Tensions have escalated west of the Euphrates following the announcement by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) of their withdrawal from eastern Aleppo’s countryside and redeployment east of the river. The move coincided with the Syrian interim government’s Ministry of Defence declaring the area a closed military zone, while mutual accusations emerged over violations of the internationally mediated agreement signed on 10 March.
As Damascus insists that its advance aimed to secure areas vacated by the SDF after an attack on a government patrol, the SDF has accused government-aligned factions of launching assaults before the withdrawal was completed. These developments raise a central question: does what unfolded in Deir Hafer mark the beginning of the agreement’s implementation, or is it merely a limited field test within an otherwise fragile negotiation track?
According to international relations researcher Tarek Ziad Wahbi, recent events reflect a cautious transition “from theoretical negotiation to selective and tightly controlled application”, though without signalling comprehensive execution. In his assessment, the field remains subject to testing rather than firm consolidation.
A controlled security shift
The interim government’s Operations Authority announced full control over Deir Hafer and Maskaneh, confirming further advances towards Dibsi Afnan and Tabqa, and urging civilians to avoid SDF positions. While Damascus frames these moves as part of restoring official security control, the SDF disputes this narrative, arguing that violations occurred before its withdrawal had been fully carried out.
For Wahbi, these developments amount to a practical – though incomplete – activation of force redeployment and unification under the Syrian Ministry of Defence. However, he stresses that this does not equate to a formal or irreversible implementation of the agreement.
Withdrawal as a political signal
SDF commander General Mazloum Abdi described the withdrawal as a gesture of goodwill, undertaken in response to appeals from friendly states and mediators, and as part of a commitment to the provisions of the 10 March agreement. This framing seeks to situate the move within a broader integration process rather than as a concession extracted by force.
At the same time, high-level meetings in Erbil between US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, Abdi, and Kurdish leaders – including Kurdistan Democratic Party head Masoud Barzani – underscore the sensitivity of the moment. Discussions reportedly focused on the future deployment of SDF forces, particularly in eastern Aleppo and the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighbourhoods, as well as the broader mechanics of implementing the agreement.
Despite this diplomatic engagement, Wahbi argues that the withdrawal remains a limited operational test. Core provisions – such as institutional integration, border crossings, and control of oil fields – remain unresolved.
While some observers view Deir Hafer as a potential turning point, Wahbi sees it more accurately as a localised model rather than the start of comprehensive implementation. In the short term, he anticipates efforts to stabilise security arrangements in eastern Aleppo and contact zones, alongside incremental coordination and partial administrative reintegration, without decisive resolutions on sovereignty-linked economic files.
This approach aligns with what Wahbi describes as a likely scenario of “selective, gradual implementation under the ceiling of the agreement”, rather than rapid enforcement or outright collapse. Such a process may include joint coordination mechanisms against ISIS, expanded security cooperation, and the gradual return of state service institutions, while retaining elements of existing local administration.
Regional and international constraints
International dynamics continue to shape the trajectory. The residual US presence east of the Euphrates affords the SDF negotiating leverage and limits the prospects of swift, full integration without Washington’s acquiescence. Russia, meanwhile, favours restoring formal state control while balancing its relationships with Ankara and Kurdish actors; encouraging gradualism over confrontation.
Turkey remains the most sceptical actor, wary of any arrangement that could confer political legitimacy on the SDF near its borders. Ankara may tolerate Syrian government redeployment if it tangibly curtails SDF influence but is likely to obstruct any outcome perceived as entrenching Kurdish autonomy.
Ultimately, Deir Hafer appears to represent a measured and reversible test of the 10 March agreement rather than a decisive breakthrough. The redeployment of forces and assumption of security control align with the agreement’s general spirit, but without resolving its most contentious pillars. As Wahbi concludes, the accord remains viable only insofar as gradualism holds, and as long as international guarantees continue to underpin it.
