One year after the fall of the Assad regime, Syria enters a new phase weighed down by a difficult question: are the trials now under way leading towards genuine justice, or drifting into fragile political settlements? According to informed observers, the judicial process is taking shape in an unstable environment that lacks strong institutions capable of enforcing the rule of law. It is presented as an attempt to prevent society from sliding into revenge, despite limited tools and the sheer complexity of the transitional moment.
Between the creation of investigative committees, unresolved truth-seeking efforts, and staggering figures for victims and the disappeared, a growing conviction is taking hold – justice cannot be achieved without binding legislation, and trust will not be rebuilt unless the major crimes are fully opened and senior figures held to account.
Youssef Lehlali, a France-based journalist specialising in Mediterranean international relations, told +963 that the first year of trials remains “shaped by the instability Syria continues to experience and by the absence of strong, capable institutions”. He described the measures taken so far as “an attempt to bring justice into society rather than allow it to descend into revenge and retribution”.
At the same time, he acknowledged that “the transitional phase is, by nature, difficult and complex, especially given the state’s lack of resources to fully impose the law and deliver justice”.
Institutional Steps: Without a Complete Legal Framework
With the launch of the transitional phase, the authorities announced the formation of the National Transitional Justice Commission, alongside specialised committees dealing with the files of the missing and forcibly disappeared. These moves were described as laying the institutional foundations for accountability. A comprehensive draft transitional justice law was also presented, intended to organise four parallel tracks – criminal prosecutions, truth-seeking, reparations, and reform of the judicial and security sectors.
However, this draft remains under public discussion and has not yet become binding legislation. As a result, accountability efforts are proceeding without a unified legal framework that defines priorities and mechanisms.
In this context, political writer and researcher Dr Imran Zahwi told +963 that interim president Ahmad al-Sharaa has “officially launched a broad project for transitional justice in Syria”. He explained that the commission’s mandate goes beyond trials, extending to “uncovering the truth about the grave violations committed by the former regime, providing reparations to victims, entrenching the principle of non-recurrence, and ultimately reaching national reconciliation”.
Zahwi stressed, however, that “forming committees alone, without practical solutions, will not lead to real progress unless this process is transformed into a binding legal system”.
Trials That Pursue the Present: While Avoiding the Past
In practice, most of the trials conducted during the first year have focused on acts of violence that occurred after the fall of the regime – particularly those in the Syrian coastal region and other areas in March 2025. Fourteen individuals appeared before the courts on charges related to killing and serious violations.
Despite the presence of minimum trial guarantees, such as public hearings and legal representation, human rights organisations argue that these cases remain far removed from the core of transitional justice. To date, the major crimes that defined the former regime’s rule – including systematic torture, enforced disappearances, and indiscriminate bombardment – have not been opened.
Zahwi explains that what took place on the coast “was not a trial within a comprehensive transitional justice framework, but rather a reflection of the tension between crimes of the present and crimes of the past”. He argues that continued violence is “directly linked to the absence of real mechanisms to prosecute the crimes of the former regime – which undermines Syrians’ trust in the justice process”.
Official Rhetoric and Real-World Fears
In its official discourse, the interim government insists that its objective is to establish “accountability, not revenge”. It points to cooperation with international forums – including the case before the International Court of Justice concerning torture under the former regime – as evidence of a legal rather than retaliatory approach.
Yet analysts note that this rhetoric clashes with a fragile security reality in certain areas, where kidnappings, killings, and extrajudicial reprisals continue to occur. These risks shifting justice from an institutional process to individual acts of vengeance.
Lehlali warns that any justice system that “loses people’s trust loses its legitimacy”. He stresses that Syrians’ belief – especially that of victims – in the integrity of the judiciary is essential for building a new Syria. Without that trust, revenge will replace the law.
Small Numbers in the Face of a Vast Tragedy
There are still no official figures on the number of cases heard by the courts since the regime’s fall. Research reports suggest that preliminary accountability measures have involved 83 former judges from terrorism and military courts, in addition to the trial of 14 individuals linked to sectarian violence on the coast.
These figures appear minimal when set against the scale of the tragedy. Security and political analyst Ihsan Al-Qaysoun estimates the number of war victims at over 750,000, stating that “more than 80 percent were killed by forces of the ousted regime”. He argues that transitional justice is “a fundamental step to absorb public anger and halt the cycle of revenge”.
Speaking to +963, Al-Qaysoun adds that holding those he describes as “the most terrifying and lethal perpetrators” accountable is necessary to “defuse popular tension and prepare the ground for building a stable state”. Justice, he insists, “is not about revenge, but about restoring dignity to victims and their families”.
Current Charges and the Problem of Absent Leadership
The files currently before the courts reveal that the vast majority of cases concern immediate crimes – such as murder, armed assembly, and sectarian incitement – alongside professional violations committed by some former judges and officials.
The torture file, despite its weight, remains largely limited to low- and mid-ranking individuals. No cases have yet targeted senior security leaders accused of overseeing torture as a systematic policy.
Zahwi points to one of the most serious obstacles – “the escape of a large number of regime figures within the first 48 hours after the fall”. He also cites “the continued presence of foreign fighters and undisciplined factions”, as well as the fact that “parts of the former state apparatus remain within the new authority” – all of which complicate efforts to dismantle the old system.
Alongside the courts, the issue of the forcibly disappeared remains among the most sensitive. Human rights estimates suggest that between 120,000 and 300,000 people have been missing since the 1970s.
Zahwi notes that this figure “means the overwhelming majority of Syrian families are directly affected”. Any transitional justice process that fails to place the disappeared at the centre of its priorities, he argues, will lose both its human and political meaning.
Is Justice a Condition for Stability?
Al-Qaysoun believes that resolving the transitional justice file is “a prerequisite for opening a new chapter of reconstruction, stability, and economic recovery”. He calls for the process not to be left open-ended, but concluded within a reasonable timeframe that allows Syria to move forward.
He also stresses the need for trials to be “public, transparent, and conducted with legal representation”, criticising “the lack of transparency in some current procedures”. Restoring victims’ rights, he says, “cannot be achieved through silence or settlements”.
Today, Syria’s judiciary stands at a crossroads – it can either become a pillar of a state governed by law, or slide into a selective process that deepens social fractures.
Lehlali sums up the test simply – “without trust, there can be no real justice”. Al-Qaysoun maintains that prosecuting documented perpetrators will help turn the page on the past. Zahwi, meanwhile, warns that failure to dismantle the system of repression will keep Syria trapped in a danger zone, amid regional entanglements and uncontrolled violence that “could open the door to the risks of fragmentation”.
