The profound political transformations witnessed in Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the rise of interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa to power have reopened a wide debate about the position of certain regions and components within the regional conflict equation. In this context, a central question has emerged. Can southern Syria and the coast be viewed as two similar external pressure cards, employed by regional and international powers through the gateway of minorities?
In the south, particularly in Druze areas, Israel has returned to the forefront as an external factor invoked whenever security and existential concerns intensify. Historically, the Druze have maintained a cautious distance from major conflicts. However, the collapse of central authority and the subsequent arrival of a new leadership with a former jihadist background have revived fears related to security, representation, and political future. Here, the Israeli factor is not presented as an explicit political alliance, but rather as an indirect deterrent umbrella or a temporary pressure card, drawing on social and religious ties with the Druze of Palestine and on Israel’s perception of its interest in stabilizing its northern borders.
By contrast, the Syrian coast appears to occupy a very different position. The Alawites were not a group seeking external protection, but rather formed for decades part of the core of the authority that has now collapsed. With the fall of the regime, they found themselves facing a political and security vacuum, opening the door to speculation about Russia’s role and the possibility of using the Alawites as a pressure card. This proposition, however, faces broad objections among a number of researchers and diplomats.
Southern Syria. A potential pressure card or temporary deterrence?
In the south, particularly in Druze areas, the Israeli factor has re entered public debate amid rising security concerns following the collapse of central authority. Historically, the Druze preferred to manage their affairs through delicate local balances, but recent transformations have once again raised Israel as an indirect deterrent option.
Dr Ihsan al-Khatib, professor of political science at Murray State University in Kentucky, told +963 that Israel “wants the destruction of Syria and the ignition of a civil war, and seeks to use the Druze as it used the South Lebanon Army to pressure the Syrian state within the framework of any potential peace agreement.”
At the same time, he notes that this path does not enjoy consensus within the Druze community, explaining that “divisions among the Druze limit the effectiveness of the Israeli pressure card,” and that Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies are “unpragmatic and cause them political headaches.”
This description aligns with the approach of Bashar al-Haj Ali, a former diplomat, who warned in statements to +963 against reducing the south to a mere negotiating tool. He stressed that portraying any component as an external “security guarantee” remains “problematic by nature,” because “true security is neither imported nor dependent on external understandings.”
The Syrian coast. Loss of power rather than a search for protection
By contrast, the Syrian coast lies outside this direct analogy. The Alawites were not a marginal group seeking an external umbrella, but were part of the power structure that collapsed. With the fall of the regime, questions emerged about Russia’s role and the limits of its relationship with the Alawite community.
Al-Khatib affirms that Russia “lost with the fall of the former regime but remains pragmatic in its approach to the Syrian situation, and saw that the new system can be dealt with through rational understandings.” He points out that the Alawite community is experiencing “a state of internal division between those who see the solution in federalism and consider it a form of division, and those who are moving toward armed resistance with external Russian support.”
However, he emphasizes that Russia “does not need this option because it is focused on preserving its interests and its relations with the new government.”
This assessment is consistent with the position of Dr Khaled Hammadeh, director of the Regional Forum for Consultations and Studies in Beirut, who rejects in principle linking the Russian presence to minorities. He explained to +963 that Russia “does not embark on the adventure of supporting minorities politically associated with the former regime in order to threaten Syria’s stability,” because it realizes that “this path does not protect its interests.”
Israel and Russia. A difference in nature, not merely in presence
When comparing the Israeli and Russian roles, the assumption of similarity recedes further. Al-Khatib explains that there is “a major difference between Russia and Tel Aviv.” Russia is “a major power with broad international relations and friends in the developing world, in addition to a historical relationship with Syria in the military and economic fields,” whereas Israel “seeks to divide Syria in a manner that serves its interests and ambitions to retain occupied territories.”
Hammadeh goes further, considering that the Russian presence on the coast resulted from a convergence of clear interests related to positioning on the Mediterranean coast, while the Israeli presence in southern Syria “aligns with Israel’s ambitions across all countries of the region,” and manifests through “the creation of camps and militias and the manipulation of the Syrian reality in an aggressive manner.”
As for al-Haj Ali, he points out that the ability of any external party to use the Syrian interior as a negotiating card “remains limited,” because the international community “cannot bypass the principle of Syria’s unity and the rejection of any solutions based on division or on protecting one group at the expense of another.”
The limits of betting on the external factor
The positions of the three commentators converge on a central point. Betting on the external factor, whether in the south or on the coast, remains “a fragile bet.” Al-Khatib notes that internal divisions weaken any potential pressure card, while al-Haj Ali argues that “stability is not built through geographic or societal bargaining,” but through a comprehensive political process. Hammadeh, meanwhile, emphasizes that “comprehensive national reconciliation” is the true entry point to closing the door on any external investment in the minorities file.
Between the south and the coast, a superficial similarity emerges in the presence of an external factor, but it does not withstand closer examination. In the south, the Israeli factor is invoked as a temporary deterrent option in moments of existential anxiety, while on the coast, the Russian role remains governed by strategic rather than sectarian interests.
Accordingly, the assumption of dealing with the two regions as equivalent pressure cards oversimplifies a far more complex reality, and overlooks the fact that Syria’s future will not be shaped through external bets, but through an internal settlement that rebuilds the relationship between the state and its society on inclusive foundations.
