Nagham Koudsiah
Transitional justice was not absent from the exceptional day Syrians marked to commemorate the first anniversary of the fall of the Assad regime. It featured prominently in the speech delivered by Syria’s interim president, Ahmad Al-Sharaa, during the official ceremony held at the Damascus Conference Palace. The reference to transitional justice on such an occasion did not appear to be an exercise in revisiting the past, but rather an attempt to look ahead – framing justice as a foundation for future stability and social cohesion. This approach aligns with one of the four core pillars of transitional justice, particularly the guarantee of non-recurrence, which represents its most strategic dimension.
This emphasis once again underlined the Syrian state’s stated interest in transitional justice as a priority of the transitional phase. It was followed by the public screening of video footage showing open investigations involving one of the most prominent figures linked to the former regime – a move that may signal the beginning of translating rhetoric into tangible action. Earlier steps included the issuance of the 2025 Constitutional Declaration, which enshrined the principle that crimes of torture are not subject to statutes of limitation and reinforced key foundations of the transitional justice framework. In the months preceding this, practical measures were also taken, such as lifting certain security restrictions, restoring some property rights, and initiating systematic documentation of missing persons’ cases.
All of this points to a seemingly serious approach to addressing what is arguably the most complex file of all. However, this approach appears to be unfolding along two parallel tracks – one led by the National Transitional Justice Authority, established by presidential decree in May, and the other overseen by the Ministry of Justice. This dual structure raises questions about coherence and coordination between the two bodies, as well as the risk of overlapping mandates, particularly given that the legislative and legal environment governing transitional justice has yet to fully mature.
This situation places Syria at the heart of the challenges facing the domestic implementation of transitional justice. Chief among these challenges is institutional reform – especially the restructuring of public sectors, most notably the judiciary and security services. This, in turn, highlights legislative reform as an urgent necessity for the transitional phase and a prerequisite for launching an effective justice process. In the absence of a dedicated transitional justice law, and with continued reliance on the current Penal Code – which many legal experts argue does not meet the demands of this stage – the legal environment remains ill-suited to supporting core transitional justice measures, including accountability.
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Against this backdrop, the first public hearing held in November last year at the Aleppo Criminal Court – which tried defendants linked to what became known as the “Coastal events” – stands as a notable precedent. The hearings included defendants from both sides, including “insurgents” and members of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, and were conducted in the presence of the media. Yet according to human rights reports, significant gaps remained. The trials were conducted under the existing Syrian Penal Code, which lacks specific definitions and standards for war crimes and crimes against humanity and does not abolish statutes of limitation. As a result, the proceedings relied on outdated legal tools that may fail to reflect the scale and gravity of the violations, potentially diminishing their legal weight and moral significance.
This reality underscores the urgent need to enact a transitional justice law and amend the Penal Code so that, together, they form the foundational legal framework for justice. Such a framework should begin with truth-seeking, followed by accountability through investigations grounded in clear crime definitions and proportionate penalties aligned with international standards. It also points to the necessity of reforming the Penal Code by introducing precise legal definitions for crimes committed during the Assad era, establishing specialised courts for war crimes and crimes against humanity, setting mechanisms for truth-seeking, and creating compensation systems to provide redress and pave the way for reconciliation. These elements are expected to be addressed through the anticipated transitional justice law and related legal reforms.
As for the work of the National Transitional Justice Authority, its very establishment reflects the need for an independent body tasked with implementing transitional justice. At the same time, some legal professionals have raised concerns about the extent of the authority’s independence, while tangible outcomes so far remain limited. This may be explained by the sheer difficulty of documentation and evidence-gathering amid the vast number of victims, as well as the inherently complex nature of the work. Transitional justice rarely delivers immediate results – progress is cumulative rather than instantaneous. However, there is concern that prolonged delays could undermine public trust in newly established institutions.
After the first year, available indicators suggest that Syria is moving in the right direction in terms of intent and overall trajectory. Yet this path still requires substantial legislative development to evolve into a comprehensive, executable justice process.
At the same time, ongoing internal tensions in certain areas continue to undermine social peace. This raises the risk that delays in implementing transitional justice could allow it to morph into retaliatory justice – prompting individuals to seek redress on their own. Such dynamics have already produced new violations, new victims, and new perpetrators. If left unchecked, they are likely to deepen societal divisions and compound humanitarian suffering for victims and their families, who continue to bear the weight of unresolved injustice.
Legal and institutional obstacles are not the only barriers facing transitional justice in Syria. Social challenges are equally significant, particularly in the absence of a shared national narrative that reflects the experiences of all communities. This makes the meaningful – not merely symbolic – inclusion of victims in all transitional justice processes an essential requirement.
While it is unrealistic to expect transitional justice in Syria to be achieved within a short timeframe, the principle of ending impunity remains a critical deterrent in a fragile transitional landscape – and a vital source of hope that the tragedy will not be repeated.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of +963.
