More than a decade after the outbreak of Syria’s popular uprising and the ensuing civil war, the question of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) has emerged as one of the most consequential and contested issues shaping the country’s future. For some, it represents a pragmatic model of local governance and participatory rule within a unified Syrian state. For others, it has become a focal point in broader struggles over power, identity, and the distribution of resources.
The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria took shape in the early years of the conflict, following the withdrawal of regime forces from predominantly Kurdish and mixed Kurdish–Arab areas in the north-east. This vacuum enabled local actors to build political, administrative, and security institutions that have since evolved into a decentralised governance model, often described as participatory and multi-ethnic. Despite its longevity and territorial reach, the administration remains unrecognised by Damascus and by major international powers, save for limited engagement by certain foreign parliaments and institutions.
Today, the issue is inseparable from renewed political and military tensions on the ground. North-east Syria has witnessed escalating frictions between Kurdish-led forces backed by the United States and the Syrian army aligned with the interim government. Attempts to integrate the institutions of the autonomous administration and its armed forces into a reconstituted central state have repeatedly stalled, while armed confrontations and mutual accusations have intensified. Against this backdrop, Syrian politicians and researchers are sharply divided over whether the AANES can be sustained as part of a comprehensive national settlement, integrated into a new state framework, or left to persist as one of the most volatile fault lines of the post-war order.
A Campaign Targeting AANES
Sherzad Al-Yazidi, a Kurdish writer and political researcher based in Erbil, argues in comments to +963 that the current reality in north-east Syria did not emerge merely as a stopgap response to state collapse. Rather, he traces its origins to the liberation of these areas from the Assad regime beginning in 2012, in the context of the 19 July revolution that first erupted in Kobani.
Al-Yazidi notes that the region, which comprises nearly 30 per cent of Syria’s territory, has been administered for over a decade by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. He emphasises that this governance model is built on power-sharing among Kurds, Arabs, and Syriac communities, and encompasses a wide spectrum of political and social orientations. Administratively, it operates through civilian institutions, alongside political frameworks such as the Syrian Democratic Council, while the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) serve as its military arm, supported by internal security forces and other security bodies.
According to Al-Yazidi, the administration’s demands extend beyond constitutional recognition, important though that may be. At their core lies a claim to genuine participation in shaping Syria’s transitional phase and drafting a future constitution. Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, he argues, Syrians should have collectively embarked on building a truly inclusive transitional order and a consensual democratic constitution.
Instead, he contends, the opposite has occurred. Power, in his view, has been monopolised through unilateral structures tailored to the authority of Ahmad al-Sharaa (also known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), beginning with the so-called “Victory Conference”, followed by a controlled national dialogue, a constitutional declaration, the formation of a government, and ultimately what he describes as a hollow parliament. These steps, Al-Yazidi argues, replicate the authoritarian practices of Baathist rule rather than laying the foundations for democratic transformation.
He stresses that Kurdish rights cannot be reduced to symbolic constitutional acknowledgement. Kurds, he insists, must be equal partners in constitution-making, alongside all political forces and social components. Any constitutional settlement, he argues, must explicitly enshrine a democratic, pluralistic, and decentralised state. Decentralisation itself may take various forms – federalism, self-rule, or autonomous administrations – but the principle, rather than the specific model, is what matters. Without a clear framework for sharing power, wealth, and resources, Syria risks reproducing authoritarianism under a new guise.
Al-Yazidi is sharply critical of recent statements by Ahmad al-Sharaa, accusing him of portraying himself as the sole source of authority, distributing rights and privileges as personal favours. In such a context, he argues, talk of participatory constitutions and democratic guarantees borders on illusion, particularly when advanced by figures with jihadist backgrounds who now design institutions to suit their own power while governing with a mentality of spoils and patronage.
From this perspective, the autonomous administration represents the principal obstacle to what Al-Yazidi describes as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s project of constructing a centralised, exclusionary Islamist authority. He warns that continued international ambiguity – especially following ethnically motivated killings of Kurds in Aleppo and Deir Hafer, alongside ongoing military build-ups – risks emboldening the new authorities to pursue rolling conflicts from the coast to Suwayda and into the north-east.
He further argues that the 10 March agreement has effectively been emptied of substance, noting that al-Sharaa himself has stated that it is not binding. Previous reversals on local agreements in Aleppo, Al-Yazidi adds, underscore a pattern of interpreting negotiations as demands for disarmament and unconditional submission, coupled with vague promises of constitutional rights.
In this context, he warns that both the autonomous administration and the SDF face the prospect of direct targeting by Damascus, with Turkish backing. While he stops short of calling for a formal withdrawal from existing agreements, he urges at least a suspension of implementation as a political and moral stance and calls on international guarantors to shoulder their responsibilities.
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Negotiation and Administrative Decentralisation as a Realistic Path
Offering a more cautious assessment, Tarek Ziad Wahbi, a France-based researcher in international relations, tells +963 that the Kurdish situation in Syria has not undergone a sudden transformation, but rather reflects a longer trajectory that began in 2011. This trajectory, he argues, must be understood against a backdrop of systematic marginalisation dating back to the founding of the Syrian state and deepened under Baathist rule.
Wahbi recalls that successive governments imposed restrictions on the Kurdish language and personal status, relegating Kurds to a secondary position within the state. The emergence of the SDF and Kurdish civil organisations, he argues, altered this equation by introducing new power balances grounded in military effectiveness and organisational capacity.
He maintains that the AANES is not merely a by-product of sovereign collapse, but also the outcome of prior political and military experience, including lessons drawn from Kurdish movements in neighbouring countries, particularly Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). This experience, combined with support from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, enabled the formation of a centralised Kurdish leadership capable of strategic planning.
According to Wahbi, Kurdish demands rest on three pillars: autonomous administration within Syrian sovereignty; administrative, rather than political, decentralisation coupled with national political participation; and integration into the defence of the state through recognised military structures, in order to avoid accusations of secessionism.
He argues that the current Syrian reality necessitates sustained negotiation and consistent emphasis on the absence of separatist intentions, while highlighting the centrality of the Kurdish component within Syrian society. The primary challenges ahead, he suggests, lie in consolidating democratic practices, from freedom of expression to political participation, and in modernising legal frameworks to enable constructive interaction with the central state.
Wahbi cautions that political divisions need not be destructive if managed wisely, and urges learning from Kurdish experiences elsewhere in the region. At the same time, he warns that excessive reliance on external support against Damascus could undermine political moderation, as international relations are ultimately governed by interests rather than principles.
Crucially, he identifies Turkey – rather than the United States – as the most significant external threat to any accommodation between the autonomous administration and the Syrian government, arguing that Ankara remains intent on settling its scores with Kurdish political movements. He concludes by stressing the importance of robust Kurdish participation in drafting Syria’s new constitution, ensuring respect for ethnic and religious diversity, and avoiding exclusionary nationalism. A form of regional parliamentary representation with constitutionally defined powers, he suggests, could offer a sustainable model of governance within a unified Syrian state.
