In post-2024 Syria, the struggle for influence is no longer defined by the question of who wins, but rather by who decides. High commissioners of a new kind crowd into Damascus, negotiating security, airspace, territory, sanctions, and borders. The result is a set of top-down arrangements that hollow out national sovereignty, reached without any meaningful Syrian mandate. What is taking shape is not a formal trusteeship, but something more corrosive – guardianship without rights, accountability, or reference.
envoy Thomas Barrack has made little effort to conceal his “modest” ambition of reshaping a new Sykes–Picot. In doing so, he echoes the logic once employed by Paul Bremer in Iraq – managing a condition of fragile stability to secure Western security interests, in exchange for the promise of future economic relief. Russia, meanwhile, seeks to reclaim its role as a power broker, not as a sponsor of reconstruction, but as a necessary security guarantor positioned between Israel and Turkey. Moscow’s renewed engagement comes at a sensitive moment, signalling its intent to reinsert itself militarily and politically into the Syrian arena.
A striking paradox has emerged. According to Reuters, Israel itself has urged Washington to allow Russian military bases to remain in Syria. At the same time, Moscow and Tel Aviv appear aligned around the concept of a weak Syria – a configuration that constrains Turkish influence. This places the United States in a strategic dilemma: its principal rival is being rehabilitated in Syria at the request of its closest ally, as “new Syria” under Turkish influence comes to be viewed in Israeli thinking as a greater threat than Russia and its bases.
Here, the model of the new high commissioner becomes clear – an external actor negotiating Syria’s future with other powers, while Syrians themselves remain devided and unable to impose a unified national position. Moscow does not require outright victory. It is sufficient to re-establish itself as the unavoidable node through which solutions intersect in southern Syria, presenting itself as a buffer between forces operating under Turkish patronage, in a game whose rules are ultimately set by Israel.
While Washington and Moscow compete over managing “stability”, Israel and Turkey contest the very shape of the Syrian state that may be permitted to emerge. Ankara has been explicit: it trains and supports Syrian forces, enhances their defensive capabilities, and has no intention of withdrawing in the near term. This signals a desire for a Syrian military partner aligned with Turkish strategic priorities.
Israel, by contrast, views this expansion as a dual strategic threat – the proximity of a major regional power to its borders, the reconstruction of a Syrian army under Turkish cover, and the potential shift in Syria’s aerial balance. Technical talks aimed at avoiding confrontation do little to change this reality. After Israeli strikes on Syrian bases that Turkey had reportedly surveyed for potential deployment, the contest over Syria’s future military infrastructure has extended decisively into the airspace.
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More recently, Israel has sought to position itself as a principal power broker among Syrians, including the Syrian government itself. While Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan accuses the Syrian Democratic Forces of coordinating with Israel and threatens measures against them, he raises no objection to peace talks with Tel Aviv. On the Israeli side, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not appointed a successor to Ron Dermer following his resignation from the Syria file. This vacuum is not bureaucratic oversight, but a clear indication that Netanyahu’s inner security circle is now directly managing what Israel sees as promising negotiations.
In this environment, the danger to Syria’s unity is no longer rhetorical. It intensifies by the day as functional borders harden under the rivalries of competing high commissioners. Past experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya suggests a familiar pattern. Signs of fatigue are already visible in Washington. As in those cases, the United States is likely to secure its trusted positions, leave behind unresolved debris, and depart – leaving regional high commissioners to settle their scores within Syria’s fragile body.
How these risks might be mitigated, and how Syrians might reclaim sovereignty over their future, is no mystery. The formula is widely understood, except by those blinded by power or vengeance: a decentralised, democratic civil state capable of national recovery, and of restoring Syrian ownership over the Syrian cause.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of +963.
