Amid the continuing escalation of events across Syria, hate speech and incitement have emerged as one of the most dangerous challenges confronting the country’s social fabric and civil peace. After more than a decade of war, violence, and deep political and social fragmentation, Syrians now face a parallel threat that strikes not only at physical security but at the very foundations of coexistence and shared citizenship.
As military and security tensions have expanded, an unprecedented wave of verbal incitement and symbolic and physical violence has taken shape. This wave is fuelled by media outlets and social media platforms and is frequently framed as part of a “legitimate” political or military struggle. In practice, however, it has become a vehicle for targeting entire social groups on ethnic, religious, or sectarian grounds, pushing society further towards polarisation and mutual hostility.
What distinguishes the current moment, observers argue, is that hate speech is no longer an emotional or spontaneous reaction to events. It has increasingly taken on the characteristics of an organised and systematic tool, used to justify violence, normalise brutality, and deepen existing divisions. In the absence of deterrent legislation, alongside the erosion of media ethics and the silence or inaction of official institutions, Syrians find themselves exposed to a compounded danger that threatens both their immediate safety and the long-term possibility of rebuilding a shared national space.
A growing societal threat
Tarek Ajib, a researcher in political affairs and international relations, told +963 that hate speech and incitement did not suddenly emerge with the current developments in north-eastern Syria. Rather, he argues, this discourse has deep roots dating back to the period following the fall of the former regime. According to Ajib, that phase witnessed widespread campaigns of hatred and incitement, accompanied by serious violations of human dignity and repeated attacks on national, religious, and social symbols.
Ajib stresses that this dangerous legacy was never addressed in a serious or systematic way. Instead, it was allowed to persist and accumulate, eventually resurfacing in more explicit and violent forms. The significance of the present stage, he argues, lies in the urgent need to restrain this discourse, particularly after it has manifested in recent days through dangerous practices on the ground. These practices have included verbal assaults against entire communities on ethnic, religious, or sectarian bases, before escalating into degrading and violent physical attacks.
In several cases, Ajib notes, such assaults have gone as far as killing, mutilation of bodies, and abuse of victims. All these acts, he emphasises, fall squarely within the definition of hate speech and incitement. When crimes – whether physical, moral, or verbal – are committed in an exaggeratedly brutal manner and are rooted in humiliation or the violation of religious, familial, ethnic, or sectarian symbols, they constitute a deliberate and calculated escalation rather than random violence.
Ajib believes this escalation is not accidental. Instead, it is driven by a range of actors, platforms, and political or social forces working methodically to widen fractures within Syrian society along ethnic, religious, sectarian, regional, and tribal lines. He cautions that the danger does not lie merely in identifying these actors – as media and social platforms are already saturated with such discourse – but in recognising the structural threat posed by organised incitement itself. Left unchecked, it risks pushing society towards levels of fragmentation that could make it extremely difficult to reconstruct the idea of a single people or a shared national identity.
According to Ajib, hate speech that lays the groundwork for internal strife almost inevitably produces violent reactions. Communities subjected to humiliation or crimes approaching the level of massacres are likely to resort to violence or arms under the banner of self-defence, protection of religious or ethnic rights, or defence of social and religious symbols. This cycle of action and reaction, he warns, poses a direct threat to civil peace, generating further bloodshed and deepening social rifts, while eroding any remaining prospects for stability.
Media complicity
Ajib offers a particularly sharp critique of the media, arguing that a significant portion of it has failed to uphold its national or ethical responsibilities and has instead become an active participant in the crisis. He maintains that many media institutions bear legal, moral, and potentially criminal responsibility for allowing hate speech, violence, and incitement to be broadcast through their platforms – whether via guests, programmes, or documentary content – thereby contributing directly to the normalisation and encouragement of crimes and mass violence.
He extends this criticism to social media platforms and personal accounts, which, in his view, play a major role in amplifying street-level incitement in a highly emotional and irrational manner. Taken together, Ajib argues, official and unofficial media, organised outlets and informal platforms alike, have become deeply embedded in the prevailing state of social and political breakdown.
Ajib acknowledges that a very small number of media outlets continue to adhere to professional ethics, factual accuracy, neutrality, and the presentation of unfragmented truth. However, he notes that such examples have become increasingly rare within an overcrowded and polarised media landscape. In this environment, media spaces – both virtual and physical – have shifted from tools of de-escalation and social repair into instruments exploited by forces seeking to inflame conflict and entrench division.
Addressing possible solutions, Ajib argues that the steps required are, in principle, clear. They begin with halting the broadcast and promotion of hate speech, denying platforms to those who disseminate it, and introducing regulatory laws that clearly define what may be aired and what must be prohibited. Yet he insists that the core obstacle lies in the absence of genuine political will. In some cases, he suggests, media are deliberately used as tools to advance narrow interests or external projects that thrive on social destruction and perpetual conflict.
Ajib also criticises the role of religious figures, arguing that the vast majority have aligned themselves with authority, sect, or party, rather than playing an inclusive humanitarian role. In many cases, he says, they have become complicit in the crisis. He emphasises that this critique targets individuals and practices, not religion itself. While he believes civil society organisations may be better positioned to promote human rights–based discourse, he acknowledges that their efforts are constrained by the overwhelming power and resources available to actors invested in continued instability.
He concludes by stressing that confronting organised incitement is not the responsibility of individuals or small platforms alone, but ultimately a political decision shaped at an international level. Although truth and reason may be delayed, he argues, they remain capable of asserting themselves in the long run.
Hate speech as a lethal weapon
From a different perspective, Salah Alamdari, a member of the Political Committee of the Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria, told +963 that human beings, wherever they live, are bound to coexist and cannot escape this reality – particularly in a world transformed by migration and digital communication into a global village. For Syrians, he argues, coexistence is not a choice but a necessity, regardless of the intensity of political or military conflict.
Alamdari believes that much of what Syria has experienced over the past fourteen years reflects repressed hatred and unaddressed social tension that exploded following the collapse of the former regime. This explosion, he argues, was not sudden or unexpected, but the result of long-term accumulation. The former regime, he says, never promoted a culture of coexistence or civil peace. Instead, through its media, behaviour, and practices, it subtly entrenched violence and sectarianism, storing resentment within society until it later erupted in more extreme forms.
According to Alamdari, the period that followed – particularly over the past year – has seen a widespread surge in hate speech, amid the absence of clear governmental policies to address it. He expresses regret that the authorities in Damascus have failed to treat this issue with the seriousness it demands, noting that no clear laws or decisions have yet been issued to criminalise or prohibit hate speech, despite its destructive impact.
Alamdari stresses that hate speech is no less lethal than armed conflict itself, as it deepens wounds, divides communities, and opens social fractures that are difficult to repair. In a country rich with ethnics, religions, and sects as Syria, this diversity should have been a source of strength rather than a trigger for division and violence.
He points to several recent cases where hate speech was particularly evident, including military campaigns along the Syrian coast that were accompanied by extensive incitement and dehumanising rhetoric. Events in Suwayda, he adds, provided another stark example, where media narratives and online discourse contributed directly to violent and degrading behaviour against civilians.
Alamdari also refers to developments in Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsoud neighbourhood, where attacks were preceded and accompanied by clear waves of incitement, followed shortly afterwards by assaults on areas of the Jazira region – notably Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Hasakah. These events, he argues, reignited feelings of hatred among wide segments of the population and produced patterns of inhumane behaviour in multiple locations.
He believes that official media institutions failed to confront this discourse, instead treating it as a normal component of war and, in some cases, actively justifying what was broadcast or shared online. Numerous satellite channels, he notes, participated in this incitement, while social media platforms amplified it further. Influencers on TikTok, YouTube, and similar platforms, some of whom command audiences larger than entire television stations, played a particularly dangerous role in spreading hate speech and encouraging violence.
How can it be confronted?
Alamdari questions why the government, despite possessing legal and coercive tools, has failed to take decisive action against those who incite hatred. He asks why calls for hate have not yet been clearly criminalised in Syria, despite their evident impact. For him, the destruction wrought by fourteen years of conflict extends beyond buildings and infrastructure to the human being himself – a far more dangerous outcome, as it damages the psychological and moral foundations of society.
He argues that Syria requires a long-term process to dismantle the accumulated legacies of the past, stressing that rebuilding human values must precede physical reconstruction. A cohesive society, he concludes, cannot be built on infrastructure alone, but must rest on dialogue, understanding, and coexistence. Violence and war, he insists, will not produce solutions – only sustained efforts towards social reconciliation can secure Syria’s future.
