By Malek Al-Hafez
In the aftermath of conflicts, a state’s return is never guaranteed. It’s not simply restored by decree or by reclaiming territory. Instead, it becomes an open question, one that societies must answer by reimagining authority in ways that don’t just recreate old power structures or fracture the country under the weight of local identities.
This is the challenge Syria faces today. The collapse of Assad’s centralized regime didn’t just dismantle its authority, it exposed how fragile and hollow that centralization had become. What’s now on the table isn’t just a conversation about rebuilding institutions, but about redefining what the Syrian state actually is, and what it should be.
Within this uncertain landscape, something new has started to emerge: field-based understandings between local actors and transitional authorities. From Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighbourhoods to other regions with unique administrative or social dynamics, new forms of shared governance are taking shape. These aren’t stopgap solutions, they’re early experiments in what shared sovereignty might look like in Syria.
Instead of relying on dominance from the centre, these arrangements allow for negotiation. The transitional government maintains a symbolic presence, recognizing local structures, while entities like the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration keep their organizational autonomy, especially in matters of security and local governance. It’s a hybrid model: flexible central authority paired with real, on-the-ground decentralization.
And its implications stretch far beyond the north. Communities in places like Suwayda and the Syrian coast are watching closely, seeing in these arrangements the possibility of a new, more balanced relationship between the state and its regions.
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In Suwayda, for example, local groups have already taken charge of daily life and public safety, often without any meaningful support from Damascus. What’s happening in Aleppo might be a chance for Suwayda to renegotiate its place in the Syrian state, not based on security dependence, but on mutual partnership.
In the coastal region, long dominated by centralized authority, there’s a growing recognition of the need for empowered local governance. If agreements like those in Aleppo are embedded within a national framework, not just struck as side deals, they could mark a turning point.
In fact, the recent agreement in Aleppo may reflect a broader political understanding between transitional president Ahmad Al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi. But its real value lies in its potential to serve as a model, a first step toward a new kind of Syrian state that embraces diversity, instead of fearing it.
This approach isn’t just theoretical. As sociologist Niklas Luhmann put it, the state is not a fixed entity, it’s a web of interactions between institutions and society. What’s happening in Syria now is a bottom-up attempt to rebuild that web. When managed wisely, these field-level agreements can transform the relationship between power and people, from one of control to one of collaboration.
Division doesn’t begin with declarations of secession. It begins when the state loses its legitimacy, when it fails to manage local affairs or treat diversity as a source of strength. True fragmentation happens when the center becomes a burden, not a support.
But there’s still a chance to move in a different direction. If these agreements are brought into a larger national political vision, supported by clear constitutional commitments, they could become the foundation for a more just and inclusive Syria.
Suwayda has already shown its readiness to try a local governance model that isn’t hostile to the center. The coast is ripe for demands of broader representation. And the Kurdish administration in the northeast has built institutions over the past decade that are too established to ignore.
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Still, success won’t come from form alone. These understandings need to be part of a new social contract, one that rethinks sovereignty, security, and belonging. Civil society must have a seat at the table. Without that, we risk creating new intermediaries, military or security elites, who speak for communities rather than with them.
Institutionally, Syria needs more than a patched-up bureaucracy. It needs a modernized system that reflects the realities of its regions. Multilevel governance, similar to models adopted in post-conflict Europe, can help balance local autonomy with national unity, if designed carefully.
Economics is also key. No agreement will last without a fair system for sharing resources and including local voices in development planning. Indonesia’s experience after 1998 shows how decentralization without financial reform can deepen regional inequality instead of healing it.
Without addressing centralized financial control and freeing up local decision-making, these field agreements will remain fragile, mere “administrative truces” that crumble under pressure.
The experiences of South Africa, Bosnia, and Iraq offer different paths. South Africa managed a deep, negotiated transition that produced a fragile but functioning democracy. Bosnia’s uncoordinated federalism froze its conflict without resolving it. Iraq’s chaotic decentralization worsened sectarian divisions. The lesson is clear: field understandings need political and constitutional support to succeed. Decentralization means little without a unifying national vision.
Syria’s transitional leadership now faces a defining choice: Will these local agreements be treated as stepping stones to new legitimacy, or as short-term tactical manoeuvres? Either way, Syrian society is already forging its own tools to redefine the state. And it will not return quietly to suffocating centralism or accept a quiet slide into fragmentation.
Field understanding isn’t a guaranteed solution. But they may be the last real opportunity to build a state based on collective responsibility, not coercion. A state created with its citizens, even through partial, local arrangements, is more likely to endure than one imposed from above, only to collapse under its own weight.
What Syria needs now isn’t a one-size-fits-all answer. It needs political courage. The courage to rebuild the state, not from palaces or conference rooms,
but from among the people. With them. For them.
