Nagham Qudsiyeh
For many years, the Caesar Act represented the single most severe constraint on Syria’s economy, despite a long history of US sanctions dating back to the 1970s. When the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act came into force in 2020, it marked a qualitative shift in US sanctions, expanding their scope to cover vital sectors of the economy and extending beyond Syrian state institutions to include any individuals or entities dealing with them. In practice, Caesar functioned as a comprehensive deterrent to investment, trade, and reconstruction.
Following the fall of the Assad regime and rapid political and diplomatic shifts in relations between Washington and Damascus, a gradual rollback of sanctions began. European measures were eased first, followed by US steps – some conditional, others temporary and subject to monitoring. This process culminated in late December, when the US House of Representatives approved the National Defense Authorization Act, which included provisions repealing the Caesar sanctions. Many observers described this as the most difficult hurdle Syria had managed to overcome. The bill is expected to complete its legislative path through the Senate and receive President Donald Trump’s signature before the end of the year, with the repeal entering into force in 2026.
This raises a central question – what comes after the repeal of the Caesar Act, and what scenarios can realistically be expected in the post-Caesar phase?
The first and most immediate scenario points to a long-awaited economic opening. Lifting sanctions in general represents a fundamental shift in Syria’s economic trajectory, while repealing Caesar would end Damascus’s financial isolation and move the country closer to reintegration into the global banking system. This would strengthen domestic monetary policy, improve liquidity, ease money transfers, and facilitate the delivery of aid and grants. Recent statements by Syria’s central bank governor, Abdul Qader Husrieh, suggest that the government has prepared plans to develop the financial and banking system immediately after Caesar is lifted. According to Husrieh, the central bank has already received training at the US Treasury and held discussions with major international banks regarding future steps.
Within this framework, Damascus appears to be preparing for the post-Caesar phase, as having clear plans is essential for navigating the next stage. Available indicators suggest that the Syrian banking sector will be among the most directly affected beneficiaries of the repeal.
At the same time, the commercial sector is expected to gain significantly. Restrictions on exporters and transport companies would ease, while improved access to foreign currency would allow for the import of essential goods, services, and technologies needed to restart idle factories. This could enhance the competitiveness of Syrian products in regional markets and gradually reintegrate Syria into its economic surroundings.
A second scenario relates to reconstruction. The repeal of Caesar could create a more favourable environment for rebuilding efforts, bringing renewed attention to agreements and memoranda of understanding signed by Damascus with foreign companies since the beginning of the year. These deals are estimated to be worth around $28 billion, yet most have remained at the announcement stage due to ongoing sanctions. Caesar had explicitly targeted any company or individual investing in Syria’s energy, aviation, construction, or engineering sectors. With its repeal, attention is now shifting to the seriousness and speed with which energy, construction, and infrastructure agreements might be implemented. The number of such deals is also expected to grow.
Before Caesar is not the same as after Caesar. The removal of this legal barrier is likely to encourage business networks and capital holders who previously hesitated out of fear that sanctions could be reimposed. As those doubts recede, the repeal is expected to pave the way for Arab and foreign investors to enter large-scale projects, especially as Syria in the post-Assad and post-Caesar phase is increasingly viewed as a fertile ground for investment and reconstruction.
Yet this opportunity also places Damascus before complex challenges, foremost among them the need for legal, legislative, and administrative reforms, alongside the critical requirement of maintaining internal stability. With external constraints diminishing, internal conditions will ultimately determine whether capital is attracted or deterred.
This leads to a third, more cautious scenario. Although Caesar targeted economic sectors, the implications of its repeal extend beyond economics. According to the draft framework accompanying the repeal, lifting Caesar sanctions is subject to non-binding conditions. These include an initial report by the US president to congressional committees within 90 days, followed by reports every 180 days over a four-year period. The draft stipulates that Syria must demonstrate tangible steps in combating “terrorist” organizations, respecting minority rights, refraining from unilateral military action against neighbouring states, combating money laundering and terrorist financing, and pursuing accountability for crimes against humanity committed under the former regime. Failure to meet these conditions for two consecutive reporting periods could trigger the reimposition of sanctions.
This framework leaves little doubt about the expected trajectory of the coming phase. Accountability and minority protections stand at the forefront, with potential positive effects on easing societal divisions and tensions if implemented seriously. It also outlines the parameters of Syria’s future relations with neighbouring countries, including Israel. In this context, Washington – through its envoy to Syria, Thomas Barrack – appears to be seeking understandings aimed at curbing repeated incursions and attacks on Syrian territory.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of +963
