The simultaneous visits of a Syrian delegation to Moscow and a Turkish delegation to Damascus reflect an extremely sensitive political moment in the Syrian scene. The visit of Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra, accompanied by officials from the General Intelligence Directorate, to the Russian capital came just one day after Damascus received a high level Turkish delegation that included Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yaşar Güler, and Intelligence Chief Ibrahim Kalin.
This simultaneity, in both timing and its security and political composition, opens the door to a unified reading of two parallel tracks managed by Damascus in the post Bashar al-Assad era, amid intertwined security and political files, particularly in northern Syria, and clear efforts to prevent the country from sliding into open regional arenas of confrontation.
Syria and Russia announced today, Wednesday, the entry of their bilateral relations into a new phase following official talks held in Moscow between the foreign ministers of the two countries. Both sides affirmed their determination to enhance political, economic, and diplomatic cooperation in a manner that serves mutual interests, with a clear Russian emphasis on supporting Syria’s territorial unity and sovereignty.
Foreign Minister of the Syrian interim government Asaad al-Shaibani said that Damascus is working to move its relationship with Moscow to a new strategic level after overcoming the repercussions of the previous phase.
A calculated simultaneity and two parallel tracks
Russian researcher Dmitry Bridzhe believes, in statements to +963, that the announcement of the arrival of the official Syrian delegation in Moscow intersects in meaning and timing with the visit of the Turkish security military political delegation to Damascus one day earlier. He confirms that this simultaneity cannot be read as a matter of protocol preference, but rather as a clear indicator that Damascus is managing an interconnected package of regional arrangements whose main title is northern Syria, the consolidation of the rules of the relationship with Moscow, and the prevention of Syria’s slide into multiple simultaneous arenas of confrontation during an extremely sensitive phase.
Bridzhe adds that reading the scene suggests an attempt by Damascus to impose a forced balance between two parallel tracks. The first is the Damascus-Ankara track, a rapid field security track aimed at managing the file of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the borders, and preventing any potential Turkish escalation. The second is the Damascus Moscow track, a long term strategic path that seeks to consolidate the rules of the relationship with Russia in the post 2024 phase, including redefining economic commitments and preventing any Russian use of the legacy of the former regime in a way that could create internal political or security threats to Syria, even in its relationship with the Syrian Democratic Forces.
By contrast, Syrian researcher on Russian affairs Taha Abdul Wahid, in statements to +963, argues that the timing of the Syrian officials’ visit to Moscow can be linked to the reception of Turkish officials in Damascus, but he stresses that it cannot generally be separated from the path of Russian Turkish coordination on the Syrian file. He explains that Turkey understands the importance of Russia as a key partner at this stage, and also realizes that any attempt to push Moscow out of Syria would have significant repercussions.
The Syrian Democratic Forces as a central knot in the ongoing arrangements
Bridzhe confirms that the file of the Syrian Democratic Forces is key at this stage, but it is not the only one. The southern Syrian file, particularly Suwayda, also emerges as a strategic issue that cannot be resolved in isolation from addressing the northern file, given the interconnection of northern and southern equations in Syrian national security.
He believes that Damascus does not head to Moscow after Ankara by coincidence, but rather carries with it a heavier negotiating file related to the distribution of roles in Syria during 2026 and beyond.
Bridzhe breaks down Ankara’s message on three levels. The first is a layer of pressure through the threat of military action, meaning that Turkey wants executive decisions rather than political promises. The second is the rejection of a formal integration that would keep the Syrian Democratic Forces as a single bloc within the Syrian army, in favor of dismantling its leadership structure and redistributing its elements. The third relates to introducing Israel into the narrative in order to reduce international sympathy for the Syrian Democratic Forces and present them as a factor obstructing Syria’s territorial unity.
For his part, Abdul Salam Ahmed, the representative of the Autonomous Administration in Lebanon, says in statements to +963 that the Turkish delegation’s visit to Damascus carried clear messages regarding Ankara’s political and security priorities, foremost among them the Kurdish file. He notes that Turkey seeks to prevent any form of independent political or military entity linked to the Syrian Democratic Forces.
He emphasizes that Ankara aims to be the most influential regional actor in the post regime era and the decisive voice in shaping the features of the interim authority, stressing that any security arrangements in northern Syria must pass through coordination with Turkey or receive its explicit approval.
Field pressure and negotiating discourse
Ahmed explains that the Turkish delegation does not visit Syria as a casual or simple act, but as a carrier of specific conditions focused on Turkey’s security first, ensuring its influence, and reshaping any Syrian settlement in a way that prevents the emergence of any form of Kurdish consensus with the interim government in Damascus.
He believes that the delegation clearly carries Turkish narratives, but presents them in the form of Syrian concerns, while the essence of the proposal remains purely Turkish and security driven, where Syria is managed as a sphere of influence rather than a sovereign state.
He points out that core issues, from the Syrian Democratic Forces to borders, refugees, and local administration, are always approached from the angle of Turkish national security rather than from the perspective of a Syrian national contract, and Syrians are asked to adapt to these narratives, not the other way around.
He also confirms that what is happening in the neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiya is no longer a local arena of confrontation, but has become a pressure card used to pass the Turkish approach, where the Turkish delegation negotiates with words while pressure is exercised through fire and siege on the ground.
Moscow as an indispensable guarantor of balances
Bridzhe believes that what Damascus wants from Moscow is essentially the consolidation of Russian strategic assets and the reduction of risks within a new Syrian environment. He explains that the primary Russian objective is to fortify interests, bases, military presence, and agreements within a post Assad equation, recalling previous reports that spoke of Syrian Russian discussions to review agreements, including those related to military bases.
In the same context, Abdul Wahid notes that all previous Syrian visits to Moscow, including this visit which is likely the third for the foreign and defense ministers, were conducted with the same composition, with the Syrian intelligence chief always accompanying them.
According to Abdul Wahid, this composition reflects the nature of the discussions, which include political, military, and security dimensions together, through political meetings between the foreign ministers, military and armament talks between the defense ministers, alongside the security track.
Abdul Wahid stresses that managing talks with this integrated composition allows for the formulation of comprehensive visions and the taking of integrated decisions, emphasizing that any political move requires parallel military and security coordination, and vice versa, reflecting both sides’ keenness on full readiness before taking any step.
The horizon of the next phase
Bridzhe concludes that combining the Ankara and Moscow tracks places Syria before a package of interconnected files, including reengineering the northeast, a phased integration formula for the Syrian Democratic Forces, preventing Turkish escalation and converting it into controlled negotiating pressure, in addition to repositioning Russia in the new Syria, reviewing agreements, restructuring the army, as well as the southern file and the relationship with Israel, and the economy, sanctions, and Damascus’s return to the international community.
In turn, Abdul Wahid believes that this visit is most likely linked to what Syria was expected to witness by the end of the year, in terms of the state restoring its control over all Syrian territory, whether in the Syrian Democratic Forces file or the situation in Suwayda province. He affirms that Russia is capable of playing an important role in this context, whether through mediation or guarantees, especially since influential actors in Suwayda view the Russian role positively and may accept engagement with it. Moscow can also play a guarantor role in talks with the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Kurdish file in general.
