As US rhetoric around the possibility of renewed security understandings between Damascus and Tel Aviv intensifies, serious questions are emerging about the nature of Washington’s role and the limits of its willingness – or ability – to exert real pressure on Israel. Leaks suggesting the resumption of talks at the direct request of the White House, alongside cautiously optimistic public statements, stand in contrast to a political and military reality in which any prospective negotiating track appears tightly bound by high Israeli thresholds and carefully calibrated American pressure. This gap has fuelled scepticism over whether Washington is genuinely seeking a substantive agreement between Syria and Israel.
The US outlet Axios reported last Tuesday that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had agreed to resume talks with Syria aimed at a potential security agreement, following a direct request from US President Donald Trump. According to American officials cited by the outlet, Trump personally urged Netanyahu to relaunch negotiations, a move to which the Israeli leader signalled his approval. Axios added that Trump and senior advisers had also pressed Netanyahu, during a meeting on Monday, to reconsider aspects of Israeli policy in the West Bank.
Core parameters
Brigadier General Fayez al-Asmar, a military analyst, told +963 that any security agreement between Syria and Israel remains conditional on three core parameters repeatedly affirmed by Syrian political and military officials, including President Ahmad Al-Sharaa. These include Israel’s withdrawal from the four positions on Mount Hermon and from all territory seized following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on 8 December; a return to the disengagement lines and the implementation of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement; and full respect for Syrian sovereignty, including an end to Israeli ground, air and naval strikes on Syrian territory.
Al-Asmar noted that the role of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), established in May 1974, has been limited to monitoring the ceasefire, reporting violations by both sides, and overseeing compliance with the disengagement agreement reached after the October War. He added that Israel, according to repeated statements by Netanyahu, is not seeking a temporary security arrangement with Syria but rather a comprehensive peace deal or full normalisation – an outcome that, under the “land for peace” formula, would require the return of the occupied Golan Heights to Syrian sovereignty. Israeli positions, however, indicate that such a formula is not currently on the table.
In this context, al-Asmar considers the most likely scenario to be a modified security arrangement building on the 1974 agreement, should the United States decide to exert sustained pressure on both sides.
Strategic calculations
During a meeting with Netanyahu in Florida on Monday, President Trump said he hoped Syria and Israel would reach a security agreement soon, describing the Syrian president as “strong” and “hard-working”. He expressed optimism that the coming phase could see some form of understanding between Damascus and Tel Aviv.
Alaa al-Rimawi, a specialist in Israeli and Palestinian affairs, told +963 that Israel views any security agreement with Syria as a means to achieve several strategic objectives. Chief among these are ensuring border stability, combating armed groups inside Syria, preventing weapons transfers to Hezbollah, stabilising relations with Syria’s new leadership, and securing guarantees that Syria will not revive future claims over the occupied Golan.
From Israel’s security and strategic perspective, al-Rimawi explained, Syria remains one of the most sensitive arenas of emerging risk – not least because of entrenched public hostility towards Israel, Syria’s geographic position on the northern frontier, and its role as a gateway to stability in Lebanon. Any shift in Syria, he warned, could reopen channels linking Hezbollah and Iran.
Israel, he added, is seeking a security framework that regulates multiple files: arms transfer to Hezbollah, the pursuit of armed groups within Syrian territory, responses to what Israel describes as attempted “liberation operations” towards its borders, and, most importantly, the establishment of lasting guarantees that permanently neutralise the Golan file.
Al-Rimawi argued that Netanyahu’s approach is rooted in a doctrine of “negotiation without withdrawal and negotiation without rights” – a posture long embraced by Israel’s right wing. This strategy, he said, reflects confidence that no meaningful US pressure will compel Israel to undertake serious territorial withdrawals, particularly in areas surrounding Quneitra and along the Syrian frontier.
Netanyahu, according to al-Rimawi, is pursuing two parallel tracks: prolonging negotiations while simultaneously working to cultivate local alliances inside Syria, particularly among segments of the Druze community. This mirrors an established model of cooperation between Druze communities inside Israel and the state – an approach reportedly overseen by Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate (Aman).
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UN forces and ground realities
Against this backdrop, the UN Security Council has renewed UNDOF’s mandate in the occupied Syrian Golan for an additional six months. Syrian interim government Defence Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra met UNDOF commander Patrick Gauchat in Damascus on Tuesday to discuss the mission’s tasks and coordination mechanisms, according to the state news agency SANA.
Political researcher Ali Thabet told +963 that UNDOF remains, at its core, a monitoring and reporting mission with no enforcement authority on the ground. He described the latest mandate renewal as routine, adding that while debates persist over the force’s future amid Syria’s evolving landscape, its practical impact remains limited.
At the same time, our correspondent reported that an Israeli military unit comprising dozens of soldiers, accompanied by armoured vehicles, advanced on Tuesday into Tal Ahmar al-Gharbi in the southern countryside of Quneitra. Observers view such movements as evidence of Israel’s continued reliance on military pressure alongside diplomatic manoeuvring – a dual-track approach unfolding under what al-Rimawi described as “capped” US pressure. This pressure, he argued, is aimed less at compelling Israeli concessions than at managing escalation within a broader regional framework encompassing Lebanon, Gaza, Syria and Iran.
Thabet pointed to significant stagnation in the file, citing Israeli reluctance to enter any security arrangement that does not clearly serve its interests, alongside Israel’s freedom of movement inside Syrian territory. On the Syrian side, he noted, the transitional government faces legal and political constraints linked to its interim status, concerns over the composition of the reconstituted Syrian army, and widespread public resistance to offering concessions to Israel without reciprocal gains.
Together, these factors continue to weigh heavily on any prospective security track – leaving negotiations, for now, suspended between political signalling and entrenched strategic realities.
