The recent visit of the Syrian interim government’s Minister of Justice to Jordan, aimed at strengthening judicial and legal cooperation, confronts substantial challenges on the ground. Large stretches of the southern border remain beyond effective state control, while cross-border drug trafficking networks continue to operate with relative impunity, rendering border control partial at best. At the same time, the appointment of officials to judicial portfolios who have past associations with armed or “terrorist” activities raises fundamental questions about judicial legitimacy and the state’s capacity to manage sensitive legal files effectively.
More broadly, the complex political and security landscape in southern Syria reflects fragile internal authority. This fragility underscores the need to reorder internal governance and build genuine legitimacy among local communities and factions if any sustainable judicial or legal cooperation with Jordan and neighbouring states is to succeed.
Syrian Minister of Justice Mazhar Al-Wais arrived in the Jordanian capital, Amman, on Sunday morning, accompanied by an official delegation of judges and legal advisers, on a formal visit aimed at enhancing legal and judicial cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The visit includes joint legal workshops and coordination meetings with Jordanian Minister of Justice Dr Bassam Al-Talhouni, in cooperation with the Jordanian Judicial Council and the Judicial Institute. According to official statements, the objective is to exchange expertise and strengthen judicial institutions in both countries.
Al-Wais stated that Syria is proceeding with the rebuilding of its institutions on the basis of justice and the rule of law, expressing Damascus’s aspiration to elevate legal and judicial coordination with Jordan, particularly in combating drug trafficking, organised crime, and cross-border criminal activity. He noted that the visit aims to “reinforce Syria’s return to its Arab and regional environment” and to affirm that Syria has become a state that places the law at the centre of governance, praising Jordan’s willingness to support cooperation through judicial and legal capacity-building.
Efforts to enhance judicial cooperation between Damascus and Amman raise serious questions about the effectiveness of border control along the Syrian–Jordanian frontier, particularly in light of persistent insecurity and areas beyond state authority in southern Syria.
Akram Seryewi, an expert in military affairs and international law, explains that combating drug trafficking between Syria and Jordan constitutes a genuine dilemma given the Syrian government’s lack of control over the entirety of the approximately 370-kilometre shared border. Much of this frontier consists of rugged terrain and valleys that facilitate infiltration and smuggling.
Seryewi notes that trafficking groups have been entrenched in these areas for years, having previously benefited from protection by the army and security forces of the former regime. During the war years, their activities expanded and evolved into armed groups that controlled wide border areas inside Syrian territory and cooperated with smuggling networks within Jordan.
He adds that security forces affiliated with the Syrian interim government are currently present in southern Syria, albeit in insufficient numbers. These forces control the main official crossings, particularly Nassib and Ramtha, and approximately 65 per cent of the total shared border. Areas beyond state control are concentrated along the Suwayda–Jordan border and the Al-Tanf region, which remain active smuggling corridors. In response, the Jordanian army has intensified its activities, pursuing smugglers inside Syrian territory and conducting multiple airstrikes.
Seryewi emphasises that strengthening cooperation between Jordan and the Syrian government remains both important and potentially effective in restricting smugglers’ movements, stressing that intelligence-led security work is the most effective means of dismantling trafficking networks. He warns of multiple security risks in southern Syria arising from weak state control, the presence of areas beyond legitimate authority, widespread arms proliferation, ongoing instability, and vast ungoverned spaces that provide safe havens for smugglers.
He further notes that Israel’s imposition of restrictions on Syrian force deployment in the south – including bans on aircraft, helicopters, and heavy weaponry – significantly limits the Syrian army’s ability to pursue smugglers and conduct effective patrols along the border.
According to Seryewi, judicial coordination alone is insufficient unless accompanied by the practical capacity to pursue, arrest, and prosecute offenders. He calls on the Syrian government to address the Suwayda file, extend state authority there, and reassure local populations in order to secure the southern and south-eastern borders. He concludes that fully controlling the Syrian–Jordanian border would remain extremely difficult even with full Syrian army deployment, given its length and the requirement for three to five military divisions to secure it comprehensively.
He adds that states facing similar challenges typically rely on enhanced border coordination alongside strengthened domestic measures to combat drug cultivation, production, and distribution, recognising that smuggling represents only one link in a chain that begins at the source and ends with dealers inside affected states. Seryewi advocates a comprehensive approach incorporating public awareness campaigns, enhanced intelligence work, stricter penalties, expanded security cooperation, and the use of modern border surveillance tools, particularly drones, in mountainous and rugged areas.
The Political and Security Context of Southern Syria
As-Suwayda Governorate and the border regions with Jordan constitute a complex political and security environment, raising questions about the underlying objectives of judicial cooperation and anti-smuggling efforts.
Political researcher Fayez Qantar argues that cooperation or coordination with Jordan – or with any Arab state, particularly neighbouring ones – is welcome in principle. However, he contends that the timing and surrounding political context raise serious concerns. He notes that recent weeks have witnessed an unprecedented campaign by authorities in Damascus accusing Suwayda of involvement in drug trafficking, a discourse that carries clear political messages, especially given the intense media focus on the governorate.
Qantar observes that a recent Jordanian operation revealed that those involved in smuggling belonged to Bedouin tribes allied with the authorities, a fact he says Syrian officials did not acknowledge, while responsibility was instead attributed to other actors. He further states that Jordanian airstrikes targeted warehouses and sites in the town of Al-Kaf, which he insists has no connection whatsoever to drug or arms trafficking. He cites documentation indicating that the targeted locations were civilian in nature and calls on Jordanian authorities to verify this on the ground.
He argues that the targeting of this town, located near Suwayda, raises questions about the motivations behind the strikes, particularly when other Jordanian targets were located in Bedouin villages historically associated with drug trafficking towards Jordan.
Qantar stresses that the complex security conditions in southern Syria and the difficulty of enforcing control render border security an exceptionally challenging task. He argues that this reality necessitates broader coordination that extends beyond Damascus to include Suwayda-based factions with tangible influence on the ground and a direct interest in securing the border and enhancing stability.
He criticises what he describes as the transitional government’s attempt to “court external actors at the expense of internal legitimacy”, arguing that genuine power derives from domestic legitimacy. Its absence, he maintains, limits the government’s capacity to build effective and sustainable cooperation with neighbouring states over the medium and long term.
According to Qantar, the Syrian government should prioritise internal reorganisation through dialogue and the construction of a new social contract among Syrians. He warns that reliance on force amid a multiplicity of armed factions will not yield real solutions but will instead further complicate the situation. He also points to the absence of participatory governance and the monopolisation of power, and the resulting negative repercussions for security, social cohesion, and religious dynamics in the south, as well as for relations with Jordan and Gulf states.
He concludes by stressing that judicial coordination loses its credibility in a context where individuals lacking legal and judicial qualifications control the Ministry of Justice, asserting that the issue is far more complex than suggested by official discourse.
