The issue of integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces SDF into the structure of the Syrian army is no longer a postponed or marginal item in the Syrian political debate. It has instead become one of the most complex and intertwined files of the transitional phase. The issue at hand is not limited to redistributing military power or reorganizing security structures. It touches the very core of how the Syrian state is defined in the post war period, the limits of sovereignty, the form of governance, and the nature of the relationship between the center and the regions where de facto authorities emerged during the years of conflict. Between the 10 March 2025 agreement signed by interim president Ahmad al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, and the deadline set for the end of the same year, both sides find themselves navigating a path filled with opportunities and risks, amid internal pressures, sensitive regional balances, and international intersections that render integration a complex political, military, and social process rather than a mere administrative procedure that can be imposed by a top down decision.
The general political framework of integration
The official discussion on integrating the SDF is based on a preliminary agreement stipulating the incorporation of its civil and military institutions into Syrian state institutions, including border crossings and oil fields, in exchange for political partnership and representation of the components of northern and eastern Syria within the structure of transitional governance. This general framework, however, quickly collides with deep disagreements related to the definition of decentralization and its political and administrative limits, the meaning of the concept of a single army, the fate of military leaderships, and the future of the self administration project compared to the concept of local governance within a centralized state.
In this context, Ezzat Baghdadi, an independent diplomat based in Vienna, tells +963 that the debate surrounding the integration of the SDF is being approached on flawed foundations, as it is treated as a technical issue related to mechanisms and timelines, while reality reflects the absence of a fully constituted state and the presence of de facto forces managing a temporary coexistence within a vacuum of sovereignty.
Baghdadi adds that the existing authority in Syria is a transitional authority by de facto status, exercising functions of governance without possessing full sovereignty or constitutional mandate. He notes that what are referred to today as military and defense institutions operate as operational descriptions rather than sovereign entities, relying for cohesion on personal and organizational loyalty networks rather than law or a national doctrine.
He continues that talking about integrating the SDF into such a structure remains problematic, because de facto systems do not accept multiple centers of loyalty within the same hierarchy. From this perspective, the only applicable scenario would be dismantling the SDF as an organization and transforming it into individuals without independent leadership, an option that the United States does not favor.
Potential opportunities of the integration process
Despite the structural complexities, several actors view the integration path as an opportunity to reassert official control over roughly one third of Syrian territory, strengthening the concept of unified sovereignty and reinforcing the position of the Syrian government in any future regional or international negotiations. It is also seen as a potential entry point to reduce military tensions in the northeast, limit the pretexts used to justify foreign interventions, and create a more stable environment for the return of displaced persons and the launch of development and reconstruction projects.
In this context, Alan Berry, a political writer and graduate of the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Vienna, tells +963 that the Kurdish current within the Syrian Democratic Forces views the ongoing transformations as an opportunity to protect political gains achieved during the years of war, rather than as a forced concession resulting from regional pressures. He emphasizes that the primary objective is to entrench these gains constitutionally within the framework of a unified, decentralized, democratic Syrian state.
Berry adds that the Kurdish presence in Syria is a historical reality that cannot be bypassed. He notes that Kurdish areas within the borders of the current Syrian Arab Republic are part of the historical geography of Kurdistan, and that during the Syrian war the Kurds, in cooperation with their Arab and Syriac partners, managed to build a stable alliance and a system of self administration they now seek to protect and develop through a constitutional path.
He continues that the demand for decentralization is not limited to the Kurds alone, but represents a general Syrian proposition aimed at transitioning from a centralized state model to a decentralized democratic state.
Structural challenges and obstacles
Opposite these opportunities stand deep challenges related to the nature of the SDF itself and the structure of the Syrian military institution, in addition to internal divisions within areas under its control and conflicting conditions between Damascus and the SDF.
In this context, Dr Mohammad Abbas, a Syrian researcher and military expert, tells +963 that integrating forces with a partisan ideological structure such as the SDF into a national army cannot be professionally achieved without first dismantling their organizational and ideological framework. He stresses that the issue is extremely complex in a Syrian environment that already suffers from multiple identities and affiliations within existing military formations.
Abbas adds that some factions of the Syrian army itself still retain ideological and religious identities formed since their inception, such as well known factions in northern Syria. This makes the gathering of different religious, secular, and regional identities within a single military institution without prior integration a recipe for confusion in military doctrine and the absence of a unifying national identity.
He continues that genuine integration is not limited to organizational or administrative measures, but requires the establishment of a shared national identity into which cultural and intellectual contradictions are dissolved.
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The external factor and regional and international pressures
The external factor constitutes one of the most influential elements in the integration trajectory, amid a clear divergence between the American and Turkish positions. While Washington views the SDF as a functional partner in counterterrorism.
In this context, Baghdadi says that Washington views the SDF as a functional tool within the framework of counterterrorism, not as a Syrian sovereign file, and that the concept of integration acceptable to the United States is limited to coordination arrangements that allow the continuation of the local coalition partners model, without implying the rebuilding of a national army or the dissolution of armed entities.
He adds that this approach, which is marketed internationally as a practical solution, is viewed regionally as a structural threat. Turkey sees the SDF as a dangerous strategic precedent, while countries such as Iraq and Lebanon fear the replication of models involving forces parallel to the state.
Scenarios under discussion for the integration path
The proposed scenarios range across four main paths: gradual integration in accordance with the 10 March agreement, symbolic integration with the effective structure of the SDF remaining intact, continued stalemate and management of the status quo, or moving toward partial or comprehensive military resolution.
In this context, journalist Abdul Halim Suleiman from Qamishli tells +963 that the existing Syrian agreement faces serious difficulties in implementation due to the complexity of the issues involved, external pressures, and the persistence of disagreements over the shape of the Syrian state and its political future.
Suleiman adds that disagreement still exists over how to integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces into a unified Syrian army. The SDF insists on a vision based on integration as an organized force within a restructured army, while the government insists on the handover of weapons and joining as individuals.
He continues that military confrontation would scramble the cards and derail the entire political process, with catastrophic consequences for Syria’s future.
Social dimensions and field implementation
The integration file is not confined to its political and military levels. It extends to complex social dimensions related to integrating tens of thousands of fighters, addressing issues of ranks and salaries, past violations, and building trust between Arab and Kurdish local communities.
In this context, Abbas says that the most important stage in the integration process is building trust and mutual belief in a unifying national project. He notes that reclassifying ranks and leadership is natural, and that officers from the SDF may assume senior positions in the ministries of defense or interior.
He adds that rebuilding the Syrian individual and restoring values and national belonging must precede the reconstruction of infrastructure, as it constitutes the foundation for any long term stability in Syria.
