The April 1 agreement between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces was merely a reflection of a political and security environment unripe for resolution. It emerged amid the absence of a unified sovereign decision and the dominance of narrow security-focused approaches over community partnership, alongside a clear lack of enforcement mechanisms and guarantees. Analysts argue that the de-escalation agreement ultimately failed due to weak trust, overlapping local and regional interests, and disregard for the complex social fabric of the two districts.
On the political environment in which the agreement was born, writer and political researcher Shivan Al-Khabouri told +963 that the agreement “collapsed because it emerged from a political environment not mature enough for resolution.” He highlighted that the absence of a unified internal sovereign decision, prioritising civilian protection over narrow security calculations, allowed a mindset of dominance to prevail over partnership logic.
Explaining the regional factors at play, Al-Khabouri noted that “the failure of the agreement cannot be separated from the Turkish role,” which perceives stability in Sheikh Maqsoud and Al-Ashrafieh as a direct threat to its project built on controlled instability. Any understanding that reduces tension or provides Kurds with a sense of security, he argued, “is viewed in Ankara as undermining the pressure tools it applies in northern Syria.” He added: “The agreement failed because some parties do not want stability, preferring areas that remain volatile and ignitable when needed.”
Since early 2026, the region has witnessed escalating clashes between forces of the Ministry of Defence and Internal Security (Asayish), reflecting the actual collapse of the security agreement. Political analyst Hassan Jaber told +963 that the April 1 agreement was intended as a temporary de-escalation measure and part of broader understandings. It should not have been interpreted as the goal of negotiations, but rather as a preliminary step towards fully integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into Syrian state institutions. He attributed its failure to “a lack of serious commitment to its provisions, particularly regarding the withdrawal of heavy weapons from Al-Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud,” noting that recent clashes revealed that such weapons remain in place.
From the perspective of local demographics and social complexity, extremist groups researcher Amr Farouk added that the agreement’s collapse is also linked to “the diverse and complex social composition of the districts, the dominance of traditional social structures of sheikhs and local notables over part of the decision-making, the multiplicity of military and civilian actors, and the proliferation of opposition factions, some independent of local councils and others connected to regional backers,” all of which “weakened the authority of the official agreement on the ground.” Farouk told +963 that the Syrian interim government seeks military control over Aleppo due to the failure of negotiation pathways and the stalled implementation of the March 10, 2025, agreement, given Aleppo’s economic and strategic importance and the rejection of any discriminatory provisions against Kurds constitutionally or politically.
This assessment aligns with Jaber’s analysis regarding the shift in political approaches, noting that “the Turkish factor adds additional pressure amid the structural conflict between regional states and Kurdish projects.”
As fighting escalated, SDF commander General Mazlum Abdi announced a ceasefire agreement through international mediation, covering the evacuation of the dead, wounded, and combatants. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defence asserted full control over Al-Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud, amid the displacement of hundreds of civilians and shortages of basic services.
Politically, the United Nations and Western states warned that renewed clashes in Aleppo could threaten the stability of prior understandings, including the March 10, 2025, agreement. Calls for dialogue were issued, emphasising peaceful integration of the SDF into Syrian state institutions. In this context, Al-Khabouri stressed that the experience yielded key lessons, foremost that “there can be no security without dignity,” and that “any agreement without clear enforcement guarantees merely postpones an explosion rather than preventing it.” He argued that the protection of besieged areas cannot rely on a permanent state of emergency mindset.
Jaber affirmed that the responsibility for the agreement’s failure does not lie with a single party, urging “the prioritisation of dialogue, integration, and peaceful compromise to preserve Syria’s unity and identity, and the rights of its social components, without sliding towards autonomous projects that may ultimately lead to the country’s division.”
