not limited to the international dimension, but extends to an internal conflict with the Syrian government, which demands the handover of detainees, a demand that the Autonomous Administration categorically rejects.
Analysts’ readings converge on one conclusion: the file of ISIS detainees and the camps of their families has not been closed because there is no will to close it. The absence of international will, the clash of political calculations, and the lack of legal frameworks all keep this file open to dangerous possibilities, making it one of the most serious latent threats to local, regional, and international security, awaiting an explosion that could bring ISIS back to the forefront, not as a state, but as an idea and a transnational organization.
