Ali Larijani, representative of Iran’s Supreme Leader, is on a high-profile tour of Baghdad and Beirut at a time when the Middle East is undergoing major political and security shifts. For Tehran, the trip is part of a broader effort to manage negotiations with the United States and Israel, and to strengthen its regional footprint after the October 7 events and a series of targeted strikes on Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon, one of Iran’s key foreign policy arms.
This visit comes during a sensitive moment for the Iranian leadership, which is trying to navigate a complex set of talks with Washington.
Given Larijani’s reputation as a seasoned politician with close ties to Iran’s decision-making circles, many observers see this tour as an attempt to relieve pressure on Iran’s allies, especially Hezbollah. But the bigger question remains: how could any regional or international understandings be reached?
Filling the Gap
According to Iranian affairs expert Wijdan Abdul Rahman, Larijani’s trip comes amid growing U.S. and Israeli pressure on Tehran.
Speaking to +963, Abdul Rahman notes that the visit followed closely on the heels of another by Esmail Qaani’s deputy, Iraj Masjedi, to Baghdad, reportedly to support the position of Iran-aligned militias.
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Abdul Rahman explains that these moves also come against the backdrop of U.S.–UK discussions over Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Washington has made clear it opposes any measures that would grant the PMF powers rivalling the Iraqi army.
In his view, Larijani is working to fill the void left by Qassem Soleimani, especially after Lebanon’s recent political shifts; changes that occurred outside of Tehran’s influence. His mission includes recalibrating Iran’s regional network, easing the pressure on Hezbollah, and mending rifts among Iran’s Shiite allies, including with Amal Movement, which has aligned itself with the Lebanese government’s decisions in ways that have caused tension with Hezbollah.
Abdul Rahman adds that Iran also wants to make sure its allies in Iraq and Lebanon are ready to compensate for any setbacks in Syria, in case a confrontation with Israel erupts; one Tehran might prefer to manage through its proxies rather than direct involvement.
Larijani in Beirut
On Wednesday morning, Ali Larijani landed in Beirut for a series of meetings with top Lebanese officials. His visit coincides with a heated national debate over whether all weapons should be under state control, including Hezbollah’s; an issue where Beirut and Tehran have clearly divergent positions.
Upon arrival at Rafic Hariri Airport, Larijani told reporters he would meet with President Joseph Aoun, Speaker Nabih Berri, and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. He stressed that Iran “always seeks to serve Lebanon’s best interests” and “will stand by its dear people under all circumstances.”
Retired Brigadier General Khaled Hamadeh told +963 that Larijani’s trip follows comments from senior Iranian officials, among them the Supreme Leader’s advisor and Iran’s foreign minister, that, in his words, “crossed the lines of diplomatic courtesy” by openly rejecting the Lebanese government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah, questioning its feasibility, and even encouraging the group to resist.
Hamadeh argues that bypassing Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry and engaging directly with the country’s three presidencies through Iran’s embassy is a breach of diplomatic norms.
He says the prime minister backs the foreign minister’s rejection of the Iranian statements and is expected to deliver a clear message to Larijani warning against continued interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs. Hamadeh also suspects Larijani will try to revive discussion of Lebanon’s “defence strategy” as an alternative to disarmament; a proposal Beirut has already ruled out.
Read also: How Do US, Israeli, and Emirati Interests Intersect in Syria and Lebanon?
The Strategic Stakes
Lebanese academic Basel Saleh tells +963 that the timing of Larijani’s visit is no coincidence, coming as debate intensifies over Hezbollah’s weapons and Iran’s direct involvement in Lebanon.
Saleh believes the two issues are intertwined. He warns that if Hezbollah were to lose its arms, Iran’s regional leverage would shrink dramatically, explaining Tehran’s staunch defence of the group and its willingness to sidestep diplomatic protocol by ignoring Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry.
He points out that Lebanon’s leadership, through statements by the president, prime minister, and foreign ministry, has reaffirmed its stance that only the state should hold arms.
While the visit may appear, on paper, to be a round of political consultations, Saleh argues it is in practice about coordinating with Hezbollah and other Iranian allies in Lebanon. This, he says, risks raising tensions further, especially given Washington’s clear opposition to any significant Iranian role in Lebanon or the wider region; putting both sides on a potential collision course.
