The U.S. announcement of President Donald Trump’s plan to end the war in Gaza was not merely an attempt to resolve a transient conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. From the very first moment, it appeared to be a comprehensive strategic move; one that extends beyond Gaza’s borders and redefines Israel’s regional priorities. Once Hamas is fully detached from Gaza, Tel Aviv will find itself facing the opportunity to restructure the Syrian front; a country that for decades remained a constant source of threat and a theatre of uncalculated tensions between the old Syrian regime and Israeli interests.
What makes this new landscape even more delicate is that the new regime led by Ahmad al-Sharaa operates with a strict pragmatic mindset. Staying in power is the ultimate goal; everything else is measured by the standard of total control over the state’s institutions. In his recent positions, al-Sharaa has shown unprecedented flexibility toward Israeli proposals, expressing readiness to negotiate a security agreement that would guarantee border security with Israel, withdraw all heavy weapons from southern Syria, and leave the management of local affairs in Suwayda and nearby areas to the Druze community; free from interference by Damascus.
In Gaza, according to the American initiative, the first military phase concludes: a halt to bombardment, the release of hostages, the entry of aid, and the disarmament of Hamas. Yet this temporary arrangement represents far more than a ceasefire. It grants Israel strategic breathing space to reorder its regional cards. Once relieved from the burden of Gaza, Tel Aviv will be able to redirect its full attention to Syria, where political vacuum and military weakness present a unique opening to recalibrate relations and secure its northern border in a more structured and transparent fashion.
The likely scenario carries multiple dimensions. Israel may push for a direct security accord with Damascus, encompassing intelligence sharing, border surveillance, and the disarmament of armed groups near the frontier, with guarantees that Damascus will not interfere in Suwayda’s internal affairs. Such an arrangement would not be merely technical; it would mark a redrawing of diplomatic and political influence. Israel would gain stability and security in southern Syria, while al-Sharaa would consolidate his grip on power, insulated from both internal and external threats to his central authority.
The regional context adds another layer of complexity. Any agreement with Damascus cannot unfold in isolation from the major capitals shaping Syria’s political environment, such as Turkey, Qatar, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, and, of course, the United States, through direct guarantees and monitoring mechanisms. Here, post-Hamas Syria becomes a laboratory for new power balances: a weak central authority, a flexible leadership seeking survival, and an Israel imposing its own security parameters, while regional powers add their weight to ensure no agreement collapses.
Within this framework, southern Syria could emerge as a miniature model of the new game: Druze areas managed with semi-autonomy, unmonitored Israeli movement corridors, removal or restriction of heavy weaponry, while Damascus remains responsible for infrastructure and public services; yet stripped of real political or military influence. What may appear at first glance as a tactical scenario is, in essence, a redefinition of the Syrian state’s role from a posture of confrontation and resistance to that of a tactical security partner seeking stability in exchange for survival.
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The very power that once posed a threat to Israel through support for resistance movements and armed factions now turns into a tactical partner, devoid of anti-Israeli ideology, responsible for maintaining border control, securing lines of communication with regional capitals, and ensuring that any redeployment of resistance or militant forces remains under control. Thus, Syria’s long-standing hostility toward Israel is transformed into a managed tactical cooperation, and what was once an entrenched conflict becomes a jointly calculated crisis management framework, shaped by mutual strategic awareness rather than national or popular ideals.
The flexibility displayed by the new Syrian leadership makes this transformation possible. Ahmad al-Sharaa is not seeking popular legitimacy or a regional political role, but rather the guarantee of continued power. Any agreement with Israel, including the gradual integration of Syria into the Abraham Accords network, would serve merely as an instrument to lift the burden of military and security threats, creating a stable domestic environment that ensures the regime’s endurance.
At the same time, a larger question looms over the price Syria will pay. To what extent can the new leadership concede to direct Israeli conditions? Will the tolerance toward the Druze in the south remain confined within precise geographic and political limits, or will the opening of security channels later be used to restructure Syria’s state institutions on a broader scale? These are questions without clear answers, yet one certainty remains: both the new Syrian leadership and Israel understand that the highest priority today is not values or vision, but survival, and the strategic investment in the vacuum left by Hamas after the end of the Gaza conflict.
In this light, the post-Hamas phase is not merely about calming Gaza; it is the beginning of a new chapter in regional relations; one in which Israel starts to perceive Syria as a potential strategic partner, and Damascus realises that survival in power may pass through the Tel Aviv gateway before its own people’s.
And in this chapter lies the central paradox: a state once seen as a core threat becomes a security bridge, and a government concerned only with retaining power turns into a nominal stabilising actor, while the region searches for a new map of influence, balancing local interests, regional ambitions, and far-reaching strategic goals.
