In Lebanon, no issue rises above the ongoing debate over the necessity of confining weapons to the hands of the state and empowering national institutions, foremost the Lebanese Army, to monopolize the use of force and control illegal arms through clear mechanisms. This has opened the door to wide-ranging discussions on how such measures should be implemented, and whether they will remain limited to the military dimension or extend further to address other sources of Hezbollah’s influence, such as banks, educational institutions, and beyond.
In recent years, Iran has succeeded in extending its influence over several countries in the Middle East, most notably Syria and Lebanon, making Hezbollah’s weapons a decisive factor in the regional security equation.
However, recent developments, particularly the fall of the Assad regime and the operations targeting Hezbollah leaders, have prompted a reassessment of local and regional balances of power.
It is in this context that the Lebanese state’s decision emerged: to formulate an executive mechanism aimed at curbing Hezbollah’s military and economic expansion at the expense of the state. This marks a highly significant step in redefining the political balance.
“State to State”
Lebanese politician Charbel Jabbour stresses that the issue of confining weapons to the state is quintessentially a Lebanese matter. On August 5, the Council of Ministers issued a resolution that clearly underscored the necessity of dismantling illegal arms, whether Lebanese or non-Lebanese, with Hezbollah’s arsenal at the forefront.
Jabbour explained in his remarks to +963 that the government will discuss, at its upcoming meeting on Friday, September 5, the plan prepared by the Lebanese Army to implement the latest Council decision, in line with earlier resolutions.
Regarding relations with Syria, Jabbour noted that they are managed through official Lebanese channels with their Syrian counterparts, with ongoing security and border coordination.
He added that Syria has practically emerged from Iranian control, while Lebanon remains captive to Hezbollah’s arms, an obstacle to establishing a peer-to-peer relationship between the two states on a “State to State” basis. Despite a shared willingness to move in that direction, Hezbollah’s dominance undermines this goal, to the detriment of both countries.
Jabbour reiterated that Hezbollah’s weapons are illegitimate, and while the party refuses to surrender them, the Lebanese state refuses to back down from the Constitution, the ministerial statement, or its past decisions.
He further argued that the project of illegal arms has proven a failure: first, through Hezbollah’s defeat in its war with Israel, and later through the agreement signed on November 27, which effectively allowed Israel to target Hezbollah militarily and security-wise across Lebanese territory.
These weapons, Jabbour stressed, should have been surrendered as early as 1991 in line with the Taif Accord. Instead, the Assad regime, along with Iran, overturned the agreement, leaving Lebanon hostage to Iranian arms.
He concluded that facts have shown the Lebanese state cannot rise while weapons exist outside its legitimacy. Such arms have turned the country into a stage for chaos, destruction, and death, reducing it to a bargaining chip in Tehran’s hands.
Jabbour ended by affirming: “The Lebanese state’s trajectory is clear: to restore its full sovereignty and assert authority over all its territory. No state can exist under the shadow of illegitimate arms, and Lebanon has no future except as one strong state monopolizing both weapons and decision-making.”
“An Integrated System”
For his part, Dr. Ali Khalifeh, professor of civic education at the Lebanese University, emphasized that Hezbollah did not stop at building a military structure but developed an integrated system alongside it. This includes schools, economic networks, and cultural institutions, all designed to impose a distinct model on the Shiite community, with the primary aim of feeding the armed faction with human resources trained to serve the party’s project.
Speaking to +963, Khalifeh explained that in the educational field, Hezbollah exploited the constitutional freedoms granted to religious sects to establish schools, creating the Mahdi and Moustafa networks.
These schools, he said, have deviated from Lebanese society’s values, culture, and diversity, as they apply educational directives imported from Iran, such as the “Document of Structural Transformation in Education,” which is full of terms such as “soft warfare” and “cultural warfare.”
The purpose, he continued, is to produce an ideologically driven curriculum that breeds loyalty to Hezbollah, replacing the state with religious authority, the homeland with the leader, and civic culture with Ashura and militant struggle.
Khalifeh argued that such orientations clash not only with Lebanon’s official educational policies but also with modern pedagogical philosophies and the psychological and social needs of learners. The ultimate goal remains: supplying the organization with fighters and indoctrinated cadres, at the expense of the state’s role, particularly in education.
He added that Hezbollah has built a parallel economic system that openly defies regulations and attracts sanctions, with the most prominent example being Al-Qard al-Hassan. This entity is not licensed by the Ministry of Interior, nor is it regulated as a bank or registered commercially. Yet, it operates as an alternative financial institution within “Hezbollah’s state.”
In the cultural domain, Hezbollah presents itself as the sole custodian of religious and historical symbols such as Husayn ibn Ali, Karbala, and Ashura, weaponizing them to bolster its influence, advance its political and military agenda, and even confront rivals within the Lebanese community itself.
The coordinator of the “Liberation for Lebanon” movement concluded that the Lebanese state must confine Hezbollah’s arsenal not only militarily, but also in its parallel systems of education, culture, economy, and finance. These, he stressed, are exclusive domains of the state and cannot be left to frameworks that contradict the Constitution or undermine the higher interests of Lebanese society.
Lebanese politician Choucri Moukarzel, meanwhile, told +963 that most of Hezbollah’s institutions lack any legal justification for their continued existence. For instance, its affiliated financial institutions are unlicensed, while the party itself, although registered as a political party in Lebanon, has no legal mandate to conduct economic activities.
He added that around 80% of Hezbollah’s domestic operations rely on smuggling, money laundering, and tax evasion, in addition to companies that are not legally registered.
