Recent figures released by the Turkish Exporters Assembly for 2025 reveal a striking imbalance in the trade relationship between Syria and Turkey. Turkish exports to Syria reached a record USD 2.57 billion, marking a year-on-year increase of 69.6 per cent. Turkish sources attribute this surge to improved political and commercial conditions following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024 and Syria’s gradual reintegration into regional trade networks.
While some economists view the figures as a sign of revived commercial activity, Syrian economic analysts warn that the growing trade deficit in Turkey’s favour risks placing further pressure on the Syrian pound and undermining prospects for domestic industrial recovery. They argue that, unless trade facilitation is tied to clear policies supporting local production and factory reactivation, the benefits will remain one-sided.
Industrialists and traders increasingly describe Syria as a large consumer market for Turkish products rather than an equal trading partner. Dependence on imports is particularly pronounced in vital sectors such as foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals and raw materials. This reality raises broader questions about the nature of Syria’s economic “recovery” and its long-term costs: does Damascus possess a trade policy capable of protecting what remains of domestic production, and how long can it continue as a net importer with limited negotiating power?
A Turkish surge in a fragile Syrian market
Economic analyst Mahmoud Al-Rashid told +963 that, while Syria’s economy remains mired in contraction, trade ties with Turkey have returned to the fore in dramatic fashion. Despite the scale of Turkish exports, he noted, this trade volume has not translated into positive macro-economic effects for Syria. The bulk of imported goods are consumer products rather than productive inputs, benefiting a narrow circle of import networks and intensifying unequal competition with struggling local industries.
Al-Rashid stressed that the core problem lies not in imports per se, but in the absence of a coherent Syrian economic strategy. The figures, he argued, expose a deep structural imbalance: Syrian exports to Turkey are virtually negligible or absent from official data, making the relationship largely one-directional. In practical terms, Syria consumes while Turkey exports, a pattern that entrenches the Syrian trade deficit.
According to Turkish data, cereals, pulses, oilseeds and related products topped the export list at more than USD 700 million, followed by chemicals at USD 299 million and electrical and electronic goods at USD 224 million. These sectors directly affect food security and everyday consumption in the Syrian market.
From a purely economic perspective, Al-Rashed argues, it is difficult to describe this as “bilateral trade” in the conventional sense. Syrian exports to Turkey are marginal or not numerically disclosed in widely circulated official data. This is therefore an almost one-directional relationship: Syria as a consumer market and Turkey as an exporting state. This is not trade exchange, but a permanent supply pattern that deepens Syria’s trade deficit.
Al-Rashed concludes that official figures confirm one reality: Turkey profits commercially, while Syria consumes without balance. When one party dominates the trade balance so decisively, this is not “trade exchange” but a form of consumer market penetration. The sharp rise in sectors such as chemicals and electricity – totalling nearly half a billion dollars – clearly reflects the paralysis of Syria’s domestic production cycle. Syria is importing from its neighbour goods it once produced in its own industrial cities, effectively “importing Turkish unemployment” while exporting scarce foreign currency. In the absence of a coherent Syrian vision for managing foreign trade, any growth in imports, however justified, will remain a positive figure in others’ ledgers and a negative one in Syria’s recovery balance.
Between opportunity and dependency
Looking ahead, economist Khaled Al-Hassan suggested that Syrian–Turkish trade could evolve into a broader regional corridor, with Ankara seeking to route exports to the Gulf and Africa through Syrian territory as reconstruction projects advance. He argued that such a scenario depends on sustained political and security stability, progress in reconstruction, and Damascus’s ability to rebuild a productive base capable of narrowing its trade deficit.
Al-Hassan acknowledged that the influx of essential goods, particularly cereals and pulses, has helped contain commodity inflation and meet basic needs. Yet he cautioned that 2025 effectively became a year of “commercial empowerment” for Turkey in Syria. The central challenge for Syrian authorities and the private sector, he said, is to convert this flow of goods into a balanced partnership that supports local production rather than mere consumption.
Imbalance or missed opportunity?
A member of the Aleppo Chamber of Commerce, speaking anonymously to +963, warned that the headline figures conceal a widening gap. Turkish goods often enter the Syrian market at prices 30–40 per cent lower than local products, while Syrian exports to Turkey, estimated at best at around USD 500 million and largely limited to raw and agricultural materials, struggle to compete. This disparity reflects weakened domestic production and fragile export networks.
The same source cautioned against Syria becoming merely a “transit platform” for foreign goods. While transit fees could bolster state revenues, the strategic risk lies in reducing the Syrian economy to a corridor rather than a producer. Ultimately, the figures are not just statistics, but a warning: without policies that enable Syrian products to access Turkish markets on reciprocal terms, the USD 2.5 billion trade volume may deepen dependency rather than support genuine economic recovery.
