The recent military developments in the city of Aleppo, particularly in the neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh, have brought the March 10 agreement back to the forefront of the political scene. This came after clashes ended with the withdrawal of the last fighters of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from Sheikh Maqsoud and the interim government forces extending their control over both neighborhoods, amid widespread civilian displacement and reports of a deteriorating humanitarian situation.
These developments followed the failure to implement the April 1 agreement, which stipulated the withdrawal of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from the two neighborhoods, the unification of administration, and the opening of crossings. This raised questions about the seriousness of the signed agreements and their ability to withstand the logic of military resolution.
In this context, political researcher Iyas Farhan al-Khatib said in statements to +963 that the problem does not lie in a specific agreement, but rather in the nature of the signing party. He argued that any agreement concluded with the interim authority in Damascus is doomed to be ineffective, because real decision making does not emanate from this authority, but is instead subject to direct influence from Turkey, which he described as the primary pressure actor and the real decision maker, practicing evasion and procrastination in implementing agreements. He added that the passage of more than ten months since the signing of the March 10 agreement, as well as the April 1 agreement, without the implementation of any of their provisions on the ground, confirms this reality.
April 1 agreement: an incomplete implementation
The April 1 agreement was viewed as an executive step toward activating the understandings of March 10, but its course stalled before the recent escalation erupted. The Syrian interim government placed responsibility for non-compliance on the Syrian Democratic Forces, while the latter insist that the agreement was violated by Damascus.
In this regard, Maryam Ibrahim, spokesperson for the delegation representing North and East Syria, told +963 that the delegation had hoped the March 10 agreement would serve as an entry point for peaceful solutions and a comprehensive process of integrating military, political, and civilian institutions. However, the breach of the April 1 agreement sent a clear message that the fate of the March 10 agreement remains ambiguous and confused due to the government in Damascus.
She explained that the negotiation track had been nearing its conclusion, noting that the last meeting between the military delegation of the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian government had reached its final stages in preparation for signing. Yet the government withdrew at the last moment, followed by an attack on the neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh, which they consider a violation of previous understandings.
On the ground, the escalation led to the effective exit of the Syrian Democratic Forces from the city of Aleppo, a development that observers considered a decisive turning point in the course of the agreements.
Iyas al-Khatib believes that what occurred represents a direct undermining of the essence of any political understanding, saying that the core of political agreements lies in neutralizing military action and protecting civilians. What happened instead was the use of military force, artillery shelling, and the occurrence of displacement and demographic change, which undermines the March 10 agreement at its foundation and ends what remains of any hope for its implementation.
In the same context, Ibrahim affirmed that resorting to the military option constituted a shock to the delegation. She explained that the delegation of North and East Syria harbors no intentions toward a military solution, and that the meeting held on January 4 included the submission of full data and military equipment. The military delegation headed to Damascus in good faith and with complete confidence that the agreement would be signed on the same day. She considered what happened afterward to be a failure in responsibility toward the local community that has suffered for fifteen years.
Read also: The March 10 Agreement: Integration Is a Partnership Not Domination
Integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces: a fundamental dispute without common ground
One of the most prominent axes of the March 10 agreement was discussion of integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces into Syrian state institutions, yet this file has remained a subject of sharp disagreement.
While the Syrian Democratic Forces see their demands as falling within a general national framework, al-Khatib considers the problem to lie in the absence of political commitment. He explained that talk of integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces into the Syrian army in its current form is impossible and resembles an attempt to mix oil with water. He argued that what the Syrian Democratic Forces demand includes building a genuine national army, ending the Turkish presence, and removing jihadist factions and foreign elements. He added that these demands were met with intransigence from the interim authority with direct support from Ankara, without any political or military commitment to implement them.
In contrast, Dr Ihsan al-Khatib offers a different reading, considering that the root of the dispute goes back to the ceiling of demands. He said that the core problem in the Syrian file relates to Kurdish political ambitions that exceed their realistic capabilities. He added that the proposals of the Syrian Democratic Forces lack realism in terms of demographic and geographic balance, and that attempting to replicate the Kurdish model in Iraq inside Syria is impossible and will not gain internal acceptance.
The American role: temporary de-escalation without resolution
The developments in Aleppo sparked international concern, as the US envoy Tom Barrack warned that what is happening could threaten the impact of the March 10 agreement and called for accelerating its implementation. American interventions also contributed to imposing a temporary ceasefire.
However, assessments of these moves differ. Iyas al-Khatib believes that these statements remained within the realm of media rhetoric without any practical effect on the ground. He argues that the need for guarantees and international pressure to implement an internal agreement confirms that the temporary authority is not fundamentally convinced of implementing any agreement.
Meanwhile, Ihsan al-Khatib considers that Washington is operating within a narrow margin. He said that the United States finds itself in a middle position between the transitional government in Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces, seeking to persuade the Kurdish side to adopt a more realistic approach. However, the presence of actors supportive of the Kurds within Washington pushes the administration toward a hesitant policy in exercising sufficient pressure.
The March 10 agreement: between declared commitment and an unknown fate
In light of these realities, the Syrian Democratic Forces affirm that they remain committed to the political path. Maryam Ibrahim said that they believe the solution can only be achieved through dialogue and integration between the two sides, given its role in protecting Syrians from sliding into civil war, and that they are keen on the unity of the Syrian people and the unity of the country. She warned that continued obstruction and government procrastination could push conditions toward further escalation.
While researchers believe that what happened in Aleppo weakened the chances of salvaging the March 10 agreement, the agreement remains, in practical terms, suspended between signed texts and a changing field reality, amid the absence of implementation mechanisms and guarantees capable of transforming political understandings into stable facts on the ground.
