Recent developments in Britain’s sanctions policy towards Syria suggest a noticeable shift in London’s approach after years of imposing broad measures that affected the state and its institutions.
In a new step, the British government announced targeted sanctions against several individuals linked to the current Syrian army. The timing is sensitive, coinciding with an intensifying international focus on counter-terrorism, alongside growing debates over the restructuring of Syria’s security and military institutions and the regulation of armed factions incorporated within them.
These measures reflect a move away from comprehensive sanctions that placed a heavy burden on the economy and society, towards targeted sanctions aimed at specific individuals. They are based on allegations of serious human rights violations or involvement in previous security incidents, including events that took place along the Syrian coast.
At the same time, Britain has sought to emphasise that the sanctions do not directly target state institutions. Instead, they are framed within the principle of non-impunity and the pursuit of accountability for those accused of crimes, in line with British legal standards.
This shift comes in parallel with other Western steps, including the easing or adjustment of certain restrictions on Syrian entities. These moves appear aimed at balancing political pressure with efforts to reduce humanitarian impact. Nevertheless, the continued reliance on individual sanctions signals a desire to maintain leverage, while sending political and security messages related to military conduct, governance, and the limits of potential international support in the coming phase.
Within this context, questions have emerged about the background to the British decision – whether it is driven by recent security developments or by long-standing documented cases – as well as its likely impact on the Syrian army’s internal structure and balances, and on future relations between Damascus and Western capitals.
Background and timing
Issmat Al-Absi, an academic and political analyst based in Damascus, explains to +963 that the political and legal motivations behind Britain’s decision are rooted in a process that is both old and renewed. He notes that Britain had previously suspended sanctions on certain entities while maintaining sanctions on individuals. This, he argues, indicates that the measures are not entirely new, but have been reactivated and expanded within a different political context.
According to Al-Absi, part of the sanctions is linked to events on the Syrian coast, while another part draws on reports and data held by the British government, as well as London’s broader narrative regarding incidents that occurred during the Syrian uprising. He points out that some of the sanctioned parties include factions and figures such as the Sultan Murad Division and the Hamza Division, based on reports alleging their involvement in violations, some of which originate from bodies associated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Al-Absi stresses that there is no direct link between the British sanctions and the US Caesar Act, arguing that each follows a distinct legal and political path. He believes that Britain, despite the repeal of the Caesar Act shortly before the decision was announced, was keen to reaffirm the principle of non-impunity, while also reiterating its support for Syria’s political transition.
Ahd Murad, a writer and journalist based in The Hague, sees the timing of the sanctions – alongside the international campaign against ISIS and renewed focus on counter-terrorism in Syria – as particularly significant. Speaking to +963, Murad argues that many factions within the Syrian army have a documented history of violations. He refers to massacres in Latakia, noting that multiple reports have implicated armed factions that later became part of the army structure.
He adds that some faction leaders attempted to deny involvement in those events, including Abu Amsha, who cited health reasons for his absence. However, Murad says these denials did little to alter the international community’s view.
Al-Absi, meanwhile, notes that Britain has maintained sanctions against individuals it classifies as violators or perpetrators of war crimes. He expresses reservations about some of the names listed, arguing that certain cases lack solid evidence, while others clearly warrant accountability.
On whether the sanctions rely on new evidence or older files, Al-Absi explains that they are based on a combination of both. He says that coastal events formed a clear basis for sanctions against figures such as Fathiya Miqdad and others linked to those incidents, alongside additional names Britain claims were involved in crimes during the Syrian uprising.
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International signals and the limits of support
Regarding the practical impact of these sanctions, Al-Absi explains that Britain is adopting a new sanctions philosophy, shifting from collective measures against the state to targeted restrictions on individuals. He notes that the tangible effects are largely limited to asset freezes and travel bans, meaning the consequences fall primarily on the individuals concerned rather than the institution.
He emphasises that the sanctions do not affect the Syrian army’s weapons, logistics, or operational capacity, as they do not target military institutions or official entities.
From Al-Absi’s perspective, international actors are using these measures to signal that they are closely monitoring the Syrian army’s governance and internal discipline, and that pressure will be applied when deemed necessary.
Murad questions whether such sanctions will meaningfully constrain support for the Syrian army. He argues that no substantial military support exists at present, apart from limited efforts related to restructuring and training based on governance principles. In his view, the international community is less interested in building a powerful Syrian army than in establishing a coherent security or policing force capable of maintaining basic stability.
He also warns that risks persist, particularly after the Interior Ministry acknowledged that one of its members had killed individuals from a US delegation and possessed a jihadist background. Murad views this as confirmation of extremist infiltration within certain institutions.
Murad believes that sanctions could, in theory, contribute indirectly to regulating the army if they are politically leveraged in a careful manner – especially if sanctioned factions are treated as internationally marginalised and excluded from formal military structures. However, he cautions that expanding sanctions to include factions close to the leadership could provoke internal tensions and power struggles. In such cases, some factions might accuse the leadership of colluding with international actors to safeguard its own position.
He concludes by noting that many armed factions currently operate within a war economy and informal networks, making them relatively insulated from external economic pressure and limiting the material impact of sanctions.
Ultimately, Murad argues that the real effect of these measures is likely to remain modest, shaping internal relationships within the military more than altering realities on the ground.
On the question of whether the sanctions are symbolic or practical, Al-Absi concludes that they carry a tangible dimension by reshaping the logic of sanctions themselves. They are intended to underline that affiliation with a formal institution does not guarantee immunity from accountability, while also curbing the symbolic influence of certain figures and factions – without directly affecting state performance or the army’s overall structure.
